Nationalism as the basis of mobilization

We are publishing Alexander Verkhovsky's review of Marlene Laruelle's article "Nationalism as an engine of change in Russia?" ), published in the journal "Counterpoint".

Reviewing an article by Marlene Laruelle 1 , Alexander Verkhovsky does not agree with her hypothesis, according to which European-style national populism, that is, a movement to protect social benefits from “come in large numbers” combined with cultural isolationism, can become a driver of change in Russia. In his opinion, like many other researchers, Laruelle exaggerates the significance of these groups.
Such an exaggeration, however, is natural. Firstly, among those who are members of such groups or sympathize with them, there are many active and bright authors, so they are more noticeable on the Web. Secondly, they were political news at the beginning of this decade and attracted unnecessarily high attention. Finally, Alexei Navalny can be classified as a national democrat, and his political weight far exceeds that of other nationalist leaders. Laruelle sees the potential for further development of such national populism in Russia on the basis of national democratic rather than neo-Nazi groups.
And yet it must be remembered that all the organizations of the National Democrats are rather small in number. On the Moscow protest marches, as well as on the "Russian marches", their total number never even reached two hundred people. Contrary to Laruelle's opinion, they played the smallest role in the mass protests of 2011-2012, although they tried very hard. And Navalny himself, back in 2012, preferred to forget about “Stop feeding the Caucasus” and noticeably moved away from the nationalist agenda.
The crisis of the nationalist movement in 2014–2015 nearly killed the National Democrats. Instead of national democracy as a specific version of the nationalist movement, another option arose, so far in the form of a series of experiments - a systemic association of the ultra-right and national populists with liberals.
Another option considered by Laruelle seems to be more productive - a possible nationalist turn within the ruling circle.

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Marlene Laruelle undoubtedly deserves the title of one of the best researchers of contemporary Russian nationalism 2 . And if she wonders if nationalism can become an engine of change in Russia, it can be said in advance that the answer will not be banal, and the train of thought deserves the most careful consideration. It is all the more worth listening to such an expert now, when some observers are talking about the rise of Russian nationalism “after the Crimea”, while others are talking about its decline, at the sight of the sharply thinned “Russian marches”.

The hypothesis suggests itself that imperial nationalism is now on the rise, while ethnic nationalism is in decline 3 . But the author of the article “Is Nationalism a Force for Change in Russia?” rightly points out that it is not very correct and fruitful to classify Russian nationalists according to such a binary criterion. Firstly, because even in theory this criterion does not give a clear division, and secondly, in practice, groups can have rather tortuous ideological trajectories and, most importantly, the most bizarre combinations of views.

Nevertheless, I would say that it is clearly premature to abandon this criterion altogether: firstly, it is actively used by the objects of classification themselves, and secondly, and more importantly, the priority they choose is “Russian people” or “state "/"empire"/"civilization" - significantly correlates with other essential features. Ethnonationalists predominantly dream of an ethnically defined nation-state of Russians, which, in their view, should be guaranteed equality with others (preferably the most powerful world states). They define “Russianness” by culture or simply by blood, and more often advocate democracy (albeit not always liberal) than dictatorship. The latter, commonly referred to as "imperials" or "powermen", focus on Russia's global and unique mission; within the framework of this system of views, Russia is thought of as etatist and ideocratic, “Russianness” is understood through connection with this ideocracy and partly through culture, and the state is most often based on an authoritarian model.

At the same time, both those and other nationalists can either be in strong opposition to the existing regime, or consider themselves to be its "fellow travelers" or even supporters. And here one cannot but agree with Laruelle that the criterion of relations with the regime is no less important for the classification of political groups in an authoritarianly ruled country. Guided by precisely this criterion, she divides the nationalists into three categories - the actual political leadership (which includes the president himself and his administration), oppositionists, and everyone in between. And he very accurately calls the latter "near-state" - and not "pro-Kremlin", as other authors often do - emphasizing that this third category always has its own game, and thus they, at least for the most part, are not just performers. the will of the administration.

