Between The Inevitable and The Unreliable: Why Ukrainian society considers territorial concessions futile, but yet is willing to discuss them

The corruption scandal at the end of 2025 did not undermine the legitimacy of the Ukrainian authorities or of Volodymyr Zelensky, and the bombardment of Ukrainian cities and widespread electricity outages did not weaken the spirit of resistance among Ukrainians. This is indicated by two waves of surveys conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in January 2026. Willingness to endure the war ‘for as long as necessary’ at the start of 2026 has even increased compared with 2025.

Most Ukrainians continue to perceive the war with Russia as existential, as an attempt to destroy the Ukrainian nation and statehood, which explains both the high level of resistance and the low readiness for compromise with the aggressor. In the event of a freeze in the conflict, more than 80% consider a renewed Russian attack likely even if formal security guarantees from the West are in place. At the same time, the reliability of such guarantees is not rated highly.

At the same time, about 40% consider it possible to transfer territories in eastern Donbas to Russia in exchange for security guarantees, while just over 50% oppose this plan, which lies at the core of the formula for ending hostilities currently under discussion. This balance supports President Zelensky’s argument that only a credible and robust package of guarantees could persuade Ukrainian society to vote in favour of territorial concessions in a referendum.

Overall, the survey data indicates that Ukrainian society remains far from the state of decline and exhaustion in which it could be coerced into capitulation. Meanwhile, high levels of wartime mobilisation have not translated into a clear trend towards autocratisation in Ukraine, while chronic corruption and war fatigue are generating demand for a profound renewal of the political elite in the post-war period.

Perception characteristics: between destruction and resistance

Ukrainians continue to view the conflict with Russia as existential. Nearly 70% of those surveyed believe that Russia’s objective is either the ‘physical genocide of the Ukrainian people’ (28%) or the seizure of most of Ukraine in order to destroy Ukrainian statehood and the nation (41%), according to a survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in the first half of January 2026. This perception helps explain both the resilience of patriotic mobilisation in Ukrainian society and its low willingness to compromise with Russia. The scope for compromise with an actor whom you believe seeks to destroy you is narrow and specific. It amounts either to capitulation or to a pause before the next round.

At the same time, 77% of those surveyed believe that Russia is advancing slowly and with difficulty on the battlefield, meaning that Ukraine remains capable of resisting, and only 12% consider resistance to be hopeless. The Kremlin has therefore failed to instill in Ukrainian society a sense of the inevitability of defeat in a war of attrition. Accordingly, 65% of Ukrainians surveyed say they are prepared to endure the war for as long as necessary, according to data from the second wave of the survey at the end of January. This is lower than in 2022 to 2024, but higher than in both the first and second halves of 2025 at 57% and 60% respectively. In Kyiv, which is experiencing a severe energy crisis, the figure is 72%, in western Ukraine 66%, and in the east 58%.

Chart 1. ‘How long are you prepared to endure the war?’, 2022–2025, % of those surveyed

KIIS sociologists regularly note that, in wartime conditions, survey results may reflect a degree of bias. This bias is not linked to fear, as in Russia, since Ukrainians freely criticise the authorities in the media and on social networks, but rather to an atmosphere of patriotic mobilisation that encourages respondents to give socially approved answers. At the same time, survey experiments suggest that this bias is unlikely to be very large, and that the data ultimately reflect the main trends in public opinion. The consolidation of opinion may also partly stem from the fact that many of those sceptical about Ukraine’s ability to resist Russian aggression have left the country, while eastern regions that were more exposed to Russian influence are now occupied and cannot be surveyed.

In any case, the majority of those surveyed by KIIS, while largely expressing a readiness to endure the hardships of war, are highly sceptical about the prospect of an early end to hostilities and about the ongoing negotiations mediated by the United States. Only 20% now believe that the war will end in the first half of 2026, compared with 26% in December. Nearly 70% do not believe that the current talks will lead to a lasting peace, primarily because they think Putin does not intend to stop his territorial ambitions, an opinion held by 35%. Some sceptics also believe that the Ukrainian authorities are not doing enough to secure peace.

With all the caveats noted above, it can be said that Ukraine still appears far from the point at which it could be worn down into submission.

Between an inevitable attack and unreliable guarantees

A majority of those surveyed (57%) are firmly convinced that even with security guarantees in place, a freeze in hostilities along the current line of contact would be merely a pause, and that Russia would attack Ukraine again after some time. A further 26% consider the probability of such an attack to be 50%. In total, more than 80% regard this scenario as highly likely. This view is also linked to considerable scepticism among Ukrainians about the ability of Western countries to fulfil their promises of security guarantees. While 59% believe that Europeans would provide the necessary assistance in the event of a renewed Russian attack, only 39% think the United States would do so.

