Victory on Credit: What is true and what is false about the state of the Russian-Ukrainian front
The Russian army is in a phase of active and large-scale offensive operations, with a pace intended to convince the United States, the wider West and Ukraine itself that Moscow can quickly secure control of the Donbas by military means and thereby influence the course of negotiations on a peace agreement.
At the end of October, Moscow claimed to have encircled Pokrovsk and to have trapped a Ukrainian grouping there that was facing inevitable destruction. It appears that the Kremlin attempted to replicate the Debaltseve scenario of 2015, when the encirclement of Ukrainian forces opened the way to the signing of the second package of Minsk agreements.
However, an analysis of frontline reports indicates that Russian forces have not yet achieved encirclement or reliable blocking of Ukrainian groupings on any axis. Assertions made by Putin and senior Russian commanders are being actively contested not only by Ukrainian and independent OSINT analysts but also by Russian military correspondents.
Meanwhile, the situation for the Ukrainian armed forces on the front has indeed become significantly more difficult. This is due first to Ukraine’s loss of advantage in the drone war and second to the effective use by the Russian army of infiltration tactics that exploit gaps in the Ukrainian defensive line to push forward small assault groups.
At the same time, infiltration tactics do not allow for rapid tactical breakthroughs. Although infiltration into Pokrovsk began four months ago, Russian forces have so far brought only about half of the city under control.
Against this backdrop, the Russian leadership has resorted to practices of information and cognitive warfare, making false claims about its control of the entire grey zone whose size has expanded amid infiltration operations and the gradual erosion of the frontline.
For now, however, Russia’s advantage is not decisive. It is highly likely that the Russian offensive will become bogged down in urban fighting, and that Russia’s ultimate territorial gains in the 2025 campaign will exceed last year’s achievements only marginally.
Tiger in poor visibility
The situation on the Russian-Ukrainian front has changed considerably over the past few weeks. Russian forces are conducting active and large-scale offensive operations for which they had prepared over recent months and with which they intend to conclude the 2025 campaign. The offensive is designed to disprove the belief formed after two years of fighting in the northern Donbas that the Russian army is incapable of achieving significant victories despite its substantial superiority in manpower and economic resources. Vladimir Putin is seeking to restore the image of a real tiger rather than what Donald Trump described as a ‘paper’ one.
As anticipated, the offensive came in late autumn (→ Re:Russia: On The Eve of a ‘Decisive Breakthrough’). Fog and poor visibility that disrupt drone operations have proved more important than foliage that provides cover for infantry. According to the Ukrainian command, Russia has concentrated 100,000 to 150,000 troops in the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad area, a figure close to the force that launched the invasion in February 2022, notes the BBC. According to DeepStateUA estimates, the Russian army carried out a total of 5,990 assault actions in November, the highest number since January.
The events of recent weeks on the frontline are also seen as a key element in the political and propaganda struggle over possible terms of the peace agreement that the President of the United States is seeking to conclude. From the Kremlin’s perspective, the success of the Russian offensive should convince Donald Trump, Europe’s allies of Ukraine and Ukraine’s own population that the Ukrainian army is being defeated and that Kyiv must, for the sake of halting hostilities, agree to limits on its sovereignty and hand over territories that Russia has yet to capture. This political and propaganda struggle is one reason why the real situation on the ground has become enveloped in a thick fog of uncertainty and competing narratives.
What is actually happening? Do the events of recent weeks represent a strategic breakthrough for Moscow, a collapse of the Ukrainian front or an offensive operation with limited success that does not go beyond the modest gains made by Russian forces last year? There is not yet a definitive answer. However, any given interpretation may prove false or alternatively may become a self-fulfilling scenario if participants come to believe it. In this sense, interpretations of events have become part of the military campaign itself.
The Russian narrative: Debaltseve and Stalingrad
The Kremlin’s narrative about the Russian offensive was shaped in its key elements almost from the outset. On 26 October, the head of the Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, reported to Putin that Russian forces had completed the encirclement of Ukrainian units near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and blocked a large Ukrainian grouping of up to 5,500 troops. No credible confirmation of these claims has emerged even five weeks later. Nonetheless, on 29 October Putin himself proposed a brief ceasefire so that foreign correspondents could visit Pokrovsk and witness the hopeless position of the allegedly encircled Ukrainian grouping.
