Non-Victory Day: the regime of military Putinism has entered a period of instability

The atmosphere of fears and rumors, ridiculous preparations and regulations on the approaches to the current May 9 add up to a general picture and a general feeling: few people can and want to share this holiday with Vladimir Putin, which was long ago appropriated by him and adopted as the day of his personal political triumph.

Fears of Ukrainian drone attacks expose the vulnerability of the main character of the festive events, and armored personnel carriers at the entrance to Moscow - the separation of his capital lair from the rest of the country.

For four years, Putin convinced the population that the war he started was necessary to strengthen the circle of security around Russia and push some invisible, looming threat away from its borders. Now it turns out that the circle of security has narrowed to his personal location and still feels unreliable.

New, additional security measures become a recognition of the ineffectiveness of those previously taken. And the more they are accepted, the more ridiculous they look and the more clearly they indicate that the main subject of fear is not something located outside the security perimeter, but something located inside. And this is not at all the fear of a coup (although it is precisely in this that dictators substantive their anxieties), but the fear of the possibility of political defeat.

The point is not that Ukrainian drones can ruin the holiday, but that there is nothing to celebrate, and security paranoia is designed to somehow cover up or disguise this emptiness by stretching a dysfunctional anti-drone net over it.

Two periods of military Putinism

If not a reversal, then the visible shift in the prevailing mood in Russia is not the result of some unsuccessful actions by the Kremlin, as many believe. The most popular explanations for current events revolve around the “personal factor”—Putin’s psychological state, which affects the quality of his decisions. In our opinion, behind them, on the contrary, there are rather structural changes. Even the attack on Telegram and the attempt to decisively isolate the Runet is not a cause, but a consequence of changed circumstances. Military Putinism, a political regime that arose as a reaction to the failure of the Ukrainian blitzkrieg and its transformation into a protracted military conflict, has entered a new, crisis period of its evolution.

The first phase of the formation of the regime occurred in 2022-2023 and was an improvised adaptation to the fact that the forced march on Kyiv had failed miserably. It turned out that the Kremlin has neither a capable army to overcome the Ukrainian resistance, nor the capacity to replenish weapons and ammunition. Over the course of a year and a half—until the fall of 2023—the Kremlin actually rebuilt the military machine, hastily experimenting with methods of recruiting manpower (“partial” mobilization, PMCs, Prigozhin’s “prison conscription”), organizing a unified command of the group, expanding military production and using Soviet reserves.

In domestic politics, the regime was forced to dramatically expand repressive and censorship practices to cope with the wave of discontent, and attempted propaganda patriotic mobilization, presenting the invasion of Ukraine as almost a new Patriotic War, an existential battle with the “new fascism”, in which the fate of the nation was decided. At the same time, this period was characterized by a very low level of counter-elite repression: high-profile anti-corruption processes were put on pause, as well as personnel rotations and even replacements of governors. Putin sought to create among the elite the feeling that, one way or another, they were in the same boat with him and had no separate way of salvation.

Around the fall of 2023, the second stage of military Putinism begins - the stage of stabilization and self-confidence. Supplies of weapons and ammunition became regular and sufficient, and an ingenious commercial contract system began to operate, ensuring a stable replenishment of the front with manpower. And as a result of the massive use of National Welfare Fund funds and oil and gas revenues, a military economic boom began - the economy showed growth of 5% per year.

The main scenario of the military campaign during this period was the “war of attrition.” Having suffered defeat in the blitzkrieg, the Kremlin sought to demonstrate that its advantage in resources and manpower made the advance of the Russian army inevitable and, ultimately, the military defeat of Ukraine. Therefore, Kyiv will have to conclude a peace agreement on Moscow’s terms. And although the military successes of 2024 turned out to be very modest (the Russian army captured only about 4 thousand sq. km), the Kremlin was given confidence by the arrival in the White House of Donald Trump, who deprived Ukraine of American aid and promoted the same idea of ​​​​the inevitability of its defeat in a war of attrition and concessions to Moscow.

A favorable economic situation and an established system of commercial contracts allowed the regime to reduce the intensity of mobilization rhetoric, especially since its speakers - z-bloggers - after the Prigozhin rebellion began to be perceived as dangerous fellow travelers. Its place was taken by the conservative-militaristic ideological doctrine of “the country is a besieged fortress of traditional values”, actively promoted in various spheres of government, public life and education. The place of national mobilization was finally taken by the commerce of “meat assaults”, and the place of patriotic inspiration was taken by the routine of endless administrative and bureaucratic pressure and prohibitions.

