Zoomers and war: will the campaign to recruit students for war be successful enough?

A large-scale campaign of recruiting students and youth for the war with Ukraine has almost universally engulfed Russian universities. However, its success looks doubtful. In principle, each subsequent generation is less and less ready to defend their homeland with weapons in their hands, international polls show. In this regard, Russian youth demonstrate similarities with the profile of developed and rich countries - military service is unpopular here.

Russian youth also have privileged positions in the labor market and quite high requirements for what they are willing to do in the workplace. Young people are one of the main beneficiaries of the wage race in recent years.

Nevertheless, as data from a February survey by ExtremeScan show, young people in general and students in particular are the most skeptical and negative category of Russians about the war.

A set of direct and indirect questions asked of respondents shows that among students only about 20–25% are ready to express support for the war (even among those who agreed to participate in the survey). A negatively distant attitude towards it is typical for the majority of respondents in this socio-demographic group.

This is also facilitated by the fact that the costs associated with war are most acutely felt in this country: difficulties with traveling abroad, the departure of Western brands from the Russian market and, in particular, restrictions on access to the Internet.

There is no doubt that the recruitment campaign will attract a number of young people, especially into the drone force - in the context of gamers' perception of this type of service. However, this campaign, given the demographic narrowness of this group and its negative attitude towards the war, is unlikely to be able to solve the problems of the lack of manpower in the Russian army for a successful offensive.

The Zoomer Generation: Demographics and Expectations

Information that there is intensive recruitment among Russian students, especially IT majors, into “practically safe” unmanned troops comes from various cities and various universities (→ Novaya Gazeta: Fly out of the university ; T-invariant: Alternative service ; Important stories: We offer a change of scenery ; Idel.Realities: A trap for a student ). The idea of ​​recruiting contract soldiers from universities seems logical: they have always served as a source of replenishment of army personnel. In many, near the dean’s offices, the same demotivational sign with a military commissar has been hanging for a long time, who is “waiting” for those who did not pass the exam on time. However, if previously expelled students were the source of recruits, now those who do not have problems with their studies are also offered to sign a contract. They are attracted by salaries, benefits and the opportunity to easily obtain a diploma. The combined authorities (of the educational institution and the military registration and enlistment office) exploit the student’s dependence on the university management, interest in money and the willingness to take risks and unwillingness to think about unfavorable outcomes characteristic of this age.

This strategy is also facilitated by an important demographic feature of Russian youth - they start a family on average two to three years after graduating from university, and it has not yet been possible to reduce this period, despite the efforts of state demographic policy. At the same time, it is the family that most often turns out to be a deterrent for potential contract workers. According to data from the Chronicles project , more than half of the respondents who expressed their readiness to go to war, but did not put this intention into practice, refer to the objections of the family (most often the wife). In students, as a rule, this factor is significantly weakened.

At the same time, as not only Russian but also international surveys show, in each subsequent generation the proportion of young people ready to serve in the army decreases, as well as the proportion of those who are ready to defend their own country with arms in hand. This trend is typical for all relatively developed countries, where the value of human life and personal comfort has increased with increasing prosperity. According to polls by Gallup International , conducted in 45 countries at the end of 2014 and 2023, the share of those willing to defend their country with arms in hand over these almost ten years has decreased by almost 10 percentage points in the world - from 61 to 52%. Moreover, the world is quite clearly divided in this matter into the global South and East and the global North-West (EU, USA, Canada). In the latter region, only 30-40% are ready to defend their country with arms in hand, while in the East and South - 60-80%. In Russia in 2023, despite the protracted war in Ukraine, 32% responded positively to the question of readiness, that is, Russia here turned out to be closer to European countries, as well as Japan, Hong Kong and the United States, than to Asian countries - India, Iran, Indonesia and Pakistan.

An important feature of Russian demography, in addition, is the relatively low proportion of youth in the population (men between 18 and 30 years old make up only about 9% of the adult population of Russia). It is, in principle, much more difficult for countries with such a demographic structure to recruit recruits for wars, the researchers note . But besides this, the shortage of young people creates favorable conditions for them in the labor market. In Russia, due to an acute labor shortage, the demand for young people and, accordingly, the level of wages have increased. In technical universities, especially in the field of information technology (namely, such students are more interesting when recruiting for troops related to working with technical devices), students begin to work long before graduation, and often their poor academic performance is a consequence of self-confidence in the labor market. A recent survey conducted by ExtremeScan in February 2026 (CATI, representative sample of 1,600 people) demonstrates this privileged position of young people. Thus, in general, only 13% of adults in the country felt that their financial situation had improved over the past 12 months, and the share of those who experienced a worsening of it was 3.5 times higher - 41%. But among young people this balance is significantly different - 22 to 32%. That is, young people are the main beneficiary of the growth in wages and incomes in recent years.

At the same time, the small number and demand of the younger generation are combined with increased demands on the employer and the workplace: although young people value careers and earnings no less than older people, they are not ready to tolerate micromanagement and engage in activities whose meaning they do not understand or do not share, notes the HSE study “Zoomers on the Labor Market” . Therefore, a military service contract may not look very attractive to them, even despite the significant financial benefits.