Over the following weeks the encirclement narrative stalled, and information from the ground pointed instead to a different scenario: relatively successful infiltration by Russian assault groups into Pokrovsk amid attempts to envelop the city that have so far failed.
Nevertheless, on the eve of his meeting with Donald Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, Putin created several occasions for extended commentary on the frontline and used them to promote the Russian narrative. At a press conference in Bishkek on 27 November, he claimed near total control over Vovchansk and Kupiansk, a crisis in Ukrainian defences at Siversk, and warned that problems near Huliaipole could lead to a collapse of the front in that sector. Putin implied that most of the Ukrainian fortified area in the northern Donbas was in dire straits and at risk of imminent breakdown.
On 30 November, during a staged visit to the command post of the Russian grouping (Putin had a cold and none of the commanders allegedly present appeared on camera), he reportedly heard Gerasimov brief him on the liberation, as Russia terms it, of Krasnoarmiisk (the Russian name for Pokrovsk) and Vovchansk, along with updates from other generals on the liquidation of the Ukrainian grouping allegedly encircled in the Krasnoarmiisk-Dymytrov agglomeration and on the liberation of areas of Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions and the town of Huliaipole. Finally, speaking to journalists on 2 December, just before meeting Witkoff, Putin again stated that Russian forces controlled Kupiansk, claiming it had been in Russian hands for several weeks, and Pokrovsk too, again inviting foreign journalists to walk through the city’s neighbourhoods to see for themselves.
The picture of events that Putin and the Russian leadership have been promoting since late October follows a familiar pattern. Russian forces have closed previously created cauldrons on several axes, with the result that sizeable Ukrainian Armed Forces units have allegedly been encircled and face inevitable destruction or surrender. This pattern broadly reproduces the course of events around Debaltseve in February 2015, when Russian units with heavy equipment entered Ukrainian territory and supported the forces of the DPR and LPR in surrounding the Ukrainian ATO grouping. The threat of defeat compelled the Ukrainian leadership to enter negotiations with Moscow on withdrawing troops from the encirclement and opened the way to the signing, with Putin and European leaders present, of the second Minsk package. These agreements effectively confirmed DPR and LPR control over parts of Donetsk and most of Sloviansk regions and formalised their de facto separation from Ukraine.
This time, according to the Kremlin, news of the supposed destruction of Ukrainian forces near Pokrovsk, Kupiansk and several other locations is meant to serve as the main argument in favour of Russia’s ultimatum-style version of a peace agreement that Donald Trump is expected to impose on Ukraine. From a Russian and Soviet propaganda perspective, which still resonates to a degree with the Ukrainian public, the image created by Putin of a large enemy grouping encircled at a turning point in the conflict evokes the mythology of the Battle of Stalingrad, when major Wehrmacht forces were surrounded and defeated on the Volga in 1943. This parallel is intended to reinforce the impression that Russian victory is inevitable.
The situation ‘on the ground’: versions from Ukraine, bloggers and OSINT analysts
The Ukrainian leadership and the Armed Forces command reject almost all claims made by Putin and Russian generals. Ukrainian and independent OSINT analysts reconstructing events on the ground likewise show that these assertions are largely deliberate fabrications, although they present a more complex picture of Russian offensive gains.
The situation in Kupiansk, according to Ukrainian military analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko, resembles a city taken on credit. He assesses the situation there as difficult, yet Russian forces have not managed either to encircle the city or bring it under control. Well-known military analyst. Renowned military analyst Konstyantyn Mashovets also believes that the situation in Kupiansk is ‘quite far from such definitions’ as ‘encirclement.’ that the situation in Kupiansk is far from fitting descriptions such as encirclement. An unofficial Telegram channel linked to Russia’s Western Military Grouping claims the opposite, arguing that Russian troops in the city are experiencing major supply and reinforcement problems and have so far failed to establish a foothold on the right bank of the river. It also refers to the idea of taking the city on credit, meaning that success was announced at the very start of the operation as a new practice of the Russian command.
The Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad area saw the highest number of Russian attacks in November at 33%, according to DeepStateUA, as has been the case for several recent months. Yet most analysts assess that at the start of December Russian forces confidently controlled only the southern half of Pokrovsk, which lies below the railway line that divides the city in two. Foreign journalists would therefore find it difficult to walk through the city’s neighbourhoods as Putin suggested. However, the southern side contains Independence Square, where a Russian soldier was filmed with a flag to signal the city’s capture. At the same time, according to DeepState’s assessment of 2 December, neither side fully controls the northern part of Pokrovsk.
