Petrol Punch: The intensity of Ukrainian attacks doubled in September, causing up to a quarter of petrol production in Russia to be lost
The intensity of Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil infrastructure reached a new level in September. The number of strikes doubled compared with August, reaching 1.3 per day. Half of these targeted refineries, while the other half struck transportation and storage facilities. This dual strategy is aimed at triggering a systemic crisis across delivery, storage, and processing chains.
Calculations by Re:Russia, based on assessments of petrol shortages by market participants and the Ministry of Energy, indicate that production fell in September by 22–27% of normal levels, roughly a quarter. Given that all planned refinery maintenance had been postponed at the start of the month, minimising the impact of this factor, this can currently be considered the most reliable estimate of the effect of Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil infrastructure.
The visible impact of the strikes is evident in queues at petrol stations, closures of service stations, and the introduction of petrol rationing in some regions. An indirect indicator of public concern over the petrol issue is the trend in related online search queries. Across Russia, this indicator exceeds the level seen during the 2023 petrol mini-crisis by 1.7 times. While this is far from a critical level, in certain regions the engagement index (affinity index) exceeds the norm by 5–8 times, with the highest levels observed in Crimea.
The government has devised measures to tackle the petrol crisis, including importing petrol from China, South Korea, and Singapore to supply the eastern part of the country, as well as significant processing of Russian oil in Belarus under tolling arrangements. Some decisions suggest that the Ministry of Energy does not expect petrol production to stabilise for at least the next nine months. Government expenditures for this period are estimated at around 35 billion roubles, excluding logistics costs. However, the logistics of moving large volumes of oil and petroleum products from the Asian part of the country to the European part, and from the European part to Belarus and back, appears to be the most vulnerable aspect of the plan.
A fiery September
In September, Ukraine carried out 40 strikes on Russian oil and gas infrastructure. This is comparable with the total number of strikes in the first half of 2025 (36) and twice as many as in August, when 21 strikes were reported (→ Re:Russia: Summer Infrastructure Offensive). These figures are primarily based on Ukrainian sources and may be incomplete. The intensity of operations on the 'infrastructure front' is thus increasing, reaching a frequency of 1.3 strikes per day. During the first week of October, six more strikes were carried out, including against the sea oil terminal in Feodosiya and five refineries (for a full list of likely targets in September–early October, see Appendix).
The main development in Ukraine’s drone campaign in September was a sharp expansion of strikes on oil transportation infrastructure. In August, 14 strikes targeted refineries and seven targeted infrastructure; in September, this ratio was 20 to 20. Ukrainian drones hit 12 pumping stations as well as three maritime transhipment facilities – oil loading terminals in Novorossiysk and two tankers of Russia’s 'shadow fleet' in the port of Primorsk (Leningrad Region); in both cases, oil shipments were suspended. Ukrainian drones also struck the administrative building of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium in Novorossiysk. The dual strategy of the Ukrainian strikes is intended to provoke a systemic crisis in oil delivery, processing, and storage chains.
The geography of the strikes also expanded significantly, from 10 regions in August to 19 in September. The most frequently targeted locations were in Krasnodar Krai (7 times), Bashkortostan (4 times), and the Volgograd, Leningrad, and Luhansk regions (3 times each). Since the start of the year, Ukraine has struck facilities in Krasnodar Krai 18 times.
The most significant strikes in September hit Bashkortostan, over 1,500 km from Ukraine. The Bashneft-Novyil refinery (capacity 23.5 million tonnes per year, 9% of Russian refining) was affected, Gazprom Neftkhim Salavat twice (10 million tonnes, 3.8%), and the Ufa refinery (7.5 million tonnes, 2.9%). Three other major refineries hit were Yaroslavl (15 million tonnes, 5.7%), Ryazan (18 million tonnes, 6.9%), and Kirishi in Leningrad Region (17.5 million tonnes, 6.6%).
As before, the Ukrainian strategy involves repeated strikes on the same plants, preventing them from resuming full operations. The Ryazan refinery was targeted for the sixth time this year in September. The Saratov refinery was attacked twice in January–February, again in August, and twice in September. The Volgograd refinery has been hit five times this year, and the Afipsky refinery four times. In September, one of the largest gas processing complexes, the Astrakhan Gas Processing Plant (with a capacity of 12 billion cubic metres per year), was struck twice; it was first targeted on 3 February.
Thus, the scale of Ukraine’s drone campaign against Russian oil infrastructure is growing. It is becoming more systematic, and the promise by the US to provide Kyiv with its intelligence on Russian energy infrastructure may give it additional momentum.
Ukrainian strikes on oil refining and transportation facilities in Russia, 2025
Is there a petrol crisis in Russia?
