Israel’s ‘Qatargate’: Did Netanyahu’s entourage aid a state supporter of Hamas?

On March 31, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told investigators that he accepted responsibility for a leak of information from a meeting of his military-political cabinet. His adviser and press secretary are suspected of working — allegedly for personal gain — on behalf of a country that is one of Hamas’s sponsors. Meanwhile, Netanyahu claims the investigation is “one big bluff” aimed at forcing him out of office. His defense argues that one of the suspects received money through American lobbyists only because he failed a Shin Bet security screening and was therefore ineligible to receive an official salary from the Prime Minister’s Office. Shortly after the investigation began, the government dismissed the head of Shin Bet — an action Netanyahu’s critics say was no coincidence.

• 1.Background
• 2.Qatari money and leaked classified information
• 3.Qatar — a non-hostile state?
• 4.What’s next?

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Background

The Qatar case is shaping up to be one of Israel’s most explosive political scandals to date, particularly given the country’s ongoing war with Hamas. It began with the arrest and questioning of two now-former officials from the Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Office: adviser Yonatan Urich and press secretary Eli Feldstein. According to Lahav 433, a special unit of the Israeli police — and corroborated by the Shin Bet security service — the two Israeli officials were paid by an American lobbying firm representing Qatar for public relations services they allegedly provided to the Qatari government.

Investigators believe the suspects may have leaked information to journalists in an effort to help improve Qatar’s image as a mediator in negotiations between Israel and Hamas. They are also suspected of passing classified information from cabinet meetings to Qatari officials. Feldstein and Urich are currently under house arrest.

The list of suspects in what is now being called “Qatargate” has continued to grow. It includes The Jerusalem Post’s editor-in-chief Zvika Klein, American lobbyist for Qatar Jay Footlik, Israeli businessman Gil Birger, and political strategist Israel Einhorn, a former Likud operative and close Netanyahu family associate who is now reportedly hiding in Serbia.

In addition to bribery, the suspects face allegations of tax offenses and breach of trust. Several prominent Israeli journalists have been questioned by police, though all were released without restrictions.

On March 31, Prime Minister Netanyahu himself was questioned in connection with the case — as a witness.

Qatari money and leaked classified information

Israel’s position on Qatar is ambivalent, much like the actions of the Qatari emirs themselves. In order to preserve its sovereignty and economic leverage, Qatar has developed a strategy that is, in many ways, unique for the Middle East: it does not join any particular bloc but instead maintains good relations with all sides, aiming to make itself indispensable to key players in the region. Qatar has a keen understanding of soft power and uses it skillfully, building ties with elites in a range of countries. Qatari foundations invest in American universities. In the early 2010s, Qatar purchased the football club Paris Saint-Germain. In 2022, the country hosted the FIFA World Cup.

Qatar’s strategy is to stay out of blocs while building good relations with everyone

At the same time, however, Qatar is an active player in the Muslim world. In Israel, it is openly referred to as a sponsor of terrorism in the Middle East. “There are three things you must understand and remember when it comes to ‘Qatargate’ — no matter how many PR tricks they try to feed you,” wrote former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. “First, Qatar is the driving force behind Hamas. Second, the prime minister’s advisers were working for Qatar, not for us. Third, all of this was happening during a war in which our children are fighting.”

In recent years, Qatar has financed the majority of Sunni terrorist organizations in the Middle East, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. The so-called political wing of Hamas is headquartered in Doha, Qatar’s capital. Qatar granted asylum and protection to Hamas leaders Ismail Haniyeh (killed by Israel in Tehran on July 31, 2024) and Khaled Mashal (still alive and residing in Qatar).

The main office of Hamas’s so-called political wing is located in Doha

Between 2012 and 2021, Qatar provided $1.3 billion in aid to the Gaza Strip. The funds were nominally intended for construction, healthcare, agriculture, support for families in need, and salaries for the Hamas-led government. In reality, the bulk of the money was spent on building Hamas’s military infrastructure and preparing for an attack on Israel. Funding for Hamas continued up until October 7, 2023. In effect, Qatar — alongside Iran — became one of the two main sponsors of Hamas’s war with Israel.

A key pillar of Qatar’s soft power is Al Jazeera, the largest media conglomerate in the Arab world. Al Jazeera, under the complete control of the Qatari authorities. takes an editorial stance that can be described as pan-Arabist and Islamist fundamentalist. In other words, Qatar is investing heavily in promoting the idea of uniting the Arab world around the values of traditional Islam.

The channel’s influence in the Middle East is enormous — it has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to bring tens and even hundreds of thousands of people onto the streets in various countries across the region. At the same time, it sharply criticizes the governments of nearly every Arab country — except, of course, that of Qatar. As a result, Al Jazeera has been officially banned in Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and even in the Palestinian Authority.

Al Jazeera harshly criticizes the governments of nearly all Arab countries — except Qatar

Al Jazeera operates especially actively in the Gaza Strip, where it distributes press credentials and flak jackets labeled “Press” to Hamas fighters and engages in de facto pro-Hamas propaganda. The network effectively acted as the producer of live broadcasts of hostage release ceremonies in January and February 2025, providing a major service to Hamas.

