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Will mobilization bring down a wire consensus in Russia?

The mobilization announced in Russia has become a real shock for the Russian population, they show sociological data. Even among supporters of war, one can distinguish at least three parties, justifying and understanding it differently. What will be their reaction to the new reality of the war? While the aggressive rhetoric of President Putin is aimed at expanding the base of support for the party of total war, administrative chaos, ideological escalation and a real threat of prosperity and life create conditions for the collapse of a wire consensus. But to say that it took place or inevitable in the near future is early.

Mobilization shock and new face of war

The data of the September survey of the Levada Center about the attitude of Russians to the war in Ukraine indicate a sharp turning point in its perception. It is impossible to say that the support of the war has collapsed - on the contrary, a decrease in this indicator looks insignificant, from 76% in July to 72% in September. However, other parameters demonstrate a sharp change in the perception of war.

First of all, these changes showed themselves in a sharp increase in attention to events in Ukraine. In the previous five months, this attention consistently weakened: in March, 64%were monitored in Ukraine, and in August only 51%; The war became a familiar and not too nervous background. At the end of September, not just a fracture of the trend occurred - the share of those who follow the events in Ukraine jumped immediately by 17 percentage points and exceeded the values ​​of March (68%). Despite the fact that attention to the topic increased in all age groups, such a powerful effect was provided by a group of respondents 24–39 years, where the share of the following events increased from 33% in August to 55% in September (at the rest of the age, it increased by an average of 8 p.).

A similar situation in the answers to the question of whether the respondents are concerned about the events in Ukraine: in August, 74% of respondents noted this anxiety, and in September their share jumped up to 88%, and the increase also provided younger age - 18–39 years (+25 p.). Thus, a sharp change in the level of attention to the war is provided primarily by respondents of draft ages, that is, it is a reaction to the declared mobilization. The Kremlin, which pursued in recent months, a successful policy of the information mutilation of the war, has now crossed out his efforts at once.

The war not only returned to the Russians after several months of growing escapism, but returned to them in a different guise. Another pillar of perception of a “special operation” has practically collapsed - the idea that it is developing successfully. So 68% of those surveyed in May thought in May in June, and even at the end of July, when the trend unfavorable for the Kremlin was already obvious during the war, 62% of the Russian Field surveyed were still called the “special operation” “successful”. In the September measurement of the Levada Center, only 53% are already called successful, 31% consider its course not successful, and 16% found it difficult to express their opinion, which in this case means “no” than “yes”.

However, the failure of the “operation” is interpreted by respondents more likely in a neutral way - its signs are most often called “tightening”, duration (27%) or the fact of mobilization declaration (23%). More serious and politically focused interpretations of failure: “A lot of people die”, “The war has no goal, it was not necessary to start”, “Unprofessional command”, “Lack of technology”, “corruption” - about 30% of respondents noted. And approximately the same amount of conviction of the need to increase efforts and act more decisively.

Despite the fact that the main trigger in relation to the war was the declaration of mobilization, citizens are quite aware of its causes - the successful attack of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. 77% of respondents carefully monitored or something about him, despite the fact that the official information channels did not apply too much on this topic. This once again shows that the Russians do not live in the information bubble, more precisely - they live in it, but they quite imagine what is happening beyond its borders. Compared to August, the ratio of those who advocate the continuation of hostilities and peace negotiations has changed: if then 48% advocated the first scenario, and 44% for the second, now the opposite ratio. The Paul of the respondent is a critical factor in this matter: 57%is expressed among men for the continuation of hostilities, and only 34%among women.

A decrease in the ratings of approval and confidence in the authorities and political leadership (primarily to the president, by 6 p.) So far, it looks quite moderate and, as RE noted: Russia , does not compensate for the effect of the “rally around the flag” - the explosive growth of these ratings after the beginning of the “operation”. And although the Levada Center survey carried out on September 22–28 could not quite catch these moods, in general, the shock from the declaration of mobilization led to significant changes in the perception of the war. While his effect was an acute unfortunate concern - the survey was conducted in hot pursuit and while the “political conclusions” look not formulated and not defined. In these FOM, the ratings also did not sank very significantly (–5 p. P. Putin), but the general mood of the respondents changed dramatically: for example, the share of the surveyed anxiety of the people around them doubled (from 35 to 69%), and the share of critical statements to the authorities is 9 p. (From 34 to 43%).

What do we know about the attitude of Russians towards war and how reliable is this knowledge?

The independent research group Russian Field (RF), together with the head of the City Projects Foundation, Maxim Katsa, have conducted eight waves of the All -Russian survey on the topic of attitude to war from the end of February. One of the objectives of the study was precisely in checking the data of large -core centers, expand them due to additional questions and measure the real readiness of respondents to answer sociologists.