Zoomers and war

To all these features are added problems of a political nature. Young people in general, and students in particular, according to all studies, are one of the most anti-war groups. For example, accordingto a February survey by the Levada Center , when asked whether it is now worth continuing military action or moving on to peace negotiations, in the overall sample, 67% chose the second option, and among the group aged 18–24 years - 79%. The results of the February ExtremeScan survey show that among all Russians, just over half (54%) support the “special operation”, and among young people - 36%, among students - only 25%.

Since the anti-war position in modern Russia is criminalized, it can be assumed that some survey participants shy away from expressing their opinions on this issue, but feel freer to characterize the opinions of others (→ Re: Russia: Between the spiral of silence and the band wagon ). In the country as a whole, in February 2026, 44% of Russians said that the majority of those around them supported military action in Ukraine, 15% said that the majority was against it, and 31% of respondents lived in a mixed environment. Among young people, the ratio of the first and last groups is already 30% versus 18%, and among students - 25% versus 18%. As we can see, both among students and among their environment the level of support for the intervention is lower. While the proportion of those in an "anti-war" environment increases slightly, the proportion of those surrounded by war supporters falls markedly, and among students only one in four are in such an environment, while 70% exist in an environment where opposing views about the war are expressed. Accordingly, proposals to risk their lives for a cause that is relatively unpopular among them, even for substantial money, are unlikely to be successful among students.

Schedule 1a. Share of those who support “SVO” among the population of the Russian Federation as a whole and youth groups, February 2026, % of the number of respondents

Schedule 1b. The share of those with a social environment with different attitudes towards “SVO” among the population of the Russian Federation as a whole and youth groups, February 2026, % of the number of respondents

To clarify citizens' attitudes toward "special military operations" in the ExtremeScan survey, another question was asked: "Which of the following statements about "special military operations" do you most agree with?", which was accompanied by three answer options: (1) ""SVO" is a common cause in which I feel involved", (2) ""SVO" is a matter of the state that should be handled by the military" and (3) ""SVO" “This is an event in which people were drawn into by a political decision.” In the sample as a whole, 37% chose the first, conformal answer option, among young people - only a quarter (26%), and among students - only every fifth. While 56% of students chose the third option, that is, the position of distancing: “SVO” for them is a matter of the state, which should be dealt with by professional military personnel and which has nothing to do with them. Based on three questions, we can conclude that among students, among those who agree to participate in surveys, 20–25% support the war to one degree or another.

Graph 2. Shares of various assessments of “SVO” among the population as a whole and youth groups, February 2026, % of the number of respondents

Affected and distrustful

It is also interesting that it is young people who feel the greatest discomfort with and express dissatisfaction with the costs of war and the restrictions it causes. Only 17% of young people aged 18 to 29 reported that they did not experience any inconvenience due to sanctions, the departure of Western companies from Russia, restrictions on access to online products and programs, and restrictions on traveling abroad, while on average 42% of Russians do not feel such inconvenience. Among students, the share of those who “didn’t feel anything” drops to 13%.

Graph 3. Shares of those who encountered various difficulties during the “SVO” among the population of the Russian Federation as a whole and youth groups, February 2026, % of the number of respondents

As we can see, sensitivity to difficulties with traveling abroad among young people is one and a half times higher than the average population, and sensitivity to the departure of Western brands is almost twice as high. Dissatisfaction with restrictions on access to the Internet in this environment is almost universal. Thus, young people, and especially student youth, see mainly tangible harm in the “SVO”, which determines the overall low sense of belonging and will clearly restrain their willingness to respond to the call of university bosses and military commissars to go to the front.

Amid expectations that the war would soon end, the influx of contract soldiers into the Russian army increased in the first half of 2025: people wanted to earn money in time, believing that due to the imminent end of hostilities, the risk of being killed was reduced. However, as surveys show, students assess the prospects for a ceasefire much more pessimistically than the sample average. While just over a quarter of Russians (27%) fear that the fighting will not end in a year, among young people and students 36–40% already think so.

Graph 4. Shares of various estimates of the completion date of “SVO” among the population as a whole and youth groups, February 2026, % of the number of respondents

Thus, young people, and especially students, despite the material gain from the increased demand in the labor market due to the war, are generally the most critical of the “SVO” group. They are less likely to feel involved in this confrontation, but to a much greater extent they feel its negative impact on their lives and are more critical in assessing the prospects for its end. As a result, young people, and especially students, are the least motivated to risk their lives for a cause that is relatively unpopular among them. And the ability of military commissars and heads of universities to change this situation is very limited. Their attempts to emphasize the special status of service in the troops of unmanned systems also do not have sufficient potential: students do not want to fight not only because they are afraid of ending up in an assault squad, but in general they strive to distance themselves from this “unpopular” and life-complicating phenomenon, to survive and wait it out, preserving their lives and health.

This does not exclude, of course, the possibility that a certain part of the youth, not even in pursuit of a long ruble, but at the call of their hearts, will respond to the calls of military commissars and sign a contract. There are always young people who are ready and want to go to the front, but, as a rule, their parents hold them back. Now the state will play against the parents and will probably succeed in doing so. However, given the small size of this age group, its optimism about its own future in peaceful life and, especially, its generally negative view of the war, it can be assumed that these efforts will not give the Russian army a significant increase in manpower.