Passing details of the negotiations with Hamas to Qatar — which serves as a mediator in those talks — could have weakened Israel’s bargaining position. In theory, Qatar could even have passed intelligence from Israel’s security cabinet to Hamas. In other words, if the suspects’ alleged actions did in fact take place, they may have compromised Israel’s national security.

At the same time, Qatar seeks to remain a key U.S. partner in the Middle East. In order to achieve this goal, the government in Doha needs to dispel any suspicions that it is cooperating with Hamas.

Qatar — a non-hostile state?

Strangely enough, Netanyahu himself sees no problem with Qatar — he even approved of Qatar’s prewar aid to the Gaza Strip. “Qatar is a complex state, but not an enemy,” the prime minister said, even as the “Qatargate” scandal was in full swing. A week after Netanyahu’s questioning, it became known that the prime minister had fully backed his former staff members, taking responsibility for the leak of information from the meeting of the security cabinet himself. After that, some of the suspicion was lifted from Feldstein and Urich, and both were placed under house arrest.

Netanyahu calls “Qatargate” nothing more than “one big bluff,” aimed at preventing the dismissal of the Shin Bet chief and “bringing down a right-wing prime minister.”

The investigation coincided with the departure of Ronen Bar, head of Israel’s General Security Service. The government decided to remove him from office on March 21. Since Shin Bet is involved in the investigation of a case in which the prime minister is a witness, a conflict of interest has emerged, one that could at the very least complicate or delay Bar’s dismissal. According to Netanyahu, this was precisely why “Qatargate” was invented.

At this point, it is impossible to determine which came first — the prime minister’s decision to dismiss the Shin Bet chief, or the start of the investigation — and whether there is actually any causal link between the two events.

What’s next?

Despite Netanyahu’s support for the suspects, suspicion remains that Urich and Feldstein were working for Qatar. On March 19, the public broadcaster Kan released audio recordings of conversations involving Israeli businessman Gil Birger, in which he confirmed to reporters that he had transferred money to Feldstein at the request of his friend, American lobbyist Jay Footlik — a former Middle East adviser to Bill Clinton and John Kerry. Footlik, now working for the Qatari government, is known to have met with Israel’s chief rabbis and asked them for letters in support of Qatar, but was turned down.

Feldstein received 40,000 shekels (about $10,000) per month from Footlik via Birger for his work. Feldstein’s lawyers claimed that Birger and Footlik were helping the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office resolve the issue of paying Feldstein’s salary — purportedly because Feldstein had failed Shin Bet’s vetting process, did not have clearance to work in the Prime Minister’s Office, and therefore was not officially employed there.

Lawyers claim Feldstein was paid by Qatari lobbyists in lieu of receiving a salary because he had failed Shin Bet vetting

Police suspect that the payment arrangement for Feldstein was set up by Netanyahu adviser Yonatan Urich with the help of Israel Einhorn, the owner of a communications agency working for the Likud party and a friend of Netanyahu’s son, Yair. Yair is an influential figure both within Likud and in the Prime Minister’s Office. He is reportedly responsible for online propaganda efforts and, according to rumors, plays a major role in government staffing decisions. Yair Netanyahu lives permanently in Miami, while Israel Einhorn resides in Serbia.

Urich denies all accusations. However, according to Israeli media, during a face-to-face confrontation, Feldstein directly accused Urich of lying.

It remains unclear how someone who failed Shin Bet vetting was nevertheless allowed to work in the Prime Minister’s Office — and whether he actually had access to classified information. As explained to The Insider by Yakov Falkov — an intelligence and terrorism expert, Tel Aviv University lecturer, and former Israeli military intelligence (Aman) analyst — there is a security officer assigned to the Prime Minister’s Office who maintains regular contact with Shin Bet and is responsible for monitoring who is consistently present in the building.

A source in the Prime Minister’s Office told The Insider that anyone hired there is required to disclose all business ties — both their own and those of family members — to the security service. If there is even a hint of a conflict of interest or risk of a security breach, Shin Bet steps in, runs a background check, and can block the person from taking the job. That’s apparently what happened with Eli Feldstein.

Yakov Falkov adds that the Prime Minister’s Office has its own physical security system, and no one gets in without going through it. If someone fails the Shin Bet screening, that fact is supposed to be flagged in the system. So when that person starts showing up to the office regularly, security should notice and alert Shin Bet. Yet for some reason, that didn’t happen with Feldstein.

What does this mean for Netanyahu? If it turns out that people close to the Israeli prime minister were working for a country that supports Hamas, the fallout could be serious. At the very least, it would hurt Netanyahu’s public image and give his political rivals more ammunition. Still, for his supporters — especially his coalition partners — abandoning him would require the evidence to go beyond questionable payments. There would need to be clear proof that real damage was done to Israel.

Of course, the story could break the other way. If Netanyahu manages to convince the public that all of this was a setup — that he's being targeted by a smear campaign — then the whole affair might actually strengthen his position.