A Quasi-existential Threat: Can European public opinion withstand the challenge of direct Russian aggression?

European perceptions of the war in Ukraine have changed significantly over the past eighteen months. As a result, the conflict is now widely viewed as a matter of European security and, to a considerable extent, as an existential challenge for Europe itself.

Paradoxically, this shift has been driven in part by the sharp deterioration in relations between Europe and the United States. The weakening of American security guarantees has created a heightened sense of vulnerability across Europe and has led Europeans to perceive the potential ‘Russian threat’ more acutely. Moscow's sabotage campaigns and hybrid attacks have further reinforced this perception. Survey data show that a majority of Europeans now regard Russia as a direct threat to their security and consider the strengthening of Europe's defence capabilities to be a top priority for the European community.

However, whilst there is consensus on the need to build up Europe’s defence capabilities, this gives way to a diversity of views when it comes to the practical questions of what the new European security architecture should look like. Europeans remain divided over the sources of funding for defence spending, the prospects for establishing European armed forces, and the role and architecture of European nuclear deterrence.

This, in turn, suggests that while the ‘Russian threat’ has already been framed in political narratives as an existential challenge, it has not yet acquired the same status at the level of public sentiment and mass perceptions, or has done so only partially.

In this situation, how would Europe and European public opinion respond in the event of a Russian hybrid attack against one of the Baltic states? Polling data indicate substantial differences among European countries regarding their willingness to confront Russia directly. In such a hypothetical scenario, Europe would likely find it difficult to reach a consensus on a military response.

At the same time, the unilateral determination of a Baltic coalition comprising Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Poland to enter the conflict and provide direct military support to an ally could prove decisive. Such a move might compel a number of hesitant states, most notably Germany, to join the coalition, thereby bringing the European pillar of NATO with them.

Perceptions of the conflict: a shift in perspective

Perceptions of the war in Ukraine across Europe have undergone a significant transformation over the past eighteen months. As recently as 2024, both public opinion and political elites in Europe oscillated between viewing the war as an existential challenge to European security and treating it as a regional conflict in the post-Soviet space with only limited relevance to Europe (→ Re: Russia: Putin’s Schrodinger’s Cat). This ambivalence was reflected in debates over the extent and duration of European support for Ukraine. Today, those discussions have largely receded to the margins of public debate.

Two developments contributed unexpectedly to this shift. The first was the sharp deterioration in relations with the United States following Donald Trump's return to the White House, which generated an acute sense of insecurity across Europe. The second was the growing hostility in relations with Russia and Moscow's expanding hybrid operations on European soil. These activities were presumably intended to intimidate European societies and deepen divisions between competing camps in the debate over the Russia-Ukraine war. In practice, however, they appear to have had the opposite effect. The sense of vulnerability created by perceived American disengagement increased Europe's sensitivity to the potential Russian threat.

Consequently, the idea that Europe, at least those states bordering Russia, could become the next target of Russian aggression either immediately after or even before the end of the war in Ukraine has become deeply embedded in European strategic thinking. Preparing for the possibility of Russian aggression has effectively become the central focus of European foreign, security, and defence policy.

European unity on these issues, namely the need to strengthen its own security and to support Ukraine as part of that effort, has clearly increased at the level of political declarations and rhetoric. However, the question of how European public opinion would respond to a challenge in the form of Russian hybrid aggression, designed to test Europe's commitment to collective defence and to provoke internal divisions (an overview of scenarios for such a conflict → Re Russia: A Fox in the Baltic), remains largely unresolved.

A vulnerable Europe between America and Russia

American disengagement and the perceived threat from Russia have profoundly altered the mood across Europe, which now finds itself in a state of heightened insecurity. According to polls from the latest spring wave of the Eurobarometer (a large-scale survey conducted twice a year in the EU’s 27 member states on behalf of the European Commission), 80% of Europeans express concern about Europe's security and defence over the coming years. Some 76% believe that Russia's invasion of Ukraine constitutes a direct threat to European security. This perception is strongest in Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and, somewhat unexpectedly, Portugal, and weakest in Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus and Hungary. When asked in which area the EU should take action over the next five years, ‘security and defence’ ranks first at 36%, comfortably ahead of the economy (29%), employment, climate policy and migration (all 22%). Meanwhile, 80% believe that European defence cooperation should be strengthened, while 64% support increased defence spending, compared with only 29% who oppose it. Support for additional defence expenditure is strongest in Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. Only in Greece and Slovakia does a narrow majority oppose higher defence spending.

At the same time, the sharp decline in trust in the US across Europe has continued over the past six months, as shown by the latest wave of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) survey, conducted in May across a number of European countries (Austria, Bulgaria, the UK, Hungary, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, France, Switzerland, Sweden and Estonia). On average, only 11% of those surveyed across these countries now regard the United States as an ally, compared with 16% in November 2025 and 22% in November 2024 (unless otherwise specified, figures cited here represent averages across country-level results rather than weighted averages for the survey sample as a whole). Even within the most pro-American group of European countries, namely the United Kingdom, Hungary and Poland, the share of those who view the United States as an ally has fallen by 6 to 8 percentage points and now stands at only around 20%.