Although Russian forces in Pokrovsk continue to suffer heavy losses, they are able to replenish personnel and continue assaulting Ukrainian positions, writes Mashovets. He claims that the need to withdraw units from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad was discussed as early as early November, yet the Ukrainian command decided instead to reinforce the garrison with airborne assault units. As a result, the battle for Pokrovsk has turned into attritional urban warfare, with positions repeatedly changing hands.
In the Myrnohrad area, Mashovets argues that Ukrainian units are already practically encircled and could only be withdrawn through fighting. A senior NATO official offered a similar assessment to the Ukrainian outlet European Pravda, describing them as practically encircled although not yet fully. Mashovets believes that Ukraine will likely have to give up both towns unless a different decision is taken. The commander of Ukraine’s Air Assault Forces, Oleh Apostol, is nevertheless confident that Russian forces will not capture Pokrovsk for a long time and risk becoming bogged down there as they previously did in Toretsk, which held out for a year and a half, and in Chasiv Yar, which is still not under Russian control despite Moscow’s Defence Ministry claiming its capture on 31 July.
The most acute situation for Ukrainian forces has developed around Huliaipole, which is strategically important for defending the Zaporizhzhia axis. The situation deteriorated in late October when half the personnel defending the area north of the town were redeployed elsewhere, writes DeepStateUA.In early November Russian forces succeeded in crossing the Yanchur river, seizing Uspenivka and launching assaults on nearby settlements.The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) notes that for the assault on Huliaipole the Russian command concentrated forces from three combined arms armies that are attempting to isolate the town from the northeast and conduct an air-suppression campaign followed by infiltration, a tactic Russia has employed in Pokrovsk since July (→ Re:Russia: The Pokrovsk Dilemma).
In mid-November Mashovets wrote that Russian forces were very close to outflanking the entire Huliaipole defensive area from the north and beginning its direct capture. Ukrainian military volunteer Serhii Sternenko offered a similar assessment, stating that the situation in Huliaipole was moving towards a strategic-scale disaster. Tatarigami, a contributor to the Ukrainian OSINT project Frontelligence Insight, wrote that the risk of strategic disaster is real and growing over time. Attempts by Ukrainian forces to consolidate new positions were unsuccessful for an extended period. Retreats were disorderly and instances of friendly fire were recorded. Only by the end of the month did additional deployed units manage to stabilise the defence and establish new lines directly in front of the town. Russian advances have not been fully halted: according to ISW estimates as of 1 December, Russian forces have captured several villages in the immediate vicinity of Huliaipole and continue to advance.
Strategies and realities: encirclement, infiltration and cognitive warfare
If the numerous reports, corrections and testimonies are summed up, three main conclusions can be drawn about the current phase of the Russian offensive.
First, the position of the Ukrainian army has significantly worsened towards the end of the year. The well-known Polish military analyst Konrad Muzyka, who returned from a visit to the Ukrainian front in November, notes that Ukrainian defences are finding it increasingly difficult to withstand Russian forces, primarily because Ukraine has lost its advantage in drone use, which it maintained until the summer. The situation has changed due to continuous improvements in Russian drone capabilities and to the more effective operations of the Russian Rubikon unit, which now strikes targets 10 to 20 km behind the frontline. Ukrainian drone logistics units and operators often suffer higher losses than infantry, he notes. The American military analyst Michael Kofman makes the same point. Russia has managed to neutralise Ukraine’s earlier drone advantage. The year began with Ukrainian drones mostly striking Russian troops, but now the strike zone affects both sides roughly equally, he argues. Russia’s drone production also exceeds Ukraine’s.
Second, the content of military reports and on-the-ground accounts indicates a fundamental change in the character of the war this autumn. While Putin and the Russian military leadership have emphasised enveloping and encircling Ukrainian positions, in reality this strategy does not yet appear to have succeeded. None of the encirclements claimed by the Kremlin is fully confirmed, although Russian pincers and envelopments create major problems and serious threats for Ukrainian forces on several axes. Pre-emptive claims of encirclement or its inevitability are intended to trigger debates within the Ukrainian military leadership about withdrawing forces, which could create the impression of a collapsing front.
