America does not trust Putin or Trump: Americans support increased military aid to Kyiv, have a low opinion of Trump's Ukraine policy, and doubt the likelihood of reaching a reliable agreement with Putin

In November, approval of Trump’s presidency fell to a new low in his second term, with 36% approving and 60% disapproving. Among all items on the current agenda, his Ukraine policy attracts the least support, with only 31% approving. It ranks lowest even among Republicans, with approval at just 67%, compared with 85% approval for Trump’s foreign policy overall. At the same time, the share of Americans who believe that US assistance to Ukraine is insufficient has reached a wartime high of 46%.

A survey by the Ronald Reagan Institute focused on national security shows that the foreign policy views of the average American largely remain within the framework of traditional US doctrine and are not strongly influenced by the relativism of Trump’s transactional approach. Between 75 and 80% of those surveyed view Russia as an enemy and consider Ukraine an ally. More than 60% want Kyiv to win, and two thirds support arms deliveries to Ukraine, including Tomahawk missiles for strikes on Russian territory, as well as the provision of security guarantees akin to NATO’s Article 5.

Trump’s peace efforts also fail to convince the American public. According to an Economist/YouGov poll, 42% of Americans believe the president is more likely to side with Russia, while only 22% think he takes a balanced position. Although Americans are not well informed about the details of the Trump administration’s peace plan, the net balance of its ratings is negative by 10 percentage points, falling to minus 17 once respondents become familiar with its specifics. Among Republicans, support for the plan drops from 57 to 38% after exposure to its details. This experiment suggests that American society would place responsibility for the consequences of an unstable agreement between Russia and Ukraine on Trump and his perceived pro Russian tilt. In contrast to Trump, most Americans see Putin as a cynical aggressor who cannot be trusted to honour agreements, with 87% believing he would violate any deal that is concluded.

Trump's worst policy

In November, President Trump’s approval rating reached a new low for his second term, at 36% approving versus 60% disapproving, according to regular Gallup polling. The decline is driven by Republicans, whose approval fell from 90 to 86%, and by independents, where it dropped from 33 to 25%. The three policy areas in which Trump receives the lowest approval are healthcare, with 30% approving, the federal budget at 31%, and Ukraine at 31%. Notably, the lowest ratings of Trump’s Ukraine policy come not only from independents, among whom just 23% approve, but also from Republicans, at 67%, compared with 85% approval for his foreign policy overall. The Ukraine issue can therefore be described as one of the points of an anti Trump consensus in American society.

Dissatisfaction with the direction of policy on Ukraine and a shift in public attitudes were already evident in Gallup's August poll. Here, 46% of those surveyed said that the US was providing insufficient assistance to Ukraine, the highest level since the start of the war, while the share who viewed aid as excessive fell to 25%. In December 2024, the balance stood at 30% saying aid was insufficient versus 37% saying it was excessive. That marked the peak of American fatigue with the Ukraine issue. The subsequent shift in the opposite direction began as early as March and was driven mainly by independents.

US aid to Ukraine, insufficient or excessive?, 2022–2025, % of those surveyed

Similarly, in December 2024, 50% of Americans believed that the United States’ main task in relation to the Russia–Ukraine conflict was to seek a rapid peace even at the cost of concessions to Russia, while 48% favoured helping Ukraine to regain territories occupied by Russia. By March and August, the share supporting the first position had fallen to 45%, while support for the second had risen to 52%. The share favouring the latter increased by 11 percentage points among Democrats and by 7 among Republicans. Particularly striking is the fact that in August 87% of Americans believed that Putin would violate any agreement concluded with Ukraine. Notably, exactly the same share of Ukrainian citizens believe that the Kremlin intends to use a 'peace agreement' merely as a pause before a renewed attack (→ Re:Russia: Peace on The Aggressor's Terms).

