On the Eve of the ‘Decisive Breakthrough’: Russia is preparing for a large-scale offensive that will long determine the trajectory of the conflict and the scenario for its conclusion

In the coming weeks, the Russian army will likely attempt a decisive breakthrough on the Donbas front in an effort to compensate for the failures of its offensive in this sector, which has been ongoing since January 2024.

Over the course of twenty months, Russia has captured only about 6,200 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory, securing control of just over half of the part of the region that had remained outside its control. During this time, Russian military losses in killed and wounded have amounted to around 700,000 that is, 110 men per square kilometre or 1,200 per day, double the losses sustained in 2022–2023.

The Russian offensive has been sustained through the intensive recruitment of new contract soldiers, at the level of around 35,000 per month, with contract bonuses having to be raised by an average of 500,000 roubles every three to four months. As a result, manpower costs have become one of the largest items of total wartime expenditure, and they continue to rise.

For eight months this year, the Russian army has failed to achieve any decisive changes on the battlefield. The attempt at a ‘decisive breakthrough’ over the next two months, for which Russia has built up a significant manpower reserve, represents an opportunity to alter the outcome of what has been an extremely costly and low-yield offensive lasting two years. Should it succeed, Ukrainian forces will, in all likelihood, be forced to abandon the Donbas. Should it fail, Russia’s efforts to bring the region fully under its control can be deemed a failure.

Even given Russia’s low sensitivity to losses, embarking on a third consecutive year of offensive operations in the Donbas, with minimal territorial gains, huge casualties, and a rapidly deteriorating economy, will be exceedingly difficult for the Kremlin. Thus, the next two months will mark the climax of the Battle of Donbas – Russia’s uninterrupted two-year offensive – and possibly the climax of the entire four-year war, setting the course of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict for a long time to come.

Twenty months of offensive

Russia’s offensive in 2025 has been a direct continuation of that of 2024. Judging by the estimates of Russian army casualties provided by the UK Ministry of Defence, the pace remained at peak levels (more than 40,000 per month) between October 2024 and March 2025 (see Chart 1). During October–November of last year, Russian territorial gains were also at their highest (over 1,200 sq. km in two months), but afterwards began to decline, falling to minimal levels by March 2025 (see Chart 2). It is possible that at the start of the year, Russian forces were under intense pressure from their command to advance ahead of President Trump’s inauguration, and were unable to adapt to the scale of the 'drone wall' that the Ukrainian armed forces had by then established (→ Re:Russia: A Wall of Drones Vs. Hordes of Motorcycles).

Between May and July the situation shifted: monthly Russian losses fell to 32–34,000 killed and wounded, while the pace of advance reached around 500 sq. km per month. For Ukraine’s army, this was the most unfavourable situation in two years. The Ukrainian investigative project Texty.org.ua noted that the 'price of capture' for each new kilometre of Ukrainian territory was steadily declining for the Russian army. Russian forces had changed tactics, largely abandoning the use of heavy military equipment in favour of small mobile units. Against the backdrop of an escalating manpower shortage on the Ukrainian side, this significantly reduced Russian losses as well as the effectiveness of the 'drone wall'.

Chart 1. Average monthly losses of the Russian army since the start of the invasion of Ukraine, thousands of people killed and wounded

Chart 2. Pace of the Russian army's advance in 2024–2025, square kilometres per month

The main goal of the Russian offensive, announced by the Russian command back in late March 2022, remains the occupation of the entire territory of Donetsk region. Although the Kremlin officially also claims full control over Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions – which are mentioned in the Russian constitution as part of Russia – in reality, no active operations aimed at significantly expanding the zone of control there have been carried out. The principal obstacle for the Russian army remains the chain of fortified stronghold cities in northern Donbas (Pokrovsk – Kostyantynivka – Druzhkivka – Kramatorsk – Siversk – Sloviansk – Lyman), which it has been unable to approach for several years.

