Thirty Years and Three Degrees

Taking stock of COP30 and explaining why the world is still not ready for decisive climate action

Organizers of the anniversary COP30 climate conference in Belém promised a “moment of truth” and a shift toward “implementation.” The talks were expected to showcase effective international cooperation but instead of a breakthrough became yet another reminder that the world remains far from coordinated collective action to mitigate the climate crisis. Meanwhile, its impacts are already hitting the planet’s most vulnerable regions—small island and coastal states, as well as the Arctic. Arctida examines what happened at COP30, what decisions countries managed to reach, and why Russia’s climate stance poses a danger.

COP30 in Belém coincided with two major milestones in the history of global climate policy. In 1995, Berlin hosted the first Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In 2015, countries adopted the Paris Agreement—an international treaty that set the goal of limiting global temperature rise to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, while pursuing efforts to keep it to 1.5°C. As of 2025, the Paris Agreement has been ratified by 195 parties—194 countries and the European Union. Russia joined in 2019, three years after signing.

One of the tools for achieving the Paris Agreement goals is Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). These are plans countries submit as part of their national climate policy, outlining measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and actions to adapt to climate impacts. Parties are required to update their NDCs every five years and report to the UNFCCC. Based on these updates, it is possible to assess how far countries have progressed in tackling the climate crisis and to project global temperature trajectories under the pledged measures.

COP30 marked the third round of NDC updates. By the end of the talks, 119 countries had submitted new plans. Their analysis showed that the world is still far from meeting the Paris Agreement goals. Even if countries fully deliver on their NDC pledges, the current trajectory of average global temperature rise points to nearly 3°C (2.5–3°C), and there is no legal liability for failing to meet stated targets. All commitments under the Paris Agreement are purely framework; in practice, this allows countries to limit themselves to lofty declarations of climate ambition.

A temperature increase beyond 2°C above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century would have catastrophic consequences for people and ecosystems. The most severe impacts would fall first and foremost on vulnerable regions—not only small island and coastal states in the Global South, but also the Arctic, which is already experiencing warming at roughly four times the global average.

Read also

How the climate crisis affects Indigenous peoples of the Arctic

Global Mutirão: the Disagreements Behind a “Compromise” Agreement

One outcome of the conference was an overarching document that brings together formal COP30 decisions and issues that did not make it onto the official agenda. Such texts are known as Cover Decisions: they consolidate the overall outcomes of a climate conference and are adopted by consensus at the final plenary. Mutirão translates as “collective action aimed at achieving a common goal.” The title reflected the expectations placed on the negotiations’ outcome—yet even here, reaching common ground proved difficult.

The agreement recognizes climate change as a shared challenge for all of humanity and underscores the need for integrated solutions to interconnected global crises—climate change, biodiversity loss, and land and ocean degradation—in the context of sustainable development. It also calls on developed countries to triple adaptation finance by 2035.

At first glance, this may sound like progress—but there are hidden downsides to this agreement, as it makes no mention of roadmaps for phasing out fossil fuels or tackling deforestation, both of which appeared in the first draft released early in the second week of talks. Nor does it include any reference to the need to move away from fossil fuels: those formulations were removed at the initiative of a number of countries whose names were never made public.

This makes it clear that, even if parties to the Paris Agreement are willing to talk about cutting emissions and the importance of addressing the climate crisis, many are not prepared to enshrine concrete steps that directly affect their industries and economies.

The goal of scaling up adaptation finance also sparked intense debate. The most vulnerable developing countries were unhappy that the target of tripling funds was pushed back to 2035; the original draft had proposed reaching the same level five years earlier. In ten years’ time, they expect to face even more devastating climate impacts, and for many, urgent support is needed now.

More on developed, developing, and transition-economy countries:

BAM!
A civil society achievement at COP30

The Just Transition Work Programme, or the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM), became one of the conference’s most significant outcomes. Its inclusion on the official negotiating agenda was due largely to coordinated advocacy by civil society organizations—a true mutirão.

Ahead of the talks, NGOs aligned their positions and put forward a demand that the conference adopt a new instrument in Belém to ensure a multilateral approach to implementing a global just transition that accounts for people’s needs and environmental protection.

“This mechanism should promote a fair phase-out of fossil fuels; transform agriculture and food systems; advance sustainable industrial processes; ensure equitable deployment of renewables and universal access to energy; and support sustainable management of ecosystems and natural resources, including fair mineral supply chains.”

A joint open letter, individual NGO positions, and on-the-ground actions during the conference paid off: the mechanism was adopted, albeit in a heavily watered-down form—without references linking the global temperature goal to a just transition and a fossil fuel phase-out. Mention of risks associated with critical mineral extraction was also removed from the final text.

Even so, the creation of BAM is an important moment in the global climate dialogue. The mechanism spans a wide range of sectors and stakeholders and, for the first time, explicitly recognizes the importance of industrial workers, people in vulnerable situations, Indigenous peoples, farmers, migrants, and other groups. Whether it will be effective depends on whether it is implemented on principles of equity, with meaningful civil society participation and without undue corporate influence. Otherwise, it risks becoming more symbolic than transformative. Detailed discussions and operationalization will continue at COP31 in Turkey.