At the same time, the infiltration tactics adopted by the Russian army appear relatively successful, supported by its superiority in artillery and aerial bombardment, Muzyka notes. This has led to the disappearance of the frontline as such and a substantial expansion of the grey zone. This dynamic reflects two key factors. Because of personnel shortages, the Ukrainian line of contact is extremely thinly manned and the main striking power of Ukrainian defence consists of drones and their operators positioned some distance from the line. The aim of infiltration is to approach them more closely.
The tactic of infiltration ultimately leads to forcing the front line back. At the same time it does not allow for major tactical breakthroughs. The situations in Pokrovsk and Kupiansk illustrate this clearly. Infiltration does not make it possible to commit large forces to battle or to exploit Russia’s numerical advantage. According to ISW, reports of infiltration in Pokrovsk, meaning Russian groups entering the town, have been appearing since early August. Four months later Russian forces still control only half of it. In Kupiansk the main problem for Russian assault units is reaching the town, in other words crossing open ground to the built-up area. According to Russian military personnel, they have not yet been able to accomplish this.
Overall, according to ISW estimates at the beginning of December, the front line in Ukraine is not facing imminent collapse. However, Russia systematically and deliberately exaggerates its gains. ISW experts describe this as a form of cognitive warfare, intended to persuade the United States, Europe and Ukrainians themselves that defeat is inevitable. These increasingly routine embellishments of military successes have triggered numerous protests even among pro-military Russian bloggers. The Telegram channel Rybar notes five settlements which Russia claimed to have seized, although there is no evidence for this. It also uses the expression 'liberation on credit', now common among military bloggers. The channel ‘Voenkor Kotenok’ disputes reports of large-scale desertion in Ukrainian units and notes that although the Russian army holds the initiative on the battlefield, it is meeting serious resistance and that counter-attacks are taking place in many sectors. It writes that the various voices praising and extolling the achievements of Russian forces distort reality 'not merely squared but cubed'.
The third conclusion is that the Kremlin is seeking to compensate for smaller-than-expected battlefield gains through information warfare. At an earlier stage of the offensive, cognitive-warfare strategy relied on pre-emptive statements about encirclements. Its main objective now is to persuade audiences that the 'grey zone' created through infiltration is an area of assured Russian control.
At least one casualty of the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare can already be identified. On 25 November, when asked about Donbas, Donald Trump stated with confidence that Ukraine would very soon lose the region militarily. Yet the current dynamics of Russia’s offensive point more towards the likelihood that it will become bogged down in urban fighting in Pokrovsk, Kupiansk and Siversk. Further Russian advances across open terrain once visibility improves and winter sets in will become almost impossible.
Although measuring controlled territory has become highly unreliable as the grey zone expands, data from the DeepState and Black Bird Group indicates that during the 2024 offensive Russian forces occupied roughly 3400 sq km of Ukrainian territory, including about 3000 sq km between January and November. This year the tempo is somewhat quicker and the area taken between January and November may amount to about 4000 to 4200 sq km, of which roughly 500 sq km was gained in November. With very high probability the total gains in this year’s offensive will not exceed, or will only slightly exceed, 5000 sq km, which would not differ in any meaningful way from last year’s outcome.
The rate of occupation of Ukrainian territory according to OSINT projects, 2024–2025, sq km
Michael Kofman, like ISW analysts, does not see any signs of an imminent collapse of the front. In his view, in 2025 the Russian leadership placed two bets, both of which proved mistaken. The first was that constant pressure would at some point trigger the collapse of Ukraine’s defences. The second was that through diplomacy the Kremlin would be able to engage with the new Trump administration in such a way that, even if the front did not collapse, Western military assistance to Ukraine might do so, allowing the Kremlin to achieve the same outcome in the end. The question, Kofman writes, is whether the Kremlin intends to rely on the same bets again in 2026.
Kofman’s conclusions regarding the failure of both Kremlin bets appear somewhat premature. The political and diplomatic push initiated by the Kremlin and Steve Witkoff, accompanied by Russia’s ongoing offensive, has not yet exhausted its potential, and threats to the front remain in several sectors, above all near Huliaipole. For now, however, the Kremlin is trading on the success of its autumn offensive largely on credit.