At the overturned table: how the shaky agreement between Iran and the United States turned out to be bad news for Putin

The Iran-US agreement undoubtedly reflects Donald Trump's partial defeat in the latest war. Unblocking the Strait of Hormuz seems to be his main goal, while all other aspects of the agreements are postponed until the next stage and, quite possibly, will not be achieved. At the same time, US concessions do not seem very significant, and further steps - lifting sanctions and unfreezing Iranian assets - are conditioned by the progress of future negotiations.

In the meantime, the negotiation process provides an opportunity for a pause in the confrontation, in which both sides are interested. It gives Iran the opportunity to break the naval blockade and earn money from oil exports without making fundamental concessions yet. Donald Trump needs to bring down oil prices, and the United States and its allies in the region need to prepare for a possible new round of military confrontation.

Trump's Iran strategy over the past year and a half has been an alternation of periods of maximum economic and military pressure and coercion/invitation to negotiations. Therefore, a new stage of escalation in the future seems very likely. At the same time, Iran's position, despite the symbolic victory, is seriously weakened by sanctions pressure, two military campaigns and internal political instability in recent years, which may increase internal pressure in favor of serious negotiations and compromises.

So far, the main loser from the signing of the fragile agreement seems to be Vladimir Putin, who was previously called the main beneficiary of the Iranian war. The agreement brought down oil prices while the Russian government further increased its spending. Relations between Putin and Trump have clearly cooled, and the latter’s interest in rapprochement with European leaders, on the contrary, has grown. The return of Russian-American relations to the 2025 track seems almost impossible, although the Kremlin has expressed clear interest in this.

Finally, the joint statement of the G7 on Ukraine - for the first time since Trump returned to the White House - reflects not only a joint position, but also directly mentions the need to provide Ukraine with long-range weapons. And although the path from this declaration to reality may not be easy, it itself raises the barrier to the transition to Ukraine’s new status as a military power.

What is and what is not in the Iranian “memorandum”

The agreement with Iran signed yesterday by Donald Trump is without a doubt evidence of his partial defeat in the war. The main focus and main practical achievement of the agreement seems to be the temporary - for 60 days - opening of the Strait of Hormuz, while the parameters of the nuclear deal are present in it in an extremely vague form, and the issues of the missile program and Iranian proxies in the region are not mentioned at all. Although these three problems were named as the causes of the war. As payment for the temporary opening of the strait, the United States will lift its naval blockade of Iran and commit to “issue exceptions” (licenses) for Iranian oil exports while negotiations continue.

This, however, is what essentially limits the defeatist substratum of the document. Its earlier version, published by the Iranian Mehr agency on June 15, looked almost like a US surrender - and was perceived exactly as such in Iran, but differs significantly from the final version. While the content of the clauses in the two versions is basically the same, in the Iranian version the same measures are presented as unconditional obligations of the United States, which come immediately or shortly after the signing of the agreement. In the final version, they look like a process distributed over time, resulting in the mutual conditionality of its various components.

In general, a document called a “memorandum of understanding” is a set of conditions that create a framework for the negotiation process, which, within 60 days (or more), must culminate in the signing of a final agreement (transaction). This process has several time horizons: 1) what happens immediately after the memorandum is signed, 2) what happens within 30 days thereafter, 3) what happens after the final agreement is signed, and 4) what happens 30 days after it is signed. This complex timing is the source of the fundamental differences between the Mehr draft and the final version. For example, the first states that the United States begins withdrawing its military forces from the region 30 days after the signing of the memorandum, while the final version states that the withdrawal of troops occurs 30 days after the signing of the final agreement. This is a fundamental difference.

The memorandum describes the general outline of the 90-day process as follows. The parties cease all military operations, including in Lebanon (the feasibility of this point is highly questionable). The United States ends the naval blockade of Iran, and Iran ends the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, allowing duty-free passage of all ships through it for 60 days. After 60 days, Iran will hold consultations with Oman and decide on the procedure for operating the strait, that is, it does not promise a return to the previous status quo and insists on its sovereignty in its waters. The parties are discussing a mechanism for monitoring Iran's commitment to abandon its military nuclear program and jointly “dilute” already enriched uranium. In parallel, they are discussing mechanisms and guarantees for lifting all sanctions on Iran and unfreezing Iranian assets. In addition, the United States is developing some kind of plan for the restoration of Iran in the amount of at least $300 billion. This, however, does not mean that the United States will provide this money, so this item is rather similar to Trump’s plans to develop rare earth metals in Ukraine, create a Russian-American energy duumvirate, or turn Gaza into a garden city.

Significant pause

The result of a compromise not only between the United States and Iran, but also within the Iranian leadership itself, the signed agreement rather confusingly defines the interdependence of obligations at different stages of the negotiation process. In particular, the procedure for implementing the nuclear deal, lifting sanctions and unlocking Iranian assets. For this reason, it can be torn by both one and the other side at almost any stage. In this sense, what will happen and whether or not it will work out in the end depends not so much on what is written in the document, but rather on the dynamic balance of power, which will determine the parties’ interest in continuing the negotiation process and the ability to defend certain positions. This is an open book that can be closed at any time. But, of course, a departure from the language of the ultimatum with which Trump began the current phase of his Iraniad.

The bottom line is, like the negotiation process of the last month, the agreement creates the conditions for a pause, which, for various reasons, is needed by both sides. It gives Iran a respite from the naval blockade and the opportunity to make money from oil exports. For Trump, firstly, it is important because it effectively reduces oil prices. During the preparation of the memorandum, they went below $100 per barrel, and after its signing - below 80. Secondly, the United States and its allies in the region get time to correct the mistakes of the previous military campaign, when underestimating the potential of Iran's missile and drone capabilities led to the depletion of traditional and extremely expensive air defense systems. Third and finally, the pause creates space for dynamics within Iran itself, whose military, economic and political infrastructure, despite the fanfare of a symbolic victory, has been seriously undermined by two military campaigns and periods of political instability. In fact, both sides suffered an asymmetrical defeat in the last war.