Two waves of the survey, at the beginning and end of January, showed that 52–54% of those surveyed are categorically opposed to transferring territories in northern Donbas to Russian control even in exchange for security guarantees, while 39–40% regard such a trade-off as painful but acceptable. The same result was obtained in a survey experiment using the ‘random acquaintance’ method, designed to reduce bias towards socially desirable answers.

Approximately one third of opponents of territorial concessions argue that such a step is unacceptable in principle. For most, however, two factors are decisive. They are convinced that transferring territory would not prevent a renewed Russian offensive and would therefore be a futile sacrifice, and they have limited trust in Western guarantees. Zelensky therefore appears correct in arguing that approval of any territorial trade-off in a Ukrainian referendum would be possible only in the presence of a credible and realistic package of guarantees with substantial status (→ Re:Russia: Three Tracks).

Once again, the residents of Kyiv are the most resolute, with almost 60% rejecting the ‘territory for guarantees’ formula. Notably, however, the pattern is reversed among younger respondents. Some 54% of those aged 18 to 29 are prepared to accept a territorial compromise, while this figure falls to 28% among those over 60. This ‘youth effect’ may be linked both to lower levels of mobilisation among younger people and to greater trust in Donald Trump, and therefore in Western guarantees. This factor was highlighted by a Ukrainian survey conducted at the end of the year by the Rating Sociological Group as part of a global study by Gallup International. The survey found that a quarter of Ukrainians view the American president very negatively, around half (47%) somewhat negatively, and only 22% positively. Among young people (those aged 18 to 35), especially young men, the share expressing positive views of Trump reaches 35%.

Features of ‘wartime democracy’

As these KIIS surveys show, Ukrainians have maintained a high level of mobilisation despite the autumn corruption scandals and the energy crisis caused by Russian strikes. In a December KIIS poll, respondents were asked what they saw as the primary cause of electricity outages: Russian strikes, the inefficiency of the Ukrainian authorities who had failed to prepare for them, or the inaction of Western partners who had not provided sufficient means of protection. While 54% chose the first option, almost a third (31%) selected the second, emphasising state inefficiency. This illustrates a characteristic duality in Ukrainian public opinion. A critical attitude towards the current authorities does not undermine mobilisation when it comes to Russian aggression. The perception of the war with Russia as deeply existential establishes clear hierarchies and priorities in public assessments.

This is fully reflected in attitudes towards President Zelensky, whose trust ratings remain consistently high at 61–62% across the two survey waves in January 2026, and have been stable for almost a year despite the autumn corruption scandal and the energy collapse. At the same time, 25% of those surveyed say they trust Zelensky completely, while 17% say they do not trust him at all. A survey experiment on trust in the president produced a somewhat lower overall figure of 53%, suggesting that 8–9% of those surveyed trust Zelensky less than their direct answers indicate.

KIIS Director Anton Hrushetskyi notes in this regard that a September KIIS poll found that among those who completely trust Zelensky, 69% would like him to remain president after the war, whereas among those who say they rather trust him (35–36%), only 21% would support him staying on. Thus, among those who express trust in Zelensky (around 60% of all those surveyed), only a minority, 25% of the total sample, would like to see him serve another term. This suggests that trust in Zelensky is more institutional or functional, reflecting his role as a wartime leader, than personal, and coexists with a perception that much of his political potential has been exhausted.

Chart 2. ‘To what extent do you trust or distrust Volodymyr Zelensky?’ 2019–2026, % of those surveyed

The idea of replacing the current generation of politicians after the war has deep roots in contemporary Ukrainian society. Some 42% of KIIS respondents agree with the more radical view that the present Ukrainian authorities are entirely compromised and should not remain in power once the war ends, while slightly more (48%) take the more measured position that the wartime generation includes competent professionals who could continue to serve in public office after the war. Notably, even among those who said in the previous question that they completely trust Zelensky, almost 20% support this radical view and favour a wholesale renewal of the political core of the country. The corruption scandal has therefore not gone unnoticed by Ukrainian society, but any reckoning over it has been postponed until after the war.

When asked whether, given the conditions of wartime, Ukraine has enough democracy, 36% of those surveyed say that the level is entirely sufficient and 16% say there is even more democracy than necessary. Some 35% are dissatisfied with the state of democracy. Among the problems they identify, the foremost is restrictions on freedom of speech and the inability to criticise the authorities, followed by the conduct of the Territorial Recruitment Centres responsible for mobilisation. Almost no one cites the suspension of elections during the war as a sign of a ‘lack of democracy’ (1%).

Overall, these findings show that high levels of mobilisation in the face of aggression are not translating into a clear trend towards autocratisation in Ukraine, while persistently high corruption continues to fuel demand for periodic renewal of the political elite, albeit with limited tangible results.