The main efforts of the 2025 campaign have focused on Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka. According to daily reports from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Pokrovsk axis has accounted for a third of all Russian attacks over recent months. At the same time, Russian command has tried to avoid a frontal assault on Pokrovsk – experience from previous assaults shows such an operation could drag on for many months and become a trap for the offensive – and has therefore bet on encircling the city and cutting the supply lines of the Ukrainian grouping. However, the Russian breakthrough towards Dobropillia to a depth of 10–15 km in the first half of August, which could have enabled this plan, could not be developed further. By early September, the breakthrough grouping, having received no reinforcements, was encircled. Nor has the attempted encirclement of Kostyantynivka in the direction of Druzhkivka so far succeeded. Nonetheless, both towns are now in salients created by Russian advances on the flanks.

In addition, the Russian offensive of 2025, according to experts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), consists of two primary and two secondary axes. The primary ones include operations northeast of Kharkiv in the Vovchansk area, aimed at pushing Ukrainian forces back from the border with Belgorod region and bringing Kharkiv within tube artillery range, as well as operations in Luhansk region intended to advance into the eastern part of Kharkiv region and encircle the northern part of Donetsk region. Secondary operations are being conducted in Sumy region, with the aim of creating buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the state border and bringing the city of Sumy within artillery range, as well as in eastern Zaporizhzhia region, with the aim of shielding rear areas from Ukrainian strikes and advancing into artillery range of the city of Zaporizhzhia.

However, on 12 September, Ukrainian President Zelensky stated that the Russian offensive on Sumy had been thwarted: 'The Russian grouping on the Sumy axis has lost its offensive capability as a result of the losses it has suffered.' Thus, two attempted breakthroughs this summer – towards Sumy and Dobropillia – have so far brought no success.

In total, from the start of the year to the end of August, Russian forces captured 2,861 sq. km of Ukrainian territory, of which 2,030 sq. km since early May, according to the OSINT project DeepState. Although this pace of advance is more than double last year’s (1,300 sq. km from January to late August), it is extremely slow by the standards of modern mechanised warfare, according to ISW experts. The area captured over the twenty months of fighting (since January 2024) amounts to 1.01% of Ukraine’s total territory (see Chart 3). As of late August, the Russian army controls virtually all of Luhansk region, about 73% of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, and roughly 77% of Donetsk region, according to ISW. In December 2024, ISW estimated the zone of Russian control in Donetsk region at 66% (the area of control in the other regions has hardly changed). Overall, in twenty months of offensive operations, Russia has managed to capture roughly half of what is required to establish full control over the Donbas.

Chart 3. Area of Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia, 2022–2025, sq. km

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) has described Russia’s 2025 campaign as a failure, claiming that during this time Russia has not succeeded in gaining full control over a single major city. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi noted that in August the Russian army had counted on achieving a strategic advantage by breaking through and encircling Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration. But that plan collapsed, and the pace of the Russian offensive in August in fact slowed.

The head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (HUR), Kirill Budanov, gives a more cautious assessment: the summer offensive cannot be considered a success, but 'to say that it brought them [the Russian forces] nothing would also be untrue'. The HUR chief noted that the Russian army had regrouped and continues its offensive operations. Indeed, in the course of the current offensive Russian forces have effectively taken Toretsk and are close to establishing full control over the settlements of Kurakhove, Chasiv Yar, and Velyka Novosilka, while the danger of an encirclement of Pokrovsk remains and has grown significantly during the summer campaign.

The cost-benefit balance

At the same time, the Russian army’s offensive, for all its very limited territorial gains, has been catastrophically costly in terms of losses sustained. Having seized around 6,200 sq. km of Ukrainian territory over 20 months, the Russian army has lost 690,000 killed and wounded excluding August, according to British military estimates, and 720,000 including August, according to the AFU, that is, 110–115 men per square kilometre or 1,200 per day. This is twice the losses recorded in the first 22 months of the war, from March 2022 to December 2023.

A project by the BBC and Mediazona, which tracks losses using open sources, had identified by the end of August the names of 124,832 Russian servicemen killed in the war. Researchers believe this represents about half of the real death toll (between 45% and 65%). Including around 22,000 dead from among the forces of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk 'people’s republics', the overall death toll since the start of the war stands at between 250,000 and 300,000 (according to an alternative calculation conducted jointly by Meduza and Mediazona based on the Register of Inheritance Cases, the number of dead had reached about 220,000 by August 2025 – though this data is also incomplete given delays in probate proceedings.) On the basis of the BBC/Mediazona figures, monthly Russian losses in killed must amount to about 7,000.