Laruelle begins his review with opposition groups and singles out three - the National Bolsheviks (Limonovites), "skinheads" (and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration, DPNI, which inherits them) and national democrats, that is, a motley multitude of groups trying to somehow combine nationalist attitudes and at least some liberal-democratic values. Probably, these three associations are the most noticeable, but all the same, entire movements fall out of the opposition list, for example, nationalist-oriented Orthodox or communists, and there are definitely no fewer of them than the National Bolsheviks or National Democrats. It is possible that the author means that they belong to the "near-state", but this is not explicitly stated, and thus they are absent in the Laruelle classification. In addition, the term “skinheads” is an anachronism: a part of Russian ethno-nationalism that grew up on Nazi skinhead soil has already evolved quite noticeably, giving rise to a whole range of different trends.

But perhaps these claims are no longer so significant, since we are dealing with a “leaving nature”: since 2012, a clear decline has been observed in the nationalist camp, since 2014 it has only intensified 4 . This applies to everyone: the National Bolsheviks of Eduard Limonov, and “pure neo-Nazis” (such as Maksim Martsinkevich’s Restrukt, who has been behind bars for a long time and will not be released soon), and almost respectable national democrats (for example, the National Democratic Party of Konstantin Krylov).

The pressure from the authorities, which has clearly and steadily increased since the autumn of 2014, was also experienced by everyone, although not to the same extent. Naturally, those who opposed the “Russian spring” found themselves under greater pressure, and this was a good half of the movement, moreover, its more radical part 5 . (Laruelle evaluates the support for one or another side of the Donbass war based on the number of those who went to fight on the corresponding side, but this assessment is incomplete. Both the fighters who fought on the side of the DNR/LNR, and notable authors whose publications provided them with active ideological support, were more; but at the "street" level, the ratio was closer to 50:50, and "pure neo-Nazis" were more often for Kiev.)

Of course, this does not mean that the nationalist movement is no longer capable of overcoming the current decline. However, it is very likely that the new rise, whatever form it may take, will take place with different leaders, in a different configuration, and, most likely, around some other ideas.

"Para-state" nationalists do not experience such a clear decline. On the contrary, the ideological activation of the state, starting, again, from 2012 and especially from 2014, creates a demand for such activity, and the "near-state" ones are trying to play with the regime as partners. This tactic is not very successful, because the weight of the "partners" is too different. Even such a major and ideologically active player as the Russian Orthodox Church cannot be an equal partner for the Kremlin; Moreover, associations of publicists such as the Izborsk Club cannot claim such a status, even though they enjoy the support of some oligarchs.

This balance of power means that the "near-state" with their ideological projects are more likely to compete for the attention of the "first category" of nationalists - in the classification proposed by Laruelle, this is the presidential administration. Competition involves both conscious adaptation to a potential customer, and attracting the attention of society through radical, utopian projects. Such projects may shock the liberal public, whose representatives sometimes call them fascist, but Laruelle rightly writes that there is no fascism in this, if only because the key element for the fascist movement is missing - revolutionism (I will add that in this sense, fascism is less and less in opposition part of the nationalist sector).

"Para-state nationalists" are not organized by parties and movements. Obviously, simply because it is counterproductive in relations with the administration, and they don’t have enough people for this. To somehow structure this field, Laruelle uses the term "ecosystems". “Ecosystem” she calls a conglomerate of groups and figures of the most diverse types - officials, businessmen, publicists, activists, PR people, connected and experienced in client relationships, and some, very approximate, ideological closeness, but connected not rigidly, not “party”

However, it is not so easy to “paint” everyone “according to ecosystems”. The author identifies at least two large ecosystems. The first is connected with the military-industrial complex - the Izborsk Club acts as its intellectual representative, and on the official political field it is represented by the Rodina party. can serve as an example The second ecosystem is associated with “Orthodox businessmen” Yakunin and Malofeev, it is more visible in the international arena (Yakunin’s project “Dialogue of Civilizations” 6 ), but it is less represented within the country. In Laruelle's terminology, the first ecosystem is "red", the second - "white", that is, as historical landmarks, they prefer, respectively, the USSR and the Romanov Empire; but this difference is not sharp, it is rather in accents. Both systems are involved in the war in Donbass, but in different ways: everyone actively campaigned for it, but direct organizational efforts are apparently connected personally with Malofeev.