There is no reliable information on the damage Ukrainian strikes have inflicted on Russian refineries and oil infrastructure. However, the visible effects of the petrol war are apparent. Various Russian media outlets report empty or closed petrol stations, queues, rationing measures, and other signs of the crisis in certain regions. Such reports are linked to Moscow, Leningrad, Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Rostov, Sverdlovsk, and Chelyabinsk regions, the Far East, Altai and Krasnodar Krais, and especially frequently to Crimea. In Crimea, at the beginning of the last ten days of September, according to OMT-Consult data cited by Kommersant, only half of the petrol stations were selling fuel. Following Crimea, some other regions also began to restrict petrol sales at filling stations due to physical shortages. For example, in Yekaterinburg, Chelyabinsk and Tyumen regions, some petrol station chains introduced a sales limit of 30 litres per person on 7 October (in Crimea, a limit of 20 litres is already in place).
To gauge the social significance of the problem, in the absence of broad public opinion surveys, search query data can serve as an indicator. Data from the Yandex Wordstat service shows that concern over petrol shortages has exceeded levels seen in early autumn 2023, when issues arose due to government plans to halve the fuel supply buffer for the domestic market. For instance, the search query ‘what's going on with petrol’ was entered into Yandex search 114,000 times in September. The previous peak in September 2023 was 79,000 searches. The expansion of the range of search queries shows that the attention index for this topic in September 2025 exceeds the figures for September 2022 and 2024 by 4–4.3 times, and the figure for September 2023 by 1.7 times.
Search queries on the topic of petrol shortages and scarcity, September 2022–2025
This spike indicates that the problem is emerging, but it does not appear to be extraordinary. However, it represents an average trend that masks significant regional variation. While the issue is entirely absent in most regions, in some areas the level of attention exceeds the norm by 5–8 times, according to the engagement index (affinity index) from the Yandex Wordstat service. The clear leader is Crimea, where the index exceeds the norm by eight times. Attention to the issue can vary markedly even within the same federal district. For example, in the Central Federal District, petrol availability is hardly a concern for residents of Moscow and the surrounding region, as well as Kostroma, Bryansk, and Yaroslavl regions. By contrast, in Kursk, Ryazan, Oryol, and Tambov regions, attention is roughly twice the average, in Tula region three times higher, and in Lipetsk nearly six times higher. In the Volga Federal District, petrol shortages are a concern for residents of Nizhny Novgorod and Penza regions.
Regions with a significant excess of the neutral affinity index level, September 2025, %
Based on this data, it can be said that the petrol crisis in Russia is not currently being felt on a national scale. At this stage, it is localised and regional in nature. Nevertheless, it can be argued that a crisis exists from an industry perspective. This is evidenced by the set of measures the government has developed to combat it. Moreover, these measures suggest that, in the government’s view, the problem is unlikely to resolve itself in the coming months and could even escalate.
How much refining has actually been knocked out by drone attacks?
Although the data we have gathered on the intensity of Ukrainian attacks appears to be fairly complete, it is impossible to accurately assess their effectiveness, the scale of the damage, or the time and resources required for recovery. As has been noted repeatedly, estimates based on the combined capacity of affected plants are entirely misleading. According to our statistics, the total capacity of plants struck in August accounted for 33% of all Russian refining capacity, and in September it reached 57%. However, this tells us very little about the actual damage.
A more reliable estimate would be based on petrol shipments to the domestic market. However, these figures were closed by the government back in May 2024. Nevertheless, the first unofficial and, in our opinion, plausible estimate of the deficit at the end of September was provided by market participants: 400,000 tonnes per month. Its relevance is supported by government documents. A letter from Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak to Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin at the end of September outlined measures to address the petrol shortfall and indicated that these measures would provide an additional 600,000 tonnes of petrol per month. The letter also noted that, despite protective measures for fuel and energy facilities, there are risks of further deterioration in domestic fuel supply. In our view, the projected figures in the letter may be conservative and do not contradict the previous estimate.
In the last pre-war year, 2021, Russia produced 40.8 million tonnes, or 3.4 million tonnes per month, while supplies to the domestic market averaged 3.3 million tonnes. The report on the activities of the Ministry of Energy for 2023 indicates that 42.1 million tonnes were produced, with 38 million tonnes shipped domestically (3.5 and 3.16 million per month, respectively); Novak's presentation, however, cited production at 43.9 million tonnes. This difference is not significant. Domestic shipments indicate petrol consumption in Russia, while the difference between production and domestic deliveries indicates exports. Market analysts estimate monthly domestic deliveries in the first half of 2025 at 3.2–3.3 million tonnes. Thus, a shortfall of 400,000 tonnes (according to market participants) represents a 15% deficit relative to normal consumption, while a shortfall of 600,000 tonnes (per Novak’s letter) indicates a 20% reduction.
However, the total reduction in petrol production is even greater. To address the shortfall, the government has introduced and extended a ban on petrol exports until the end of 2025. Therefore, the total reduction in production should be considered as the sum of the domestic shortfall and the volume of typical monthly exports. In 2021, monthly exports averaged 370,000 tonnes, and in the first half of 2023, prior to one of the government’s early export bans, about 515,000 tonnes, according to Kpler's estimates. Some estimates suggest that, in 2024, petrol exports fell sharply to 4.4 million tonnes, or 370,000 tonnes per month, the same as in 2021.
