An effective commercial “contract for war” remains the key factor allowing Vladimir Putin to carry out offensive campaigns in Ukraine for the second year in a row, despite extremely high casualties and little real effect in terms of the size of the territory captured. Replenishment of manpower became possible thanks to the rapid growth in the size of bonuses for concluding a contract. This growth was particularly rapid in the second half of last year.

An effective commercial 'contract for war' remains a key factor enabling Vladimir Putin to carry out offensive campaigns in Ukraine for a second consecutive year, despite extremely high losses and limited tangible gains in terms of captured territory. The replenishment of manpower has been made possible by the rapid increase in signing bonuses. This growth was especially sharp in the second half of last year.

In the second half of 2024 and the first half of 2025, the Kremlin turned to regional policy after a pause taken in 2022-2023. At the same time, the dynamics of personnel rotation indicate that new approaches to it may turn out to be even more stringent than before. This is evidenced by almost carpet sweeps of the administrative elite in a number of regions where governors were replaced.

In the second half of 2024 and the first half of 2025, the Kremlin turned its attention back to regional policy after a pause taken during 2022–2023. The pace and nature of personnel rotations suggest that new approaches may prove even harsher than before. This is evidenced by near blanket 'purges' of the administrative elite in several regions where governors were replaced.