In general, we can say that the RF and “Levada Center” data look completely agreed in the main parameters. The share of citizens who positively answer the direct question about the support of “Svo” in the RF polls grew in the spring: if immediately after the start of the “operation” about support was declared 59% of the respondents, then by the end of July the share of supporting increased to 69%. At the initial stage, the Levada Center data were significantly higher, but by the end of the summer the difference with RF was reduced and does not look fundamental: 70–75% say that they support the actions of the Russian troops, of which they are more than half-they fully support, and the rest mainly support.

The share of citizens who positively answer the question about supporting “Sw”, % of the number of respondents

It is quite consistent with the data of the Levada Center and another indicator-a noticeable improvement in assessments of the situation in the country after the beginning of the “operation”. Here, the “Levada Center” data is also higher (+10 p.) Than RF, but in general both indicate the general trend. This growth of optimism is also due to the effect of consolidation - a patriotic rise in response to geopolitical challenges (“rally around the flag”). This phenomenon was observed after the annexation of Crimea, and in 2022 it even spread to the readiness to vote for the previously lost popularity "United Russia". However, the growth of satisfaction can be explained by the fact that the expectations of a sharp deterioration in welfare in connection with the outbreak of war and sanctions did not materialize. The first waves of RF showed that respondents were extremely pessimistic evaluated personal financial prospects at the end of February, but according to the results of the eighth wave at the end of July, almost half of the respondents said that she did not feel the influence of sanctions on her life and the life of her loved ones.

The share of citizens satisfied with the current state of affairs in the country, % of the number of respondents

The RF study expands our understanding of another discussion issue: how much in the conditions of war, repressive and propaganda pressure the decision to participate in the survey remains neutral, does not depend on the position of the respondent on sensitive topics. RF reports, conducting their research by a telephone survey, fix in detail the dynamics of the respondents' readiness to participate in the survey (Response Rate). According to RF researchers, since the beginning of the war, the number of failures has increased by 25%, and the number of interrupted profiles by 34%. For all eight waves of polls, the average values ​​of failures ranged at 88%, or 14.3 refusal and interruption on one target questionnaire. At the same time, about a third of the refusals to continue the conversation were recorded on the direct issue of supporting “Switch”.

In the fourth wave of the survey, a direct question was asked whether respondents are afraid to take part in research on the topic of events in Ukraine. 21% of respondents confirmed the presence of such fears; At the same time, opponents of the “military operation” fears almost twice as often than supporters (48% versus 28%).

Interestingly, these data are also consistent with the measurements of the Levada Center. In 2015, among those who support and not supporting Putin, the share of those who feel free in the statement of political judgments was the same, and in 2022, among those who did not support, they felt twice as much as respondents in the statement of their opinions than among the supporting ones, and the share of those who were afraid to express him was four times higher among the non-proper ones. These figures leave little chance of the assumption that the willingness to participate in the polls is the same for loyal and disloyal respondents (despite the fact that the experts of the Levada Center insist that there were no changes in the readiness of the respondents).

"Climate of opinions": a willingness to publicly talk about the attitude to the actions of the authorities and the president among the approving and not approving President Putin, % of the number of respondents

Three parties of the war and one and a half part of the world

A direct question about the attitude to the war in Ukraine is extremely sensitive to Russian respondents. The public expression of an anti -war position is persecuted by the “military” legislation, examples of the application of which are known in Russia to almost everyone. But even in addition to the fear of repression, the attitude to the war is a very difficult question for most Russians: while the war goes and “ours” die, on which side are you?

Therefore, sociologists complement the direct question about the attitude to the war by projective (not direct) issues. And in this regard, RF surveys significantly complement the picture of views on what is happening in Ukraine. Firstly, from the third wave of the respondents' research began to be asked: if they had the opportunity to return to the past, whether it seems more correct for them to make a decision on the beginning of the “operation” or was still made? While about 70% of respondents announced the direct support of Svo on average, only 56% do not consider it right to cancel the decision on its beginning, if there was such an opportunity. This means that for approximately 15% of respondents claiming the support of the war, her reasons for her began not outweigh her costs. It does not seem to them that the threats to which she was an answer were serious enough to start the war. These people “support” the war not because it was needed, but so far as it is already coming.

In another question, the respondents were asked what they would prefer now - to continue their “sucker” or go to peace negotiations? For the continuation of the war in RF polls, a little more than half of the respondents spoke in May-July, and 48%in the August survey of Levada Center. That is, only half of the respondents believes that the threats that the war is to the war are quite serious and relevant to continue further. Finally, the respondents were asked about their readiness to personally participate in the “special operation”. More than half (60–64%) responded men responded negatively; About 30% of men are ready to take part in Svo, and only about half of them are people of draft age.

