Semi-existential threat: will European public opinion survive the challenge of direct Russian aggression?

The perception of the war in Ukraine in European public opinion has changed significantly over the past year and a half. As a result, today it is clearly seen as a direct issue of European security and, to a large extent, an existential challenge for Europe.

Paradoxically, this was facilitated by a sharp deterioration in relations between Europe and the United States. The weakening of American guarantees created a sense of vulnerability in Europe and made it more sensitive to the potential of the “Russian threat.” And Moscow’s sabotage and hybrid attacks only strengthened this perception. The majority of Europeans, as polls show, see Russia today as a direct threat to their security and consider strengthening defense capabilities to be a priority task for the European community.

However, agreement on the task of building up Europe's defense capabilities turns into differences of opinion when moving to practical issues of what the new European security architecture should look like. Europeans disagree on the sources of defense spending, the prospects for a European military force, and the role and architecture of Europe's nuclear deterrent.

This, in turn, demonstrates that, although in political narratives the “Russian threat” is already conceptualized as an existential challenge, at the level of emotions and mass perception it has not yet become so, or has only become half so far.

In this situation, what will be the reaction of Europe and European public opinion in the event of Russia’s hybrid aggression against one of the Baltic countries? Polls show that European countries vary widely in their preparedness for direct confrontation with Russia, and in such a hypothetical scenario, Europe would have difficulty reaching a consensus decision on a military response to aggression.

At the same time, the unilateral determination of the Baltic coalition - Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Poland - to enter into the conflict, providing direct military support to the allies, could tip the scales, forcing a number of wavering countries to join it, primarily Germany, and with them the entire European NATO grouping.

Perception of conflict: change of coordinates

The perception of the Ukrainian war in Europe has changed significantly over the past year and a half. Back in 2024, European public opinion and the political class were wavering between understanding it as an existential challenge to European security or a regional conflict in the post-Soviet space, which has limited relevance to Europe (→ Re: Russia: Putin-Schrödinger's Cat ). This hesitation was expressed in discussions about to what extent and to what point Europe should and could support Ukraine. Today this topic has finally moved to the periphery of public discussions.

This change was unexpectedly facilitated by two circumstances. Firstly, the sharp deterioration of relations with the United States after the return of Donald Trump to the White House and the acute feeling of insecurity that arose in Europe in connection with this. And the growing hostility in relations with Russia and Moscow’s hybrid operations in Europe, secondly. The latter, as apparently expected, were supposed to frighten Europeans and strengthen the split between camps holding different points of view on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, but as a result they had the opposite effect. The feeling of emerging vulnerability as a result of US “defection” has increased Europe's sensitivity to a potential “Russian threat”.

As a result, today the idea that Europe - at least in the form of states bordering Russia - could become the next target of Russian aggression immediately after or even before the end of the Ukrainian conflict is quite deeply rooted in European political consciousness. And preparations for possible Russian aggression have actually become the main focus of European international and defense policy.

European unity on these issues - the need to strengthen its security and support Ukraine as part of this task - has clearly increased at the level of political declarations and political rhetoric. However, the question of how European public opinion will react to the possible challenge of Russian hybrid aggression, the purpose of which will be to test Europe’s resolve in matters of collective defense and attempt to provoke its split (overview of scenarios for such a conflict → Re: Russia: Fox in the Baltic ), remains largely open.

Vulnerable Europe between America and Russia

The US defection and the threat from Russia have dramatically changed the atmosphere in Europe, which today lives in a heightened sense of vulnerability. According to surveys from the latest spring wave of the Eurobarometer (a large-scale study conducted twice a year in 27 EU countries commissioned by the European Commission), 80% of Europeans are concerned about security and defense issues in Europe in the coming years. 76% believe that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a direct threat to the security of Europe. This feeling is shared to the greatest extent in Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and (surprisingly) Portugal, and to the least extent in Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus and Hungary. In answers to the question “Which area should the EU prioritize action over the next five years?” “security and defense” are in the lead (36%), confidently ahead of “economy” (29%), “employment”, “climate” and “migration” (all three - 22%). 80% believe that European defense cooperation should be strengthened, and 64% believe that more money should be spent on defense (only 29% are against). The countries most committed to additional security spending are Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden, and only in two countries—Greece and Slovakia—a slight majority is against it.

At the same time, over the past six months, a sharp decline in trust in the United States in Europe has continued, as shown by the next wave of survey research by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) , conducted in May in a number of European countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Great Britain, Hungary, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, France, Switzerland, Sweden and Estonia). On average, only 11% of respondents in these countries see America as an ally, while in November 2025 there were 16%, and in November 2024 - 22% (hereinafter, the average is not indicated for the entire survey, but for the values ​​​​obtained in individual countries). Even in the most pro-American group of European countries - Great Britain, Hungary and Poland - the share of respondents who see America as an ally has dropped by 6-8 percentage points to only about 20%.

