The Foundations are Crumbling: Polls show that the Russian authorities are suffering a fatal setback in their efforts to promote traditional values among Russians

Unlike the classic period of Putin’s authoritarianism, the current model of ‘military Putinism’ rests on a combination of repression and ideological propaganda. At the core of its narrative lies the image of the country as a ‘besieged fortress’, engaged in an existential conflict with the ‘West’ and serving as a bastion of ‘traditional values’, which global ‘liberalism’ is purportedly seeking to dismantle. The principal efforts of this propaganda are directed at younger generations, aiming at their indoctrination through the education system.

However, survey data indicates that the effectiveness of this indoctrination remains extremely limited, and may even be counterproductive. Its success varies across different thematic domains of the official ideological narrative. Whilst anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian sentiments have undoubtedly intensified, the opposite trend is observed in the sphere of ‘traditional values’. Despite sustained propaganda efforts, the preferences of the ‘Russian majority’ continue to reflect modernising tendencies characteristic of the previous decade.

For example, campaigns promoting early childbearing have not altered behavioural attitudes, despite rising demographic anxieties. Increasing numbers of Russians, and especially young people, consider having their first child later in life to be the norm. Support for a traditionalist family model is declining even among more conservative groups. Similarly, against the backdrop of active promotion of Orthodoxy, trust in the Russian Orthodox Church and positive assessments of its societal role are falling.

Finally, the image of the army as yet another pillar of society, promoted by propaganda, is also failing to gain traction. The proportion of those surveyed who wish to see their children pursue careers as professional soldiers or officers is steadily declining, while preferences for a contract-based, professional army are increasing.

It is possible that, over time, the propaganda push will lead to qualitative changes in preferences and a shift in favour of ‘traditional values’. However, the regime’s resources in the sphere of ideological indoctrination currently appear limited: the influence of television is waning, attempts to dominate the internet provoke irritation and rejection, and the Kremlin’s monopoly on ‘patriotism’ is being undermined, in part, by criticism from the ‘right’, notably from pro-war bloggers. As a result, top-down ideological pressure tends either to foster a neo-Soviet form of ‘doublethink’ or to provoke a counter-reaction of resistance, particularly among younger people, who remain the primary target of the Kremlin’s ideological drive.

Family and the Church

The late Putin-era dictatorship, or ‘military Putinism’, relies far more heavily on ideology and repression than the classical authoritarian model of the late 2000s and mid-2010s. The earlier model combined electoral manipulation, restrictions on political competition, and political control over the media, yet maintained a limited ideological repertoire and relied on selective repression. Political scientists highlight that the growing role of ideology and repression in autocratic evolution is closely intertwined. Ideology serves to justify both the sacrifices demanded of the population in the name of regime stability and the repression directed at those unwilling to accept such demands (→ Re:Russia: Between De- and Hyper-politicisation).

Accordingly, the role of propaganda at this stage of the regime’s evolution is growing. It is now expected not only to promote the regime’s effectiveness but also to impose a single permissible worldview. The current Putin system actively advances ideological narratives centred on the image of a 'besieged fortress' engaged in an existential conflict with the 'West' while upholding 'traditional values' allegedly threatened by global 'liberalism'. A particularly intensive effort is directed at younger generations through the education system and its coercive instruments. The key question, however, is how effective this effort at indoctrination has been and to what extent levels of ideological internalisation among the Russian population have increased over the four years of the 'special military operation'.

It would appear that the outcomes of indoctrination vary across different thematic domains of the official ideological narrative. Anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian sentiments are undoubtedly more deeply entrenched today than they were prior to the war. By contrast, with regard to ‘traditional values’, the effect of propaganda appears extremely limited, or rather, questionable. Despite the widespread accounts of a surge in demand in contemporary Russian fashion for kokoshniks and traditional ‘à la Russe’ styles, public opinion surveys indicate that the underlying attitudes of Russians have not only failed to undergo significant change but may in fact be shifting in the opposite, less ‘traditionalist’ direction.

Propaganda promoting earlier childbirth is framed as a cornerstone of the 'traditional family' ideology and of the patriotic consolidation of the 'besieged fortress', encapsulated in the formula ‘women give birth, men go to war’. The pressure of this campaign intensified markedly in 2023–2024 against the backdrop of the officially designated ‘Year of the Family’, when Russian regions en masse introduced payments for early births, defined as occurring before the age of 25, including in some cases for school-age mothers, as part of the government-approved demographic policy strategy. FOM surveys indicate a measurable effect of this information campaign in the form of a notable increase in demographic anxiety among Russians. By 2026, compared with 2023, the share of those surveyed who consider the birth rate in Russia to be low rose sharply from 37% to 51%, while the proportion believing it to be declining increased from 19% to 36%. At the same time, this heightened demographic anxiety, actively amplified by the authorities, does not lead to the conclusions that proponents of ‘traditional values’ seek to impose.