If the defining trend of 2025 was the decline in perceptions of the United States as an ally, the most notable development in the latest survey is the growing share of respondents who now regard the United States as an adversary. Across the fifteen countries surveyed, this group already accounts for 13% of those surveyed. The sharpest increases have been recorded in Denmark, Spain and Switzerland, where between 20% and 25% now view the United States as an adversary. The deterioration in perceptions of Washington in these countries reflects specific bilateral disputes, including US claims regarding Greenland, President Trump's criticism of Madrid over its reluctance to participate in the war with Iran, and the White House's trade dispute with Bern, which culminated in the imposition of 39% import tariffs on Swiss goods in 2025.

At the same time, this new sense of vulnerability has not translated into confidence in Europe's own ability to defend itself. The ECFR survey indicates that Europeans remain deeply uncertain both about their countries' capacity to withstand military aggression and about the reliability of formal alliances such as the EU and NATO. What they do retain, however, is a belief in European solidarity. Only around one quarter of those surveyed across the surveyed countries believe that the United States would come to their aid in the event of an attack. By contrast, roughly two thirds are confident that ‘at least some European countries’ would provide assistance. Confidence in such support is strongest in the northern European and Baltic states, particularly Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, where it exceeds 80%. It is weakest in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. Notably, belief in European solidarity extends even to right-wing Eurosceptic constituencies. As ECFR experts Jana Kobzova and Pawel Zerka observe, supporters of France's National Rally (RN), Italy's Brothers of Italy, the Dutch Party for Freedom, and the Sweden Democrats also tend to expect assistance from other European countries in the event of a crisis. This is an important finding. It suggests that, in the event of Russian aggression against one of the Baltic states, neighbouring countries would likely become involved even if the EU or NATO failed to reach a unified position. In such circumstances, the logic of European solidarity could prove stronger than the political and cultural divisions that characterise peacetime Europe.

At the same time, Europeans' personal willingness to defend their countries by force remains relatively limited. Across all surveyed countries, an average of 43% of those surveyed believe that most of their fellow citizens would be prepared to defend the country in the event of an attack. Even fewer, 38%, express a personal willingness to do so themselves. Only in Denmark and Sweden did a majority of those surveyed indicate both a personal readiness to fight and confidence that most of their compatriots would make the same choice. Germans are the most sceptical, both regarding themselves and their fellow citizens: only 29% say they would be willing to fight, and an equally small share believe that most Germans would do so. However, relatively low willingness to fight even in defence of one's own country is a broader characteristic of post-industrial societies (→ Zvonovsky, Khodykin: Zoomers and The War). The widest gap between perceptions of fellow citizens' courage and respondents' own willingness to fight is found in Italy.

Figure 1. Personal willingness to defend one's country in the event of aggression and assessments of the willingness of the majority of fellow citizens to do the same, % of those surveyed

Disagreement within agreement: Europe at a crossroads

However, surveys show that European scepticism towards the United States and NATO does not translate directly into support for replacing the Alliance with an exclusively European defence union. According to the ECFR survey, only 29% of those across the countries surveyed support such an idea, while 28% oppose it and as many as 43% remain undecided. This distribution, however, is likely influenced by the wording of the question itself, which framed the issue in terms of ‘replacing NATO’. Most Europeans recognise that such a replacement is not feasible in the foreseeable future and tend to view the strengthening of European defence capabilities as a complement to, rather than an immediate substitute for, the alliance.

Furthermore, the prevailing view in Europe remains that transatlantic relations could return to their previous trajectory once Donald Trump leaves office, although this expectation is less firmly held than in the past. Across the countries surveyed, an average of 53% of those surveyed believe that US-European relations may eventually recover, while only 27%, roughly half as many, regard the deterioration as more fundamental and enduring. This expectation of a future return to normality also weakens the sense of urgency surrounding the creation of a fully autonomous European military infrastructure, leaving Europe in a state of strategic ambiguity.

Generally speaking, broad agreement on the need to strengthen Europe's defence capabilities and improve coordination in security and defence policy gives way to considerable divergence when practical questions arise concerning the shape of a future European security architecture. Thus, in eight of the 15 countries surveyed, there is stable support for the development of either a common European nuclear force or national nuclear capabilities as an alternative to reliance on the American nuclear umbrella. At the same time, public opinion remains divided not only in countries traditionally sceptical of deeper European defence integration, such as Bulgaria, Austria and Hungary, but also in Italy and, most importantly, Germany. In Germany, support for both European and national nuclear sovereignty stands at roughly 45%, while around 35% oppose such initiatives. In Britain, whilst there is strong support for the idea of pan-European nuclear forces, the prospect of building up the country’s own nuclear capabilities in the interests of collective security remains a matter of debate. Some 38% support such a step, while 40% oppose it.