While the main trend in 2025 was a decline in perceptions of the United States as an ally, the most notable shift in the new survey is the increase in the share of respondents who perceive the United States as an adversary. On average for 15 countries, this group is already 13%. Its greatest growth is observed in Denmark, Spain and Switzerland, where the United States is considered an enemy by 20–25% of respondents. A sharp deterioration in the perception of Washington here occurred against the backdrop of US claims to Greenland, Trump’s sharp criticism of Madrid for its reluctance to take part in the war in Iran, and the White House’s trade war with Bern - in 2025, the US introduced import duties of 39% on Swiss goods.

At the same time, in the face of this new vulnerability, as the ECFR survey shows, Europeans are deeply unconfident either in their own ability to defend their countries in the event of military aggression, or in the reliability of formal alliances (EU, NATO). At the same time, they believe in European solidarity. Only about a quarter of people in the countries surveyed believe that the United States will come to their aid if they come under attack. However, about two-thirds are confident that “at least some European countries” will come to the rescue. Residents of the northern Baltic countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden - more than 80%) are absolutely convinced of this, and to the least extent - Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. It is characteristic that faith in neighboring European solidarity is characteristic even of right-wing Eurosceptics - supporters of the National Rally (RN) in France, the Brothers of Italy, the Freedom Party in the Netherlands and the Swedish Democrats, ECFR experts Yana Kobzova and Pavel Zerka note in their review . Overall, this is a very important result, which can be considered as an argument in favor of the fact that in the event of possible Russian aggression against one of the Baltic countries, its neighbors will most likely enter into conflict, even if there is no unity on this issue within the EU or NATO, and the factor of European solidarity will be more important than peacetime cultural and political divisions.

At the same time, the personal readiness of Europeans to defend their countries with weapons in their hands is not too high. On average, across all survey countries, 43% of respondents believe that in the event of an attack, the majority of their fellow citizens would be ready to defend their country. And even fewer—38%—express personal willingness to participate in this. In only two countries—Denmark and Sweden—the majority of respondents expressed both personal readiness and confidence that the majority of their compatriots would make a similar decision. The greatest skepticism towards the majority of their compatriots, as well as themselves personally, is expressed by residents of Germany: only 29% are ready to fight and believe that the majority of their compatriots will fight. However, the relatively low willingness to fight even to defend one’s country is a common problem of post-industrial communities (→ Zvonovsky, Khodykin: Zoomers and War ). The greatest gap between the idea of ​​the courage of one's compatriots and personal readiness to go to war is observed in Italy.

Graph 1. Personal readiness to defend the country in case of aggression and assessment of the readiness for this of the majority of its population, % of the number of respondents

Disagreement in agreement: Europe at a crossroads

Europeans' skepticism towards the US and NATO does not, however, translate directly into a determination to “replace NATO exclusively with a European defense alliance,” polls show. An average of 29% support this idea in the ECFR survey countries, 28% do not support it, while 43% cannot choose a position. This distribution, however, is most likely a consequence of the question being formulated too harshly (“replace NATO”). Europe recognizes the impossibility of such a “replacement” in the near future and sees the build-up of European defense capabilities as a complement rather than an immediate alternative to the alliance.

In addition, there is still a dominant view in Europe - although not as confident as before - that after Trump's departure, US-European relations can return to their previous track. Across the countries surveyed as a whole, an average of 53% think so, while 27% (half as many) believe that European-American relations are damaged in a more fundamental way. This expectation of a return also weakens Europe's conviction in the need to create its own full-fledged military infrastructure, in a sense leaving it in limbo.

In general, agreement on the need to strengthen Europe's defense capabilities and greater coordination of efforts in the field of defense and security results in scattered and discordant opinions when moving to practical issues of what the new security architecture should look like. Thus, in eight of the 15 countries surveyed, there is strong support for the idea of ​​developing a pan-European or even national nuclear arsenal as an alternative to the “American umbrella.” At the same time, not only among the traditional renegades of strengthening European security (Bulgaria, Austria, Hungary), but also in countries such as Italy and - most importantly - Germany, public opinion is divided regarding the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bboth European and national nuclear sovereignty (about 45% support and about 35% oppose). In Britain, with strong support for the idea of ​​a pan-European nuclear force, the prospect of increasing its own nuclear potential in the interests of collective security is controversial: 38% are in favor and 40% are against.