The long-term trend in attitudes towards the timing of a first birth has not only reversed direction but is also strengthening. In 2014, around 70% of those surveyed considered it optimal for women to have their first child before the age of 25, while fewer than 30% believed childbirth should occur later. By 2018, the former group had declined to 58%, and by 2023 to 54%, while the latter increased from 28% to 39%. Over the past three years, the rate of growth among those favouring later childbirth has accelerated, rising by 8 percentage points, from 39% to 47%, compared with an increase of 11 percentage points over the preceding nine years (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Before 25, or after: ‘What age is now considered optimal for a woman to have her first child?’, 2014–2026, % of those surveyed

​From a socio-demographic perspective, as shown in Table 1, the decline in support for early childbearing is most pronounced among younger people, that is, among precisely those whom the authorities are seeking to influence. While the overall share of those surveyed favouring early parenthood has fallen by 11 percentage points since 2018, the decline among young people amounts to 18 percentage points. Furthermore, over the past three years, diminishing adherence to this behavioural model has been observed even in groups that until recently constituted strongholds of traditionalist views, including older generations and residents of the North Caucasus. These findings suggest that, despite sustained efforts by the authorities, a modernised model of family attitudes continues to spread in Russia, both broadly and deeply, gradually eroding even established ‘islands’ of traditionalism. State-driven messaging that amplifies demographic anxiety appears to have little meaningful impact even within these segments.

Table 1. Supporters of early childbearing (the optimal age for having a first child is under 25), 2018–2026, % of those surveyed

Another trend that sits uneasily with the official propaganda line is the observed decline in trust in the Russian Orthodox Church. The legacy of official Soviet atheism continues to be reflected in a level of religiosity in post-Soviet Russia that remains low by international standards (→ Re: Russia: Declarative Orthodoxy). This, in itself, sits awkwardly with the image of the country as a bastion of traditionalism. At the same time, the early decades of the 21st century saw a rise in both declarative religiosity and trust in the Church. However, despite intensified state promotion of Orthodoxy and religiosity, the trend has reversed over the past decade.

According to surveys conducted by FOM, the share of those surveyed expressing trust in the Church declined from an average of 65% in 2014–2019 to 59% in 2026. While this shift is less pronounced than in the case of family attitudes, it is nonetheless clear and consistent, with the trend corroborated by responses to closely related questions. For instance, the proportion of those who believe that the Russian Orthodox Church has a positive influence on public life has also fallen: in 2014–2015, around 55% of those surveyed held this view, declining to 47% in subsequent years, where it remained relatively stable before dropping further to 40% in recent surveys (see Figure 2). It is notable that, excluding the outlier of 2020, when the survey coincided with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the most marked declines in both indicators are concentrated in the most recent, wartime period, when propaganda promoting traditionalism has intensified significantly. The share of respondents identifying as Orthodox Christians is also gradually decreasing (Table 2). Taken together, these patterns suggest that the long post-Soviet wave of compensatory Orthodox identity has already passed its peak and is now in decline, largely irrespective of state propaganda efforts.

Figure 2. Trust in the Russian Orthodox Church and assessments of its influence on public life, 2014–2026, % of those surveyed

Table 2. ‘Do you consider yourself a religious person? If so, to which religion (denomination) do you belong?', 2012–2026, % of those surveyed

Two views on the army

Finally, the situation is not particularly favourable regarding another pillar of ‘national cohesion’: attitudes towards the army and military service. On the one hand, according to FOM surveys, the proportion of those who believe that ‘enhancing the combat readiness of the Russian army is the most important task facing the state today’ rose in response to a direct question framed in these terms, from 43% in August 2021 to 66% in April 2026. However, this effect can be interpreted not as evidence of the success of militarist propaganda, the scale of which far exceeds that of campaigns promoting early motherhood, but rather as a reaction to the shock generated by the Russian army’s inability to achieve significant success in the course of the protracted war in Ukraine. Respondents appear to recognise that there are serious deficiencies within the military and to harbour doubts about its capacity to fulfil its core functions.