RF surveys expose a number of paradoxes in the perception of war. So, if the decision to stop the “military operation” was made by Vladimir Putin, two -thirds of the respondents would be supported by him. But approximately the same share of the respondents would support the opposite decision - to begin a new attack on Kyiv. This indicates the high loyalty of Putin's decisions participating in the survey. And against this background, the presence of 27% of respondents who would not support Putin if he decided to end the war now. These people are imbued with propaganda arguments proving the need for war and its existential character.

So, people are not, of course, black and white balls - those who are for war, and those who are against. They are made by the questions of half the stars. But the same questions allow us to see gradations regarding the respondents to the war. Let's try to summarize what we know about this from the polls of the Levada Center and RF, especially since, as we have seen, they do not differ too much in the basic distributions.

So, 27% are considered threats that have become the reason for the war so serious that even Putin’s decision to stop it will look like a defeature. 35–40% say they fully support the war. Somewhere between these borders (27–40%) lies the border of the real batch of war-those who seriously and deeply perceived the arguments in its favor and feels its inevitability and necessity.

About 50% are those who consider threats that have caused the war that have not yet been stopped, although not all of them support military operations completely and in everything. Finally, despite the fact that 70–75% of respondents speak of their support for the “military operation”, only 55% believe that the war should have started.

Thus, the gradations of the attitude to the war can be approximately determined as follows: about a third of those answering questions make up a real “party of war”, about 20% more support the war with some reservations and another 20% support it, although they believe that it could not (or should not) begin. In addition to them, about 10% find it difficult to answer, about 20% openly opposed the war, and, very likely, there are also a “party of silent” - negatively related to war, but seeking to avoid answers on this subject.

Total war, fair war, inevitable war, peace and silence

This picture of dry numbers will be filled with content if we turn to those main narratives that explain the Russian-Ukrainian war of the Russian layman. If you turn on the Russian TV, we will see two main versions of the war. In the author’s television shows of famous Kremlin leaders-jackets (Soloviev, Kiselev, Skobeev), we plunge into the atmosphere of the total war of Russia with the West, which is firmly aimed at defeating Russia and cannot come to terms with its existence. Here they think of the categories of the Apocalypse and the last battle, they say that the enemy on the threshold, often and with pleasure call the Ukrainian leadership and army Nazis, speak of genocide in relation to Russians, etc.

But if (before the mobilization announcement) switch to ordinary news programs on the same state television channels, we will see another war, more precisely, a “special military operation”. This “operation” is conducted by the forces of the highly professional army and aims to liberate the inhabitants of Donbass, suffering from the oppression of Ukrainian nationalism and dream of reuniting with Russia. This is a “fair war” based on the Doctrine of “Responsibility to Protect”, which has limited and mainly humanitarian (“liberation”) tasks. The confrontation with the West is also present here, but as a secondary factor.

A large -scale study of the laboratory of public sociology, analyzing an array of more than 2000 in -depth interviews with Russian citizens about the war, demonstrates the use of the same main narratives with ordinary Russians. “From the point of view of the content of the excuses [the interviewed war], they rely on three narratives: salvation (Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics), confrontation (with Ukraine and the West), geopolitics (the struggle for influence with the“ great powers ”),” the authors of the study write. They also note the presence in this array of strategies for various reservations and doubts - those who believe that, since the war is already going on, it is necessary to support “their own”, those who cannot formulate the goals and reasons for the war, but explain this with their incompetence and expresses confidence (hope) in the competence of the authorities, those who support the war, but expresses doubts about its final goals and results, etc.

All this fills with a concrete content a line of gradations of war support, built above. In general, we can highlight, first of all, a “party of total war”; For these people, the war is a response to a “camouflaged” or prepared attack on Russia from the West by “the hands of Ukraine”. For them, war is close, it is almost on the threshold and requires citizens to defend the Fatherland. The second party is the Party of Fair War, the purpose of which is to liberate the Russian population in the east of Ukraine. For them, war is far away, it is a “special military operation” of professional Russian troops, which have a specific and local task.

Наконец, третья партия — партия конформистов, которые так или иначе уклоняются от обсуждения достаточности причин и основательности целей войны, но поддерживают российские войска, поскольку война уже идет. Для этой партии война также находится «где-то» в отдалении. Следует также помнить, что вопрос поддержки/не поддержки войны не является для респондентов предметом абстрактного выбора. Позиция неподдержки чревата как конфронтацией с поддерживающим войну «большинством», так и с властями — она чревата перспективой лишиться работы, стать объектом репрессий и пр.