Figure 2. Support for the development of nuclear forces, % of those surveyed

An even more pronounced divergence of opinion can be observed on the question of how increased defence spending should be financed. Over the past six months, support for higher defence expenditure has grown relative to opposition in almost every country covered by the survey. The most significant shift occurred in Portugal, where the net balance between supporters and opponents increased from 26 to 42 percentage points. Spain recorded a similarly notable change, with the gap widening from just 1 to 16 percentage points. While the idea of increasing spending is supported in eight out of 15 countries surveyed, it encounters strong resistance in Italy, remains unpopular in Estonia, Austria and Hungary, and only narrowly secures majority backing in Germany, Spain and Switzerland. Moreover, although some countries are prepared to increase spending if it is funded through increased joint European borrowing, the majority of others oppose this idea. This presents a significant challenge because the principal alternative, reducing other areas of public expenditure in order to fund defence, also faces strong public resistance (including in Germany, Spain, Austria, Italy and even Sweden). Thus, public opinion in a number of countries simultaneously endorses the objective of increasing defence spending while remaining divided over how such spending should be financed. In many cases, there is no clear majority behind any of the available options.

Figure 3. Support for increasing defence spending from various sources, % of those surveyed

On the one hand, the survey reveals a relative consensus across Europe that increased defence spending should be directed specifically towards the procurement of European-made weapons. On average, this view is shared by almost 60% of those surveyed across all countries. By contrast, only slightly more than 20% are willing to support the purchase of American weapons. In practice, however, this European preference often leads to lower efficiency in defence spending and higher prices for European armaments as a result of administrative restrictions on external competition. Ultimately, it risks becoming a source of weakness for advanced European economies and their defence strategies, while developing countries rapidly adopt cheaper alternatives to Europe's increasingly costly military systems.

In other words, despite a high degree of agreement on strategic objectives, namely the need for greater strategic autonomy and for strengthening Europe's defence capabilities through its own resources, the roadmap towards these goals remains unclear, including at the level of mass public opinion. This, in turn, demonstrates that although the ‘Russian threat’ is already understood in political narratives as, to a significant extent, an existential challenge for Europe, it has not yet acquired the same status at the level of emotions and popular perceptions, or has done so to a limited extent.

The crux of the matter: a coalition of the willing

Judging by the countries covered in the ECFR's May survey, Europeans' willingness to support the deployment of their national troops on military missions to conflict zones remains relatively low, though not overwhelmingly so. The survey tested two scenarios: the deployment of troops to Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping mission following the end of the active phase of the conflict, and the deployment of troops to the Baltic states in the event of a Russian attack. In most cases, across all countries, the levels of readiness for both challenges at national level correlate. On average, 39% of those surveyed expressed support for such deployments, while 45% opposed them. It is worth noting that this represents a considerably more balanced distribution of opinion than was the case in 2023 and 2024, when the prospect of sending a European peacekeeping mission to Ukraine met with much stronger public resistance.

Figure 4. Willingness to deploy troops on a peacekeeping mission to Ukraine and to defend the Baltic states in the event of Russian aggression, % of those surveyed

Overall, European public opinion appears more willing to support participation in a peacekeeping operation than involvement in a direct military conflict. Poland is the main exception. Owing to the complexities of Polish-Ukrainian relations, participation in a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine attracts relatively limited support there, whereas willingness to contribute to the defence of the Baltic states is comparatively high. Across the countries surveyed, the idea of deploying troops to the Baltic states in the event of Russian aggression is supported by an average of 39% of those surveyed, while 43% oppose it. Behind these aggregate figures, however, lies a pronounced degree of polarisation.

Public opinion is most supportive of such a response in Sweden and Denmark, where 60% to 62% favour sending troops. In the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Poland, around 50% of those surveyed express support, while roughly 30% oppose it. In Spain, Portugal and Germany, approximately 40% are prepared to support such a dramatic course of action. In Germany, however, opponents of direct involvement already constitute a majority, at 46%. In France, supporters of direct military assistance to the Baltic states are outnumbered by opponents by roughly one and a half to one, with 30% in favour and 45% against. In Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Hungary and Romania, the number of supporters is 3.5–4 times lower.

If one were to assess the likely course of events solely on the basis of public opinion data, several tentative conclusions emerge. In the event of a Russian hybrid or conventional incursion into one of the Baltic states, any attempt to forge a Europe-wide consensus on a military response would almost certainly fail, given the unwillingness of public opinion in a significant number of countries to support such a course of action. However, the unilateral determination of a Baltic coalition comprising Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Poland to enter the conflict and provide direct military support to an ally could prove decisive. Such a coalition could shift the balance of political calculations, drawing in a number of wavering states, most importantly Germany, and with them the broader European component of NATO.