War in The Air: Russia strikes back at Ukrainian infrastructure, with high costs for both Ukraine and Europe

Against the backdrop of a military stalemate on the Russian-Ukrainian front, the war in the air between Russia and Ukraine is becoming increasingly large-scale and dramatic. In the first half of October, Russia deliberately attacked Ukrainian gas infrastructure and power generation facilities, hitting more than half of the country's gas production capacity.

This has been made possible by the refinement of combined missile-drone attack techniques, which systematically exceed the limited capabilities of the air defence systems currently available to Ukraine. Such attacks represent a systemic challenge both for Ukraine today and for Europe in the future, in the event of a potential conflict with Russia.

In terms of the scale of damage, Russian strikes appear to have immediately surpassed the damage inflicted on Russian oil infrastructure by Ukrainian attacks over the past two months.

Ukraine will now be forced to import gas from Europe. Ukraine's economic costs will rise, as will the costs to Europe of supporting it. Kyiv needs to find an innovative response that both strengthens the protection of its own infrastructure and increases the impact of its air attacks on Russian targets. In this context, the question of domestic missile production and the supply of long-range Western missiles to Kyiv has become extremely urgent.

A new phase of the war in the air

While the 'on-the-ground' front in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict remains in a military stalemate (in the first two weeks of October, the pace of Russian advances increased only slightly compared with September, when it was at its lowest), the conflict in the air is accelerating and expanding. As noted previously, a key innovation on Russia’s part has been the use of combined missile-drone attacks (→ Re:Russia: Missile-Financial Balance), which overwhelm Ukrainian air defences and sharply reduce their effectiveness. This is now a systemic problem, which also determines the vulnerability of European infrastructure in the event of a potential conflict between Russia and NATO.

In response to the sharply increased intensity of attacks on Russian energy infrastructure (→ Re: Russia: Petrol Punch), Moscow launched a massive and highly destructive strike on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in October. The strike on 3 October against targets in the Kharkiv and Poltava regions (the exact locations remain classified) led to the loss of approximately 60% of Ukraine’s gas production, Bloomberg learned from its sources in the EU, who had been informed by Kyiv. This marks a new and dangerous turn in the ‘war of attrition’ for Ukraine, which has now taken on a new dimension.

As noted by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), throughout September Russian forces stockpiled ballistic and cruise missiles for mass attacks. The number of missile launches increased sharply in May this year, according to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and then fell to a minimum in August. According to data collected by the OSINT project Shahed Tracker, the number of ‘Shaheds’ used also declined (see graph). In the second half of September and early October, the intensity of combined attacks surged once again. Experts at ISW note that, for precision strikes on Ukrainian targets, the Russian military relies mainly on ballistic missiles, as the only air defence systems proven effective against them are Patriots, of which Ukraine has too few. As the data show, by unevenly distributing missile usage, Russia achieves a high level of effectiveness in mass attacks, consistently exceeding the capacity of Ukraine’s defence systems.

Russian missile and drone strikes on Ukraine, 2024–2025

The effectiveness of the Patriot system has also declined: while Ukrainian air defence systems intercepted 37% of ballistic missiles in August, in October they intercepted only 6%, writes The Financial Times. This is another key development in the war in the air: new modifications of Russian Iskander-M and Kinzhal missiles allow for unexpected evasive manoeuvres in the final stage of flight, significantly complicating interception, according to a report published in August by the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA).

However, missile technology expert Fabian Hoffmann notes on his blog that there is not yet conclusive evidence of a decline in the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defences. Kyiv publishes data on the number of missiles launched by Russia and those intercepted, but does not disclose the number of interception attempts. Hoffmann suggests that the lower number of interceptions may also be due to Russia increasingly targeting areas not covered by Patriot or SAMP/T systems. Victoria Voitsitskaya, an expert at the 'We Build Ukraine' analytical centre, told The Washington Post that whereas the Russian military previously targeted energy infrastructure within major cities, aiming to cut power to residents and businesses, it now more frequently strikes rural facilities, which are less well protected.

A shortage of interceptor missiles for the Patriot system likely forces Kyiv to allocate only one interceptor per ballistic missile, whereas the system achieves maximum effectiveness when two to three interceptors are launched per target, Hoffmann writes. According to estimates by the Kiel Institute, the Patriot system can intercept a Kinzhal missile with a probability of 25%, but this requires firing all interceptors in a Patriot battery.

Consequences and challenges

Details of the 3 October attack have not been disclosed by Kyiv, and a Bloomberg report remains the only direct source of information (Ukrainian authorities confirm the strike but do not provide estimates of damage to gas production). According to Gas Infrastructure Europe, cited by S&P Global, gas injection volumes in Ukraine fell sharply after two strikes – on 3 and 5 October – from approximately 383 GWh/day on 2 October to around 200 GWh/day on 6 October. However, this is not the first attack of this scale. A previous strike on 21 February similarly halved injection volumes, and full recovery took months, according to S&P Global experts.

In any case, the damage caused now appears to have immediately exceeded the losses Ukraine inflicted on Russian petrol refining infrastructure over the past two months (by our calculations, Ukrainian attacks in September may have reduced petrol production by up to 20% of normal levels → Re:Russia: Petrol Punch). Kyiv will need to import about 4.4 billion cubic metres of gas worth about €1.9 billion by the end of the heating season. Ukrainian Energy Minister Svitlana Hrynchuk has said she is negotiating with G7 countries to increase gas imports by about one-third (around 1.38 billion cubic metres) through loans and grants.

The analytical company ExPro estimated Ukraine’s gas storage levels at 12 billion cubic metres in mid-September, slightly above last year’s levels. However, Bloomberg notes that Russia could inflict even greater damage on gas production, which may not be remedied before the end of winter. Emergency repair work on Ukraine’s energy system is estimated to cost around €758 million, according to market sources cited by the agency. Meanwhile, Naftogaz received a €500 million loan from the EBRD in August to fund emergency purchases, and another €300 million from the European Investment Bank in early October.

Rising gas imports to Ukraine will also put pressure on the European market, writes Reuters columnist Ron Bousso. In the first nine months of 2025, LNG imports into Europe rose by more than a quarter compared with the previous year (to 108 billion cubic metres), with almost two-thirds supplied by the US. While Europe is not at risk of a gas shortage, Ukraine’s growing import needs will require additional LNG purchases, potentially driving up prices. A harsh winter, which would deplete storage levels and increase demand, could further destabilise the gas market, Busso adds. However, S&P Global analysts are more optimistic, expecting only a short-term speculative price increase and forecasting market oversupply by spring, which should restore 'bearish' conditions.

As a result of Russian strikes on Ukraine, more than half of the country's generating capacity has also been destroyed, former Ukrainian Energy Minister Olha Buslavets told The Wall Street Journal. According to the publication, several large battery parks designed in the US have been constructed in secret locations to provide electricity to residents. These 200 MW parks can supply around 600,000 homes for two hours. During Russian attacks, they give engineers a few hours to restore power and prevent outages. Currently, six such facilities operate in Kyiv and the Dnipropetrovsk region.

However, this is not a panacea. If Russian strikes on Ukraine’s gas infrastructure and power generation continue with the same effectiveness, the balance in the aerial war will once again tilt against Ukraine. An innovative response is urgently needed, and the question of domestic missile production (→ Re:Russia: From Stings to Deterrence) and the supply of long-range Western missiles to Kyiv has become critical.