Graph 2. Support for the development of nuclear forces, % of the number of respondents

An even more dramatic range of opinions is observed on the issue of financing defense spending. Over the past six months, in almost all countries surveyed, there have been more supporters of increased defense spending than opponents: the sharpest increase occurred in Portugal, where the net difference between supporters and opponents increased from 26 to 42 percentage points, as well as in Spain (from 1 to 16). While the idea of ​​increasing spending is supported in eight out of 15 countries, it is strongly opposed in Italy, unpopular in Estonia, Austria and Hungary, and barely gains a majority in Germany, Spain and Switzerland. Moreover, while some countries are ready to increase spending only by increasing the collective debt of European countries, most others are opposed to this idea. And this is a big problem, because the alternative idea of ​​​​cutting other government spending (for the sake of defense spending) is strongly opposed by public opinion (including in Germany, Spain, Austria, Italy and even Sweden). Thus, public opinion in a number of countries, while agreeing with the need to increase spending, is divided as to how it should be done and does not agree on any scenario.

Chart 3. Support for increasing defense spending from various sources, % of the number of respondents

On the one hand, the survey shows a relative consensus in Europe that increased defense spending should be aimed at purchasing European weapons. This opinion is shared by an average of almost 60% of respondents in all countries. While just over 20% agree to purchase American weapons. However, in practice, this European patriotism often leads to a decrease in the efficiency of military spending and inflated prices for European weapons due to administrative restrictions on external competition. And in the end it turns out to be a factor in the weakness of developed European countries and their defense strategies, while developing countries are quickly developing cheap alternatives to their expensive weapons.

In other words, despite the high level of agreement on strategic positions - the need for strategic autonomy and strengthening Europe's defense capabilities through its own forces - the road map towards these goals remains vague, including at the level of mass public opinion. This, in turn, demonstrates that, although in political narratives the “Russian threat” is already conceptualized as largely an existential problem for Europe, at the level of emotions and mass perception it has not yet become so, or has only become half so.

Choice Point: Coalition of the Determined

Europeans' willingness to accept sending troops on a military mission to a conflict zone is relatively, but not categorically, low, based on a sample of countries covered by the May ECFR survey. The survey tested two scenarios: sending troops to maintain peace in Ukraine after the end of the acute phase of the conflict and sending troops to the Baltic countries in the event of an attack by Russia. In most cases, the degree of readiness for both challenges at the country level correlates, and on average, across all countries, 39% of respondents expressed such readiness, and 45% expressed unpreparedness. It should be noted that this is a much more balanced ratio, demonstrating significant progress compared to the strong opposition to the idea of ​​​​sending a European peacekeeping mission to Ukraine , which was recorded in 2023-2024.

Chart 4. Readiness to send troops on a peacekeeping mission to Ukraine and to protect the Baltic countries in the event of Russian aggression, % of the number of respondents

In general, the readiness of European public opinion to participate in a peacekeeping operation is higher than to participate in a direct military conflict. The exception is Poland, where participation in the peacekeeping mission in Ukraine, due to the difficult relations between the two countries, does not enjoy support, while the readiness to participate in the defense of the Baltic countries is quite high. The idea of ​​sending troops to the Baltic countries in the event of Russian aggression is supported by an average of 39% of respondents across the sample of countries; it is opposed by 43%. But these averages in this case hide a fairly severe polarization.

Public opinion is most ready for such a turn of events in Sweden and Denmark, where 60–62% support sending troops. In the UK, the Netherlands and Poland, about 50% of respondents express readiness, while about 30% are against it. In Spain, Portugal and Germany, 40% are ready for such a dramatic development of events, while in the latter, opponents of direct participation in the conflict already make up the majority (46%). Во Франции поддерживающих прямую военную помощь балтийским странам в полтора раза меньше, чем ее противников (30 против 45%). В Италии, Австрии, Швейцарии, Венгрии и Румынии их меньше в 3,5–4 раза.

Если оценивать шансы того или иного вероятного развития событий исключительно на данных общественного мнения, то можно сказать примерно следующее. В случае российского (гибридного) вторжения в одну из стран Балтии попытка выработать консенсусное решение относительно военной реакции Европы потерпит несомненный крах в силу неготовности общественного мнения большого числа стран к такому развитию событий. Однако односторонняя решимость балтийской коалиции — Швеции, Дании, Нидерландов, Великобритании, Польши — вступить в конфликт, оказав прямую военную поддержку союзникам, может перевесить чашу весов, заставив присоединиться к ней ряд колеблющихся стран, прежде всего — Германию, а с ними — и всю европейскую группировку НАТО.