As for the prestige of military service and military affairs, the pattern largely mirrors the dynamics of public opinion in the post-Crimea period. The prestige of military service rose sharply in the second half of the 2010s, before declining from around 60% to 40 to 50% in the early 2020s. Following the outbreak of the war, it experienced a renewed surge, peaking in early 2024, but subsequently resumed its downward trajectory in 2025–2026 (Figure 3). During the initial phase of the war, in 2022–2023, a significant segment of society experienced a degree of military-patriotic mobilisation, shaped both by developments on the battlefield and by the mobilisation rhetoric of pro-war bloggers. However, from the second half of 2024 onwards, the army engaged in Ukraine has increasingly come to be perceived in more instrumental terms, while assessments of its moral standing have deteriorated (→ Re:Russia: Heroes, Mercenaries, Victims).

Figure 3. The prestige of military service in Russian society, 2010–2026, % of those surveyed

While responses to questions about the prestige of military service may largely reflect the prevailing social climate, the current information environment, and respondents’ perceptions of the ‘majority opinion’, which may lead them to choose a socially desirable answer, the question of whether they would like to see their children and grandchildren as career soldiers or officers provides a picture of more ‘deep-seated’, personalised preferences. Here there is no evidence of the mobilisation-related surge observed in responses to earlier questions. The share of those surveyed expressing a desire for their children to pursue a military career declined by 10 percentage points between 2018 and 2021, from 53% to 43%, and fell by a further 12 percentage points during the war, reaching 30% (Figure 4).

Figure 4. ‘Would you like or not like your children and grandchildren to be officers or professional military personnel?’, 2018–2026, % of those surveyed

A broadly similar pattern can be observed in another set of questions relating to the military. On the one hand, there remains a widely held view in society that conscription constitutes a ‘school of life’ that everyone should go through. This view is shared by between 55 and 75% (depending on the social and media context) of those surveyed (Figure 5). On the other hand, the share of those who believe that military development should prioritise a contract-based, professional army rather than conscription has increased markedly over the course of the war (Figure 6).

Figure 5. ‘Some describe compulsory military service as a 'school of life'; others believe it is ‘time wasted’. Which view do you agree with?', 2011–2026, % of those surveyed

Figure 6. ‘In your opinion, ideally, should the Russian army consist mainly of conscripts or contract soldiers?’, 2018–2026, % of those surveyed

It should also be noted that, according to data from Gallup International surveys conducted in 45 countries, the proportion of people in Russia willing to take up arms to defend their country is low (32%, 2023 survey).This figure is comparable to those observed in developed countries such as EU member states, the United States, Canada and Japan, whereas in more traditional societies across Asia and the Global South it is, on average, two or more times higher. In other words, while acknowledging the importance of the military and even expressing concern about its current condition, the median Russian respondent does not appear ready to regard it as a ‘pillar’, that is an instrument of patriotic mobilisation, and instead there is a preference for delegating its functions to professional soldiers, although respondents are generally reluctant to see their own children among them.

Somewhere between ‘doublethink’ and protest

It should be emphasised that in certain thematic areas Russian public opinion is influenced by wartime and foreign policy mobilisation, as well as by the propaganda that sustains it. This is reflected in heightened hostility towards perceived geopolitical adversaries, particularly Europe and Ukraine, and in inflated assessments of Russia’s global influence and international standing (Figure 7). However, the conservative-militarist value system promoted by the Kremlin under the banner of ‘traditional values’ remains largely alien to the average Russian citizen, whose preferences continue to evolve gradually along a modernising trajectory broadly consistent with that observed over the previous decade.

Figure 7. Russia’s global influence and international standing, 2012–2016, % of those surveyed

The question of how long it will take for the quantitative pressure of the counter-modernising propaganda narrative might translate into qualitative shifts in public preferences remains open. It is worth noting, however, that the toolkit available for promoting the ‘traditional values’ ideology of Putin-era authoritarianism remains limited. Television no longer functions as an instrument capable of reaching the majority of the population with a unified, undifferentiated ideological message (→ Re: Russia: The War Has Killed Television). The Kremlin’s attempts to establish a monopoly on the internet have so far failed and are causing considerable irritation, particularly among younger audiences. Even the Kremlin’s claim to a monopoly on 'patriotism', which enables it to polarise society along the lines of 'us versus them', has been undermined by pro-war bloggers criticising the authorities from the right and accusing them of duplicity and hypocrisy. The model of 'commercialising' the war in Ukraine, which the Kremlin has adopted, also does little to enhance the credibility of its 'traditionalist' narrative (→ Inozemtsev: Deathonomics). As a result, it is likely that propaganda efforts, particularly the promotion of propaganda through the education system and its coercive mechanisms, are likely partly to instil a neo-Soviet form of 'doublethink' characterised by outward conformity, while at the same time provoking a counterproductive effect of rejection, particularly among younger people.