Assessing Climate Adaptation: the Hard-won Compromise Years in the Making

The most anticipated practical outcome of the Belém negotiations was agreement on indicators to assess adaptation measures under the Global Goal on Adaptation.

Over 3.5 billion people live in areas exposed to adverse climate impacts—floods, typhoons, extreme temperatures, and other phenomena that threaten lives and the resilience of local ecosystems.

The need to adapt to climate impacts has been discussed for decades, including at the 1992 UN Convention. Active work on adaptation, however, began much later. The Global Goal on Adaptation was adopted in Paris in 2015, but countries only began discussing indicators to assess adaptation actions for the first time in Belém.

Preparation for the talks took two years. Experts compiled a list of roughly 10,000 potential indicators, then narrowed it down to 100 for discussion at the conference.

Reaching agreement on a single set of indicators was difficult. Developing countries, including the African Group, rightly argued that implementing adaptation measures across such a broad list would require substantial financial resources they simply do not have. These disputes once again highlighted the imbalance in climate finance and the critical lack of support for developing countries—a problem that resurfaces every year in negotiations from different angles.

Lack of support was not the only obstacle. Another challenge was that climate impacts vary widely by region and country. Governments and communities understand their adaptation needs differently, which must be taken into account in future assessments.

Despite difficult negotiations, countries agreed on a set of indicators that will allow both quantitative and qualitative evaluation of adaptation effectiveness. These cover:

• water supply for domestic and economic needs;
• food security and agriculture;
• health and health risks;
• ecosystems and biodiversity;
• human settlements and infrastructure;
• well-being and poverty reduction;
• knowledge and cultural heritage;
• impact, vulnerability, and risk assessments;
• as well as indicators related to planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of adaptation efforts.

Countries may select the indicators that best match their climate risks and needs. Importantly, this choice should not affect their access to financial support under the Global Goal.

Russia’s Minimal Commitments Policy

Compared to previous conferences, the Russian delegation was less active at COP30. This year, Russia did not have a dedicated pavilion hosting daily events organized by businesses and government agencies. The delegation even declined to hold its traditional official event, where Russia typically lays out its position on the climate crisis, decarbonization, and international cooperation.

Russia’s current stance can be gleaned from remarks by the Foreign Ministry’s Special Envoy for Climate, Sergey Kononuchenko, at the start of the second week. He noted that Russia recognizes the importance of addressing climate change and international cooperation, but warned that shifting the primary focus to emissions reductions is a “dangerous imbalance,” calling instead for greater emphasis on adaptation.

During negotiations on adaptation indicators, Russia favored a “less is better” approach—proposing to adopt only the bare minimum and postpone further discussion until next year.

Russia is adept at turning terminology on its head even at the international level. Speaking about a just transition, Kononuchenko offered a definition tailored to Russia’s interests:

“Just means taking into account national circumstances, starting positions, and the capacities of each country.”

In other words, the focus of justice shifts away from the interests of vulnerable groups, Indigenous peoples, local communities, workers, and citizens at large toward immediate benefits for the state. It is reasonable to assume that by “starting positions,” the envoy meant Russia’s economy, which is deeply dependent on fossil fuel extraction and exports—a point reinforced by his next statement:

“Calls for accelerated, shock-style decarbonization not only threaten economic and energy security, but also deepen global inequalities.”

Kononuchenko’s remarks fit Russia’s long-standing position at climate conferences. But increasingly, they signal Russia’s reluctance to engage meaningfully in addressing the climate crisis. This is evident in its calls to avoid introducing new mechanisms and obligations, and in its refusal to treat emissions reductions as a priority.

Russia also insists on using the term “low-carbon economy,” reflecting its unwillingness to phase out fossil fuels, while actively promoting “technological neutrality” to shift attention from renewables toward natural gas and nuclear energy. According to this view, the choice of technologies matters less than achieving an overall balance between emissions and carbon sinks. In reality, this approach sidesteps genuine solutions to the climate crisis.

Given that Russia prioritizes industrial interests over environmental protection, this stance is unsurprising. A clear example is the intensive industrialization of the Arctic, despite thawing permafrost and other serious climate risks in the region.

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More on Russia’s position in the UN climate negotiations and the challenges facing the Arctic

Russia is not alone in taking a largely blocking position in climate negotiations. Alongside other fossil-fuel-producing countries, such as Saudi Arabia, it has consistently opposed including any references to fossil fuels in official texts, seeking to preserve the energy status quo.

Russia’s position raises serious concerns. Even the NDCs it submitted this year imply rising emissions rather than reductions. Against the backdrop of escalating climate risks and the inevitable transformation of the global economy, this trajectory is alarming.

By refusing to cut emissions and slowing progress in international agreements, Russia gains little beyond short-term financial benefits from continued fossil fuel development. In the longer term, this approach could have tragic consequences for both the economy and the population. Increasing greenhouse gas emissions will only worsen the impacts of the climate crisis—especially for already vulnerable regions like the Arctic.

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On what Russia can do for its northern regions to improve their resilience to the climate crisis

If Russia does not change course and begin actively reducing emissions and implementing adaptation measures, people and ecosystems will suffer first. Moreover, emissions generated in Russia will exacerbate climate change worldwide. This is a shared historical responsibility that Russia seeks to evade through “low-carbon” rhetoric—but one it will not escape if nothing changes in the near future.

Cover photo: Unsplash