At the same time, Laruelle rightly considers the ROC to be a separate “circumstantial” ecosystem. But she singles out the fourth ecosystem, in fact, according to the residual principle, referring to it various politicians such as Sergei Baburin, Gennady Zyuganov, Natalia Narochnitskaya (missing out Vladimir Zhirinovsky for some reason), even Sergei Naryshkin. All these people have played or are playing with nationalistic themes in one way or another (in particular, with the problem of “compatriots”), but still it seems unjustified to combine them into an ecosystem in the same sense as the three previous ones. It can be tentatively assumed that some of these politicians tend to focus on the three previous ecosystems, while others, quite possibly, are limited to the framework of their small circles.

The prospects of all these circles and circles, although they try to present themselves as independent social movements, depend entirely on the course and practical decisions of the presidential administration. The latter can use their developments, their connections with Western partners, engage them as propagandists, can even give them much broader local powers - as was the case in 2014 in the Donbass, when Alexander Borodai and Igor Girkin (Strelkov) close to Malofeev turned out to be key figures of the beginning war 7 . But the administration, as a decision-making center, does not see them as partners - no one has been awarded such a status in Russia, as mentioned above; and they do not see another way of action, as through the administration. Even open opposition to the policy of the authorities seems to be understood more as a means of bargaining and influence, and not as building one's own, oppositional and alternative course. And so, presumably, it will be as long as the political regime remains stable.

The regime itself, as Laruelle rightly writes, does not put forward a single ideology of nationalism, but rather gives a certain set of “signals”. This deliberate vagueness persists even after two waves of overt ideologization, in 2012 and 2014. The task of this activity, more propaganda than actually ideological, is not so much to rally the majority around a certain idea, but not to prevent the majority from rallying around power, despite the fact that within this majority there are different ideological preferences. At the same time, the regime more or less clearly singles out the dissenting pro-Western minority, emphasizing its opposition to the “patriotic” majority.

At least one thing can definitely be said about this set of signals: this is not ethnic Russian nationalism. Of course, it is not civil either, since “civil nationalism” implies political activity and a certain political freedom of citizens. How imperial is he? Laruelle doubts this, and indeed, here one can put forward various arguments for and against; but her interpretation of Putin's nationalism as "state", that is, anti-Western and statist, is certainly correct. Putin's public statements regarding the national question are quite consistent with the general attitudes of "imperial" or "civilizational" nationalism, which were discussed above. At the same time, official nationalism is not ready to identify itself in any terms, including these. Even etatism, which is fundamental for the Kremlin, is not declared directly, so as not to limit its own freedom of maneuver, which is of paramount importance for the supreme power. So far, there are no reasons that would prompt the Kremlin to modify its version of nationalism, although some fluctuations in course are quite possible, for example, in order to revive Putin's election campaign.

Nevertheless, sooner or later, both the regime and the dominant quasi-ideology will inevitably change, if only because nothing lasts forever (the nature of the changes, of course, will depend on a number of circumstances), so today one can try to imagine which of the above nationalist actors can play an essential role in this. In his article, Laruelle considers the possible role of the opposition. In her opinion, official nationalism can be opposed by two alternatives that have prospects in Russia, although both are still relatively weak. The first is the Islamic movement: the construction of one's own collective identity within the framework of this movement runs counter to the established informal hierarchy of ethnic cultures (in which Russian "civilization" is described through a certain Russian and Orthodox "core" 8 ); but Islamism is still a completely separate issue.