Attitudes in December 2024 were shaped by Trump’s campaign rhetoric, in which he claimed that he would miraculously end the war in Ukraine as soon as he became president. To some extent, these promises appealed even to Democrats, among whom support for Ukraine also weakened at that time. Since then, however, the war has continued for another year, while the absence of US assistance has worsened Ukraine’s position. Moreover, Trump has failed to change Americans’ views of Vladimir Putin, who continues to appear in their eyes as an unprincipled and untrustworthy aggressor. In an October survey by the New York based Institute for Global Affairs, published under the title ‘The Reckless Peacemaker’, 42% of those surveyed said that Trump’s actions had worsened the situation surrounding the Russia–Ukraine war, while only 23% believed they had improved it. The same share, 23%, think that President Trump deserves the Nobel Peace Prize, whereas almost two thirds of Americans believe that he does not.

Reagan's perspective versus Trump's

A major survey on national security issues conducted by the Ronald Reagan Institute in late October and early November clearly demonstrates the pro Ukrainian orientation of American public opinion. A majority, 62%, want Ukraine to win the war, while 11% would prefer a Russian victory. Unlike Trump, 75% of Americans view Ukraine as an ally, while Russia tops the list of US 'enemies', a label applied by 79% of those surveyed, ahead of China at 76% and Iran at 77%. The views of MAGA Republicans do not differ dramatically from the national average, with 73% considering Ukraine an ally and 74% viewing Russia as an adversary.

Two-thirds of those surveyed by the Reagan Institute support the supply of US weapons to Ukraine, which is 9 percentage points higher than last year. Among Republicans, support has increased by 15 percentage points to 59%, while among the most pro Trump respondents it has risen by as much as 20 percentage points to 62%. Support among independents remains the lowest at 53%, but is also increasing by 5 percentage points. Two thirds of all those surveyed, 65%, support sending Ukraine long range cruise missiles such as Tomahawks with permission to strike targets on Russian territory, and 69% support providing Ukraine with US backed security guarantees similar to NATO Article 5.

In the Reagan Institute survey, American attitudes appear perhaps at their most Reaganite, that is, consistently pro Ukrainian and anti Russian. This may partly reflect the broader framing of the survey, which was entirely focused on US security and geopolitical positioning and may have primed respondents accordingly. Overall, however, the findings suggest that the relativism and eclecticism of Trump’s foreign policy orientation, often described as transactionalism, have not yet undermined the core framework of traditional priorities and value based reference points of US foreign policy doctrine as understood by the average American. A total of 68% of those surveyed view NATO favourably, and 76% support adherence to the Alliance’s Article 5 commitments.

An unreliable agreement

The latest online survey by The Economist/YouGov, conducted at the turn of November and December, reflects public reactions to the latest peacemaking efforts by the US administration and presents a more nuanced picture that nevertheless remains unfavourable to Trump. Some 42% of those surveyed believe that Trump is more likely to side with Russia, only 12% hold the opposite view, and 22% think that Trump maintains a neutral position. Around 30% of Americans say they are reasonably familiar with the substance of his administration’s peace proposals, while a further 28% know something about them. Overall, 33% tend to approve of Trump’s strategy on Ukraine, which broadly aligns with Gallup figures, while 46% tend to disapprove.

When respondents were informed about the details of the Trump–Witkoff peace plan, including consent to reductions in the size of the Ukrainian armed forces, the transfer of Donbas to Russia, a ban on NATO membership, and a prohibition on deploying Alliance forces in Ukraine, their attitudes became more negative. Among those unfamiliar with the details, the net balance of approval for the 'peace plan' stood at minus 10 percentage points, while among those who learned its specifics it fell to minus 17. Independents, although generally negative about the plan, became slightly less critical after learning the details, with the net balance shifting from minus 25 to minus 18. By contrast, support among Republicans dropped sharply from 57 to 38% after exposure to the plan’s content. This experiment suggests that as the negative consequences of an unreliable agreement that is more favourable to Russia become increasingly apparent, American society is likely to place responsibility for them on Donald Trump.

A majority of people surveyed by the Economist/YouGov, 56%, believe that the war in Ukraine is directly related to US national security, while 26% take the opposite, essentially isolationist view, and a further 17% are unsure. Among younger respondents under 30, Republicans, and those who voted for Trump, the share of isolationists who see the conflict as distant and irrelevant to the United States is higher, but remains below one third. These distributions also indicate that Americans’ foreign policy views are far less susceptible to Trump’s supposedly 'revolutionary' relativism in international affairs than is sometimes assumed.