In addition, if we look closely at the entire Iran track of Trump’s second term, we will see that it represents a change in phases of maximum pressure and military escalation (January-March 2025, June 2025, February-April 2026) and invitation/coercion to negotiations (April-May 2025, August-September 2025 and May-June 2026). At the same time, periods of pressure are aimed at the economic, political and military exhaustion of Iran, and periods of diplomatic flirting are aimed at strengthening the position of the moderate wing in the leadership of the republic. Speaking about the symbolic victory of Iran, which took the world into Hormuz pincers, we should not forget that Iran itself today, after two military campaigns and the destruction of most of the military-political elite, no longer looks like the same power that it was when Trump came to power.

Therefore, the signed document is not a capitulation, but rather a retreat, which can be interpreted as a forced abandonment of positions, but may ultimately turn out to be more of a maneuver than an escape. At the same time, the document is also an invitation. After all, of the 46 years of the Islamic Republic's existence under the leadership of its two diehard ayatollahs, Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei, exactly half were spent fighting over a military nuclear program and under foreign sanctions. The outcome of this struggle does not look impressive, and the legitimacy of the ayatollahs’ regime is quite credible, both outside and inside Iran.

Worse than under Biden

When it became clear by mid-March that the military campaign in Iran had reached a stalemate, it was popular to say that Vladimir Putin was the main beneficiary of Trump's failed war. In fairness, it should now be said that Vladimir Putin looks at this moment to be perhaps the main loser from the signing of the Iranian-American memorandum.

On the surface, of course, are oil prices. If the agreement holds (which is not a fact), oil will be under pressure from a downward trend throughout the entire negotiation period. And although prices will not rise to pre-war levels, taking into account the discount on Urals, they will not bring much money to Putin’s treasury. At the same time, during the short period of high oil prices, the Russian government managed to further increase budget expenditures, practically spending the military bonus. As a result, the situation with public finances in Russia remains extremely tense.

Secondly, during the Iran crisis, relations between Putin and Trump seem to have cooled noticeably. More precisely, Trump’s view of Putin has changed, who, on the one hand, certainly rejoiced at the failures of his friend Donald in Iran and, apparently, provided restrained support to Tehran, and on the other hand, as a result of his own military failures, today looks like a less powerful player than a year ago. It is characteristic that Trump now reacted rather restrainedly to Putin’s call on his birthday, while Putin’s adviser Yuri Ushakov spoke in detail about the warm conversation and deep relationship between the two leaders. Ushakov also mentioned that Witkoff and Kushner are expected in Moscow soon. Ushakov already mentioned their imminent arrival a month ago, but in both cases there was no clear response from Washington. Moscow would like to return to the track in 2025, but it seems to be no longer popular in Washington.

Finally, a powerful cold shower for Moscow (just before the hot day in Kapotnya) was the joint communique of the G7 countries on Ukraine. For the first time since Trump returned to the White House, it expresses a position of solidarity based on the European approach, and this appears to be a sharp turn in the dynamics of relations between the United States, its G7 partners and Russia. The point here is not only about Donald Trump’s changed view of Putin, but about a structural change in the balance of power. First, a much less confident Trump is now much more interested in supporting European leaders. He needs their support both in relation to the negotiation process and in a possible new conflict with Iran, and its price, undoubtedly, is his position on Ukraine. Secondly, the informal alliance between Trump and Putin - the two “big guys” who decided the affairs of Europe and Ukraine in the last cycle without regard to their opinions - turned out to be both very fragile and fruitless. At the same time, what looked a year ago as an “alliance of the weak,” the alliance between Europe and Ukraine, has turned out to be much more stable and effective in its efforts, as evidenced by the changing balance of power in the Russian-Ukrainian war. The question of who has and who doesn't have cards in their hands now looks at least debatable.

These changes had a direct political result. The point is not only in the appearance of a “joint statement” of the United States and partners on the Ukrainian issue, but no less in its content. The Seven expressed unity in supporting Ukraine, understanding the need to increase economic pressure on Russia, as well as providing urgent assistance to Ukraine in air defense systems and providing it with long-range weapons and licenses for their production. And this is an absolutely fundamental point. Never, even under old Biden, has a political decision on long-range weapons for Ukraine been made or declared. And although there may not be a very quick or easy path between declaration and implementation, such a declaration raises the barrier to the transition to Ukraine’s new status as a military power.

In a funny way, what happened at the G7 meeting looks like a return to the almost forgotten “Kellogg Doctrine” - Trump’s former adviser on the Russian-Ukrainian settlement. Formulated at the end of 2024, this doctrine was based on the fact that in order to achieve peace in Ukraine it was necessary to put pressure on both sides. At the same time, pressure on the Kremlin implies a complex of two sets of measures: increasing pressure on Russian oil exports and the threat of providing Ukraine with increasingly powerful weapons, which should convince Putin that victory by military means is unattainable. Although Kellogg, who had lost his influence, finally resigned in November 2025, it was precisely at this time that Donald Trump turned to the first package of measures from his doctrine. Now, seven months later, it has come to the second.

One way or another, a return to the track in 2025, which, judging by Ushakov’s remarks, is dreamed of in the Kremlin, looks extremely unlikely after this communiqué. And Vladimir Putin risks, having lost his “tough guy” image, moving somewhere into the category of imitators of Iranian ayatollahs.