The second alternative is European-style national populism, that is, a movement to protect social benefits from the “come in large numbers” combined with cultural isolationism. Such movements are usually related to the traditional, neo-Nazi far right, but develop separately from them. Laruelle sees the potential for the development of similar national-populism in Russia, also on the basis of national-democratic rather than neo-Nazi groups 9 . And here the problem arises: like many researchers, Laruelle clearly exaggerates the significance of these groups.

Such an exaggeration is natural 10 . Firstly, among those who are members of such groups or sympathize with them, there are many active and bright authors, so they are more noticeable on the Web. Secondly, they were political news at the beginning of this decade, which attracted unreasonably large attention, including because they tried to partly lean against the liberal democratic opposition (however, it should be noted that since the end of 2010, the same DPNI tried to do the most). Thirdly (or firstly), Alexei Navalny can be classified as a national democrat, and his political weight far exceeds that of other nationalist leaders.

And yet it must be remembered that all the organizations of the National Democrats are rather small in number. On the Moscow protest marches, as well as on the "Russian marches", their total number never even reached two hundred people. Contrary to Laruelle's opinion, they played the smallest role in the mass protests of 2011-2012, although they tried very hard. And Navalny himself, as Emil Pain 11 well showed , back in 2012 preferred to forget about “Stop feeding the Caucasus” and noticeably moved away from the nationalist agenda. In the midst of the anti-migrant hysteria of 2013, he, however, again used this agenda in his campaign for the election of the mayor of Moscow, but in this sense he did not stand out from other candidates (with the exception of Sergei Mitrokhin), and then he again forgot about migrants.

The crisis of the nationalist movement in 2014–2015 nearly killed the National Democrats. The New Force Party simply closed down, the National Democratic Party almost ceased to exist, and the already small National Democratic Alliance became even less visible. New groups of national-democratic orientation, born on the ruins of the "Russians" movement, are still very weak.

Instead of national democracy as a specific version of the nationalist movement, another option arose, so far in the form of a series of experiments - a systemic association of the ultra-right and national populists with liberals. The first sign was the parliamentary campaign of the liberal Parnassus party, when Vyacheslav Maltsev, known for his scandalous xenophobic statements, was in second place on its list of candidates. Liberal politicians ended up not just side by side at the rally, but in the same structure with people like the neo-Nazi Dmitry Demushkin. You can also call the "New Opposition", which united - on an almost unprincipled basis - a variety of groups from liberal democrats to the recent radical far right, but this is a small and ephemeral association.

Perhaps the most striking example of the rise of national populism was Maltsev’s Artpodgotovka movement itself, only slightly disguised as national democratic. In terms of the number of notable supporters (the word “activists” is not entirely appropriate here), this movement began to overtake all other nationalist groups, which continued to shrink and fragment. And the participation of the Artpodgotovka asset and the Demushkin Party of Nationalists in the actions organized by Navalny on March 26 and June 12, 2017 gave some reason to talk about a possible scenario of a national-populist revival, including Navalny himself (at a debate with Strelkov on July 20, 2017, 12 Navalny considered it necessary remember that he is still a nationalist).

Does this mean that the scenario described by Laruelle, involving the rise of nationalism from below, can become a reality? I think while this is extremely unlikely: the scale of national populism is modest even against the backdrop of a generally extremely weak Russian opposition (at least as long as Navalny only occasionally positions himself as a nationalist), it is still impossible to compare with the corresponding European movements. In addition, the authorities, very sensitive to any potential threat, have already reacted by sharply increasing pressure on the nationalist sector, and the sector turned out to be, as before, very vulnerable: in July 2017, several nationalist leaders left Russia, including Maltsev, apparently , difficult times have come for Artpodgotovka.

The current situation does not allow us to make assumptions about the future, when the development of Russia will be determined by political movements and parties. Accordingly, it is impossible to say whether nationalistic ones will dominate among them and of what kind. It depends on many circumstances that today it is not possible to calculate - including how Russian politics can move to a real struggle between political movements, as well as the dynamics of migration flows, economic processes, the development of relations with other countries, the situation in the North Caucasus etc. So far, we can only state that nationalism fails to become the driving force of opposition mobilization.