Based on these figures, normal monthly petrol production should be around 3.7 million tonnes, of which the domestic market consumes 3.3 million tonnes. Therefore, a 400,000-tonne shortfall indicates production fell to roughly 2.9 million tonnes, and a 600,000-tonne shortfall indicates a reduction to 2.7 million tonnes. It can thus be stated with relative confidence that petrol production fell by 22–27% in September, roughly a quarter. Notably, on 3 September, the government agreed with oil companies to postpone scheduled repairs planned for this month, meaning that the ‘repair’ factor has had a negligible impact on the decline.
There is no crisis, but there are measures to combat it, albeit insufficiently convincing ones
According to Novak’s plan, as outlined in the letter to Mishustin, the petrol shortfall will be addressed through imports from Belarus, China, South Korea, and Singapore, as well as by relaxing environmental fuel quality standards and using ethyl alcohol in production.
Belarus is expected to supply half of the required volume – 300,000 tonnes of petrol. In September, Belarusian refineries already supplied 45,000 tonnes to Russia, according to Novak’s letter (Reuters sources report about 49,000 tonnes). The capacity of the two operating Belarusian refineries, Naftan and Mozyr, is 12 million tonnes per year. However, they usually produce around 9 million tonnes, or 750,000 tonnes per month. Novak’s plan assumes full utilisation and an additional 50,000 tonnes beyond this. Notably, last week President Alexander Lukashenko held a working meeting at which discussions were held on 'improving efficiency and increasing oil processing volumes,' i.e. effectively implementing Novak’s plan.
To increase imports from Belarus, a so-called tolling scheme must be launched: Belarusian refineries will process Russian crude and return it as refined products. Oil will be delivered to Belarus via existing Transneft pipelines, the infrastructure of which remains within reach of Ukrainian drones. In September, Belarusian petrol was imported into Russia by rail, but this capacity may be insufficient for a 300,000-tonne volume. In principle, one of the existing Transneft pipeline lines could be used in reverse, analysts from BCS Investment Company told Re: Russia, though this is still theoretical. Processing in Belarus is relatively inexpensive, costing no more than 3,000 roubles per tonne, or 0.9 billion roubles per month for the entire volume, excluding logistics costs.
In order to ensure gasoline supplies from China, South Korea and Singapore to the Far East, which even before the Ukrainian attacks was considered a fuel-deficient region, Novak proposes eliminating the 5% import customs duties and introducing a mechanism for Russian petrol importers ('Rosneft', the Independent Oil and Gas Company owned by former Rosneft head Eduard Khudainatov, and another state-owned company, 'Promsyryeimport') similar to the domestic price buffer scheme. This would compensate importers from the budget for selling petrol below world market prices. Novak’s letter states that the plan would allow around 150,000 tonnes of petrol produced at Siberian refineries to be redirected each month to central regions of the country. It can be assumed that expected imports would be roughly the same volume.
Typically, the buffer scheme covers only two-thirds of the difference between domestic and world petrol prices. However, analysts at BCS suggest that compensation for Asian petrol importers will likely cover the full difference. The calculated buffer price for September 2025, according to Reuters, is expected to be 12,680 roubles per tonne. Based on this estimate, covering 100% of the price difference would cost 19,020 roubles per tonne, or 2.85 billion roubles for shipments of 150,000 tonnes of petrol per month. This represents about 7% of the government’s budgeted compensation for maintaining domestic petrol prices by September – about 39 billion roubles.
The letter does not specify a timeline for implementing these anti-crisis measures. However, on 30 September, the Eurasian Economic Commission Council decided to temporarily eliminate import duties on petroleum products until 30 June 2026. This indicates that authorities do not expect the Russian refining sector to stabilise over the next nine months. During this period, payments to Asian petrol importers could exceed 25.5 billion roubles. Thus, excluding logistics costs, Novak’s measures would cost roughly 34 billion roubles over nine months (including importer buffers and Belarusian processing). Logistics, however, appears to be the most vulnerable part of the plan in many respects. The tolling scheme requires supplying around 450,000 tonnes of crude to Belarus and transporting 300,000 tonnes of refined products back to Russia. The exchange with eastern regions involves moving petrol to the Far East and transporting fuel from Siberian refineries to central Russia. Logistics costs could make petrol transportation unprofitable even with the duty elimination, warn analysts at OMT-Consult. Meanwhile, the supply infrastructure to Belarus and back is vulnerable to attacks, and the logistics plan remains unclear.
For these reasons, the market has likely received Novak’s plan cautiously. Wholesale prices for AI-92 petrol continued to rise this week and, as of 8 October, reached another historic high of 74,200 roubles. This suggests that the market has little confidence in the plan or does not expect its rapid implementation.