A wide front of inadequacy

Social moods of the summer of 2022

The data of the July survey of the Levada Center demonstrate the complete absence of any changes regarding Russians to the war in Ukraine, assessments of the situation in the country and its leadership-they are held at the levels that they have reached in April. At the same time, the most striking feature of social moods was the excessive growth of the general optimism of Russians and economic optimism, including completely non -corresponding objective data on the state of the economy. For the third month in a row in the Polls of the Levada Center, the level of attention of the respondents to the “special military operation” has not changed (55–56%monitor the news about it), the level of support (75–77%, of which 47–48%of the respondents are unconditionally support), assessment of the situation in the country (positive assessment-68%), the level of approval of Putin (82–83%, does not change. Five months in a row) and the premiere of Mishustin (68–70%, also since March). It seems that the respondents of the Levada Center have some keys in their heads.

In general, this picture is difficult to consider natural. As already noted , in the March -April of the assessment of respondents on a wide range of issues, the regime and authorities have dramatically in the direction of greater loyalty. The share of Putin approving as the President increased from 64% on average for 2021 to 83% in March-July 2022 (+19 percentage points), Prime Minister-from 55 to 71% (+16 pp), Government-from 49 to 70% (+21 pp.), Duma-from 41 to 59% (+18 pp). For three and a half previous years, an average of 48% of respondents believed that the country was moving in the right direction, and 42% - that it is walking along the wrong path. Since March, this ratio has been kept at the level of 68% versus 22%, and this means that at least 10% of citizens who believed that the country is moving in the wrong direction, after the start of the war with Ukraine changed their minds to the opposite (provided that none of the previously evaluating the situation changed their opinion).

This phenomenon is a sharp increase in loyalty, which showed itself after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, is well known in sociology as a “rally with a flag” (Rally Around the Flag). However, in Russia, its manifestations look unusually wide and stable.

So, for example, in recent months, respondents not only show a higher readiness to vote for the unloved and despised “United Russia” unloved in the country (39% of respondents in recent months are ready to vote for it instead of 26% on average over 2021), but also the number of those who said that voted for EP in 2017, increased from 40% in 2021 to 53% in July in July, in July, in July, in July, in July, in July, in July, in July, in July 53% in July in July 2022 (see Fig. 1).

Figure 1. The intention to vote for “United Russia” in the Duma elections and the share of claiming that they voted for it in past elections, % of the number of respondents

And the following effect looks completely absurd. In the polls of Thomas to respondents, the question of the mood of the people around them is constantly asked; This is another indirect indicator that allows you to monitor the changes in the "average temperature in the hospital." So, the share of those who evaluate the mood of others as “calm” reached a peak (62%) at the end of July , and the share of “alarming” answers - absolute minimums (32%). While in the pre -war period this ratio was approximately 45% by 45%. It turns out that only war and sanctions allowed Russian society to experience the level of peace and tranquility unattainable in ordinary life. However, in the polls of the Levada Center, the July answers to the regular question "What could you say about your mood in the last days?" They demonstrate the maximums that were observed in the postcrymist period and at the end of 2017-early 2018.

Note that in comparison with the postcrymist "rally" the current anomaly demonstrates one significant change in the mobilization pattern. In Figure 2, we see the ratio of three parameters: the dynamics of Putin’s approval, the dynamics of positive assessments of the situation in the country and the dynamics of trust in Putin.

Figure 2. The dynamics of the approval of V. Putin, to him and positive assessments of the state of affairs in the country, % of the number of surveyed

As you can see, this time Putin’s personal gain in the “rally” turned out to be much smaller than in 2014, and looks not very stable (“trust” on average grew by 10 percentage points, that is, even less than the willingness to vote for United Russia). In 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, 85%of the respondents spoke about Putin’s approval, and 55%trusted him, 83%approved Putin in the spring and summer of 2022, but 41%claims to trust him. Previously, the fractions of the state of affairs in the country and trusting Putin were almost the same and synchronously grew up during the postcrymist's “rally”. In 2019–2020, the level of trust in Putin was falling and the share of those trusting him was significantly less than the share of the general state of affairs in the country. During the current “rally”, the assessment of the situation took off again, and Putin's trust did not grow so significantly. This means that the euphoria, which, according to polls, citizens experienced in connection with the outbreak of war and the introduction of sanctions, is not inspired by the image of the “leader” and his personal messenger.

Finally, as in 2014, the effects of the survey anomalies apply to assessments of the economic situation. Figure 3 shows how synchronously and radically improves the assessments of the economic situation of Russia in 2014 and in 2022. The difference, however, is that in the spring of 2014 there was no economic crisis in Russia and GDP reduction by about 4%. The economic compression rates were comparable to the current pace of compression in early 2015, and the economic situation index reacted to this large -scale fall. In contrast to this in the spring and summer of 2022, respondents practically do not see any crisis.

Figure 3. Dynamics of assessments of the economic situation of Russia

The social mood index , calculated by the Levada Center, reached the value of 96 points-and the last time such values ​​were observed in 2008, when the economic growth rate was at least 5% per year; The unemployment index , on the contrary, has reached minimum, also unprecedented since 2008. And even the consumer sentiment index reached the levels of the Dopandemium 2019. The latter is especially curious taking into account the fact that economic statistics, on the contrary, indicate the dramatic compression of consumer demand. The same, however, write about the same, the Central Bank experts write in a recent review, based on the info polls: the consumer mood index has reached the maximum value since May 2018. In general, it can be said that the assessments of the current economic situation today are significantly higher than they were in the second half of 2021, when the economy has experienced the highest growth rates over the past 12 years in the post -pandemic recovery phase.

The phenomenon of the “rally with a flag” usually means an increase in the support of the government in moments of an external threat. At the same time, researchers do not have a consolidated opinion regarding the mechanisms that cause it, and it is very likely that in the conditions of democratic and authoritarian political systems, these mechanisms differ significantly. However, as we see, on the example of two cases of an “authoritarian rally” in Russia, it is not so much about the growth of government support, but about a wider and more abrupt change in the perception of social reality by respondents. The question of the nature of this sociological anomaly is whether it is the result of the efforts of propaganda, falsification of preferences under the influence of the imaginary “superbolstery” or the result of a change in the relations of the respondents to polls (that is, a lower tendency to participate in them in critical citizens), requires further careful study. But it is important to fix so far that we are talking about a kind of wide front of inadequacy that manifests itself in polls.