Помимо трех партий войны в российской социальной реальности присутствуют еще полторы партии. Это партия противников войны, считающих ее бесцельной, не рациональной, морально преступной и несправедливой (около 20%). А также партия сомневающихся и уклоняющихся — затрудняющихся определить свое мнение в отношении войны или уклоняющихся от общения с полстерами.

Мобилизация: раскол или консолидация?

В обращении к нации по поводу своего решения Владимир Путин щедро использовал риторику партии «тотальной войны» с Западом и внушал гражданам, что «враг у ворот», а потому необходимо встать на защиту Родины. В общем, если «специальная военная операция» начиналась как косплей Великой победы и 9 мая Путин планировал принимать в Москве, как в свое время Сталин, двойной парад, то теперь война оборачивается косплеем 1941 года — «Вставай, страна огромная…». Это, как считают многие, подорвет провоенный «навязанный консенсус» в российском обществе.

И действительно, для многих поддерживающих войну она не является ответом на непосредственную угрозу, но выглядит внешнеполитическим решением Путина, с которым респонденты искренне (партия «справедливой войны») или не совсем искренне (конформисты) соглашаются. Объявленная мобилизация подрывает эту интерпретацию и оказывается угрозой для этих групп. Именно среди них резко возросло внимание к информации о событиях в Украине и обеспокоенность происходящим. Резкая перемена настроений охватывает, видимо, от 15 до 30% опрошенных.

Если эти люди или их значительная часть перейдут в стан противников войны, то этот стан перестанет быть меньшинством. Это в свою очередь стимулирует присоединиться к ним часть «молчащих». However, not everything is so simple. Сомневающиеся или умеренные сторонники войны вряд ли быстро обратятся к антивоенным нарративам. Как отмечают исследователи Лаборатории публичной социологии, между антивоенной партией и сомневающимися существует определенная враждебность. Противники войны и их аргументы фреймированы для сомневающихся и умеренных как маргинальный, моралистический и «безответственный» дискурс. Динамику мнений в среде умеренных сторонников войны определит исход их внутреннего раскола, который провоцирует объявление мобилизации. В этом отношении протесты в Дагестане и Якутии, организованные родственниками мобилизуемых, гораздо важнее протестов в Москве и Петербурге, организованных антивоенными активистами. Чтобы найти свое место среди противников войны, им необходимо найти голос «альтернативного большинства»: неудачи и тяготы войны связаны с некомпетентностью руководства, коррупцией, а начало войны, в которой не было необходимости, обусловлено политическими интригами и желанием сохранить место во власти за счет жертв простых людей.

Однако существует и другой сценарий. Владимир Путин — опытный гроссмейстер авторитарных манипуляций общественными настроениями. Своими выступлениями последних дней он пытается расширить базу поддержки «тотальной войны». Его мобилизационный призыв, подкрепленный работой репрессивной машины, нацелен на то, чтобы принудить партию «сомневающихся» к большей лояльности и вовлеченности.

Он рассчитан на то, чтобы поляризовать общество, заставив «сомневающихся» в войне определиться. Он рассчитан на то, что потери среди призванных станут залогом оправдания их гибели и войны в целом. И он рассчитан на то, что режиму удастся представить тех, кто примет неправильную сторону, отщепенцами и меньшинством, как это удавалось сделать на предыдущих этапах.

У этих расчетов есть резон. Мы видим, что, в то время как жители крупных городов, более продвинутые слои, спасаются от мобилизации бегством, на периферии люди принимают ее как данность и отправляются на призывные пункты. Они не горят желанием воевать, растеряны и испуганы, однако не готовы к тому, чтобы разорвать сознание своей общности с воображаемым «национальным телом», волю и стремление которого выражает для них Владимир Путин. Но это вынужденное решение увеличит их враждебность к тем, кто делает противоположный выбор.

Впрочем, ход мобилизации на протяжении первой недели наносит серьезный удар по вполне рациональным расчетам Путина. Этот процесс оказался настолько хаотическим, спешным и нервозным, что подрывает доверие обывателя к государственной машине, ее эффективности и нацеленности на «общее дело». А значит, подрывает то ощущение единства государства и нации, на которое рассчитывал Путин.

Итак, в целом можно сказать, что судьба начатой Владимиром Путиным войны в значительной мере зависит от динамики настроений в двух описанных выше партиях — партии «справедливой войны» и партии конформистов. Общий рост издержек, который несет обывателю объявленная мобилизация, радикализация военного нарратива, объясняющего смысл и характер войны, и управленческая неэффективность самого хода мобилизации создают условия для перелома настроений, который подорвет и дезавуирует навязанный Кремлем провоенный консенсус. Однако говорить, что это уже произошло, преждевременно, а что это неизбежно — самонадеянно.