More intriguing is also Laruelle's version of a nationalist turn within a small ruling circle. After all, if we exclude a completely unbelievable development of events, namely that this whole circle will suddenly and at once disappear, then we can expect that sooner or later a regrouping will occur within it. And it is quite possible that members of one of the openly nationalist "ecosystems" will end up at the top after that. To what extent will these people change the face of official nationalism? Laruelle believes that radical changes should not be expected: the new version of the official quasi-ideology will still not be ethno-nationalist or more aggressively imperial, because these parameters are limited by the regime's self-preservation instinct. The core of this ideology will still remain etatism. However, the ratio of different approaches to the formation of the future official line can still vary significantly depending on subjective factors and the objective circumstances listed above.

It can be assumed with great certainty that a significant regrouping at the top will lead to greater ideological mobilization, since the renewed regime will inevitably have to expand support, as well as discredit and partially suppress opponents. What it looks like, we saw during the ideological mobilization of 2012, although then the mobilization was required not because of reshuffles at the top, but because of the emergence of protest from below. And it is difficult to imagine any ideological basis for this future mobilization other than one or another version of nationalism. And what changes this can lead to is a completely open question.

Notes

1.       Laruelle M. Is Nationalism a Force for Change in Russia? // Daedalus. Spring 2017. Vol. 146, Issue 2. P. 89–100. URL:  http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/DAED_a_00437?journalCode=daed (доступ 01.09.2017). 

2.   See, for example: Laruelle M. In the name of the nation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

3. An example of such an analysis see: Ponarin E., Komin M . Russian dilemma nationalism. "Imperial" and ethnic nationalism in post-Soviet Russia // Politia. 2016. No. 4. pp. 82–93.

4. Verkhovsky A.   National radicals from Medvedev's presidency to the war in Donbass // Counterpoint. 2015. №2.

5. With the ups and downs of development movement of Russian nationalists can be found in a condensed form in corresponding chapters of the annual reports of the SOVA Center written by Vera Alperovich. This article relies heavily on them. All reports are available on the Center's website. Last: Alperovich V. Far-right in protest. Winter-spring 2017 // SOVA Center. 2017.11 August. URL: http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2017/08/d37611/ (accessed 25.08.2017).

6. "Dialogue of civilizations" - a series of international conferences and publications designed to bring together "civilizations", understood roughly in the Huntingtonian sense. At the same time, all these "civilizations" are clearly called upon to unite against the dominant influence of one - secular and liberal West, although the project cultivates quite Western rhetoric of tolerance and multiculturalism, only understood rather in a geopolitical sense. See the website of the Dialogue of Civilizations Foundation

7. Mitrokhin N. Invasion of the Farsians // Grani.ru. 2014. May 19. URL: http://graniru.org/opinion/mitrokhin/m.229356.html (access 25.08.2017).

8. The concept of Russian, Orthodox "core" is quite explicitly formulated in the "Strategy State national policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025 year”, approved by presidential decree on December 19, 2012.

9. By this National Democrats differed from the “Russians” movement, which also claimed the role the Russian version of the French National Front or the Austrian Party freedom, but remained a coalition of former and current neo-Nazis who appealed to the themes of freedom and democracy only when they were pressed too hard authorities.

10. Significance of these groups Russian researchers, for example, Emil Pain, also tend to exaggerate. Pain later revised his estimates, but still believes that national democrats will still play a significant role in Russia: Pain E. The evolution of nationalism in Russia // Political Conceptology. 2016. №3. WITH. 231–251.

11. Pain E. Modern Russian nationalism in the mirror of Runet // Russia is not Ukraine: modern accents of nationalism. M .: Center "Sova", 2014. S. 8–31.

12. Full Recording Debate on the Navalny LIVE video channel.

Sources

• Verkhovsky A. Nationalism as the basis of mobilization // Counterpoint. N 7. 2017. November.