Although such losses may appear irrational in relation to the limited objectives achieved, they remain acceptable to the Kremlin. The key factor sustaining the offensive is the Russian authorities’ ability to replenish losses with new contract servicemen. By most estimates, recruitment runs at around 35,000 a month, roughly matching the rate of killed and wounded. HUR deputy chief Vadym Skibitsky told Ukrinform that Russia is recruiting at least 35,000 servicemen per month and, over the first eight months of 2025, had gained about 280,000 new contract soldiers. This figure is consistent with Russian claims: Security Council deputy chairman Dmitry Medvedev stated that in the first half of 2025, 210,000 contract servicemen joined the Russian army.

This estimate is supported by economist Janis Klugge, who also estimates August recruitment at 35,000, based on regional budget data. Analysing the amounts spent on enlistment bonuses in 37 regions and extrapolating them nationwide, Kluge concludes that the number of new contracts fell in the spring but rose again by late summer. While extrapolation may skew final numbers one way or the other depending on the sample of regions, it is likely to reflect the overall trend accurately. Kluge links the rise in contracts by late summer to a new round of bonus increases. According to our calculations, based on data from the aggregator gogov.ru, bonuses in August were on average 600,000 roubles higher than in May across 14 regions (see appendix).

Kluge estimates this means the average cost of signing up a contract soldier for the Russian budget rose from 1.5 million roubles in January 2025 to around 2 million, and may reach 2.5 million by the end of the year. Our estimates are somewhat higher: contracts can be signed in any region regardless of actual residence or registration, which means the real average bonus is likely skewed upwards towards regions with higher payouts.

Either way, the increase of 500–600,000 roubles in the average enlistment bonus needed to maintain a recruitment rate of 35,000 a month adds 17 billion roubles in monthly spending, or 210 billion annually. According to our June estimates (→ Re:Russia: From Living Force to Dead), total spending by all levels of government on manpower is set to exceed 4 trillion roubles (2% of GDP) for the year. Moreover, the rate at which contract costs are rising supports Kluge’s assumption that another comparable increase will be required by year’s end to sustain replacement levels. This would mean current manpower expenditure rising by a further 10%. Although the Russian budget can still bear this burden, manpower costs have already become one of the most significant items of wartime expenditure and are a heavy strain on both the budgetary system and the Russian economy as a whole.

Thus, the Russian offensive is proving extremely costly not only in humanitarian but also in economic terms.

On the eve of a ‘decisive breakthrough’

The pace of the Russian offensive slowed in August and even further in the first half of September. This, however, is likely linked less to the stubbornness of Ukrainian resistance than to preparations for a 'decisive breakthrough'. The Russian army is preparing a large-scale autumn offensive in eastern Ukraine, the main objective of which is to break through the front in the western part of Donbas and ideally to capture at least one or several key AFU strongholds.

According to Ukrainian military estimates, by early September the Russian army had concentrated a force of 100,000 personnel on the Pokrovsk axis, whose likely task is to break through into Dnipropetrovsk region. The grouping, ISW notes, includes elite airborne and marine units redeployed from Kursk, Sumy and Kherson regions. According to a report by the 7th Corps of the Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces, the Russian army intends to use this grouping in the Donetsk region for a 'decisive breakthrough' aimed at seizing the Pokrovsk–Kramatorsk–Sloviansk agglomeration. In Pokrovsk, Russian forces have already by early September been seeking to move as close as possible to the positions of Ukrainian drone and mortar operators (apparently attempting pinpoint infiltrations behind the front line with small groups), while at the same time consolidating new positions, according to Ukrainian soldiers. Simultaneously, Russian units have intensified assault operations on the flanks with the use of armour and vehicles, in an effort to cut the 7th Corps’ supply lines and encircle the Pokrovsk agglomeration.

In addition, Ukrainian military believe the Russian army is preparing for a large-scale assault on Siversk in Donetsk region, with the aim of consolidating on the city’s outskirts before the onset of autumn rains. To this end, Russian troops are rotating forces on the Siversk axis, a representative of the 54th separate mechanised brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has stated. Increased Russian pressure is also expected shortly in the area of Dobropillia, north of Pokrovsk, where an attempted breakthrough failed in August, writes RBC-Ukraine, citing sources in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The likelihood of success for a new breakthrough is increased by the manpower reserves built up by the Russian command, coupled with the depletion of Ukrainian forces. Ukrainian authorities have been unable to improve the effectiveness of mobilisation, according to military expert Michael Kofman. A general decline in morale and worsening conditions are reflected in public criticism of military leadership from rank-and-file commanders. For example, a Facebook post by Oleksandr Shyrshyn, commander of a battalion in the 47th AFU Brigade, caused a stir after he railed against the setting of 'idiotic tasks' that led to the 'senseless loss of men'. As Shyrshyn explained to The Wall Street Journal, he had begun regularly receiving orders that were incompatible with the unit’s limited resources and caused significant casualties. Other Ukrainian servicemen likewise complain about unworkable or unfair orders, particularly refusals by commanders to authorise timely tactical withdrawals in the face of encirclement. The systemic cause of these frictions, however, is the lack of manpower reserves for rotation, regrouping, or shoring up defensive lines under Russian pressure.

Even so, military experts agree that seizing the fortress cities of north-western Donbas, or even approaching them, remains an extremely difficult task. East of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk and Pokrovsk lies open terrain where it is difficult for attacking forces to establish positions, notes Atlantic Council Director John Herbst. The terrain makes the capture of these cities both exceptionally challenging and exceptionally significant for the Russian army, as they could serve as a springboard for future offensives deeper into Ukraine.

So far, every attempt by Russian forces to take a fortified Ukrainian city has resulted in many months of fighting and enormous losses, recalls The Financial Times. The battle for Bakhmut lasted almost a year, while Chasiv Yar fell to Russian control only after 15 months of fierce fighting. The nearby fortress cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk are roughly three times larger than Bakhmut. They contain numerous multi-storey buildings suitable for defence, and Kramatorsk also has a large disused steel plant, whose grounds the AFU could turn into a powerful stronghold. Wall Street Journal columnist Gillian Melchior argues that capturing the fortress cities of Donbas would take the Russian army years, and that this is precisely why Vladimir Putin is trying to secure them without fighting, declaring full control over Donetsk region as a key condition for halting hostilities. Yet the encirclement of the agglomeration, which the Russian command appears to be counting on, would also require extremely significant effort. If Russian forces manage to consolidate their positions, however, Ukrainian attempts to break the encirclement could lead to heavy losses on their side.

Either way, the forthcoming 'decisive breakthrough' is of critical importance for the further course of the war and for any potential negotiations on its end. Should it succeed, the Ukrainian army may have to cede the remaining territory of Donbas. Should it fail, it will mark the collapse of Russia’s two-year offensive in the region.

Even despite Russia’s low sensitivity to high losses, embarking on a third consecutive year of offensive operations in Donbas, given the minimal successes of previous years, against the backdrop of a rapidly deteriorating economy, a fiscal crisis and mounting strikes on Russian infrastructure, will be extremely difficult for the Kremlin. While Russian opinion polls are likely skewed towards more regime-loyal respondents, a Levada Centre survey conducted in August showed that the share of those believing that the goals of the 'special military operation' require continued fighting, rather than a shift to peace negotiations, had fallen to 27%. In August 2024 that figure stood at 41%, meaning it has declined by a third over the past year.

Thus, the coming two months will mark the climax of the Battle of Donbas – a three-year struggle for the region and two years of uninterrupted Russian offensive operations – and possibly the climax of the entire four-year war, setting the course of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict for a long time to come.

Appendix. Regions that increased the bonus for signing a contract from May to August 2025

	Bonus in May, million roubles	Bonus in August, million roubles	Bonus increase, thousand roubles
Tula Oblast	0,8	2,6	1800
Bashkortostan	1	1,8	800
Novosibirsk Oblast	0,8	1,6	800
Altai Krai	0,8	1,5	700
Ryazan Oblast	0,4	1	600
Kaliningrad Oblast	0,5	1	500
Rostov Oblast	1,6	2,1	500
Sakhalin Oblast	1,65	2,15	500
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug	2,2	2,65	450
Altai	0,4	0,8	400
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast	1,1	1,5	400
Omsk Oblast	0,8	1,1	300
Adygea	1,3	1,5	200
Sevastopol	0,5	0,7	200