Repression of the elite, on the contrary, gained momentum during this period: spectacular corruption cases and redistribution of assets took on the character of a state campaign designed to punish lack of loyalty and discipline doubters. In Putin’s imagination, the common boat has turned into a victorious battleship, from which one can, at one’s pleasure, throw those in whom doubts arise with a bag over their heads—as a punishment and as an edification to others.

Third period: causes and triggers

Several circumstances marked the end of this most prosperous period of military Putinism. First, over the course of 2025, the war economy bubble deflated. In total, in 2022–2025, more than 12 trillion rubles were spent from the National Welfare Fund to support it; as a result, the reserves were practically exhausted, and current income decreased: oil prices fell under the influence of a surplus in the oil market. The deflation of the war economy bubble revealed its ugly legacy: intense fiscal stimulus sucking funds from the civilian commercial sector while creating a significant inflationary overhang.

Expenditures of the Russian consolidated budget in 2025 exceeded 39% of GDP, with an average level of 34.5% for 2011–2019. At the same time, the rent to finance the additional 4.5% of GDP in spending has dried up, and these costs can no longer be passed on to anyone other than citizens and private businesses. In the face of a public finance crisis, Russian authorities have significantly increased the tax burden. In addition to increasing the rates of all three basic taxes (personal income tax, VAT, income tax), expanding the base of application of VAT on small businesses, increasing indirect taxes and payments, the government, under the banner of “whitening” the economy, is tightening control over the circulation of funds, which leads to a further increase in the effective tax rate and withdrawal of funds from the private sector.

Secondly, the military campaign of 2025 has called into question the viability of the war of attrition scenario. Despite the enormous human and material resources expended, the second year of the offensive in Donbass did not bring the Kremlin significant success on the battlefield. At the same time, it became obvious that there was no potential for a relatively painless further pumping up of the military machine. The Kremlin’s geopolitical calculations also did not come true - hopes for a crisis in European support for Ukraine and for achieving a peace beneficial for Moscow through the hands of Donald Trump.

Today it is believed that the war in Iran has diverted the attention of the American president from negotiations on Ukraine. But this is not entirely true. Negotiations stalled at the end of 2025. Kyiv and its European allies have ceased to be afraid of Trump, who, it seems, today does not have enough tools to put pressure not only on the Kremlin, but also on Ukraine. And most importantly: there is no convincing evidence that Moscow is winning a war of attrition. This means that the main argument of the negotiation track is also called into question. Therefore, a return to it at the current stage is hardly possible in principle.

The costs of war on the Russian side are still incomparably lower than on the Kyiv side. But their noticeable growth is no less shocking to the Russian population than the lack of heating in winter is to the Ukrainians. The drone war has entered a new stage, and preparations for the current non-parade have become a clear demonstration of its new reality: most of Russia has turned into a zone of vulnerability. Over the past year, Kyiv has managed not only to “transfer the war to Russian territory,” but to make it part of the daily information background and a circumstance of everyday life.

Finally, the attack on Telegram and the attempt to effectively isolate the Runet became, on the one hand, the regime’s reaction to the deteriorating economic situation and the dynamics of military operations, which should inevitably affect social sentiment, and on the other, a trigger for the vertical crystallization of “military ressentiment.” Some are fed up with bans, others with taxes, others with the constantly raised sword of punishment and a feeling of lack of rights, and all together with an attempt to invade and seize the sphere of their private digital autonomy - social networks and private communications. This assassination attempt is interpreted as an unjust reprisal for loyalty shown over four years.

The reasons for dissatisfaction with the regime among elites and ordinary citizens, as a rule, differ: some have empty cabbage soup, some have small pearls. This usually prevents the emergence of mutual solidarity. The danger for any regime comes from the intersection of claims coming from above and below: claims in this case acquire a vertical dimension. Elites invent a legitimate rhetoric of discontent, which becomes for ordinary citizens a pattern and justification for “just” demands and protest petitions and a justification for routine resistance. Boni's appeal went to the people - various triggers of discontent formed into a single puzzle and found a targeted addressee.

The Grail is cracked - what next?

The circumstances listed above indicate that we are not talking about some local difficulties. The regime of military Putinism has entered a new period - much more problematic and less stable than the previous one, and we will not get the answer to the question of whether the regime will cope with these challenges and this instability not tomorrow or in a month. It is hardly worth expecting its collapse soon. Moreover, such a prospect, if for some reason it arises in the near future, will most likely frighten today's dissatisfied people themselves, who present their timid demands to the regime. At the same time, the grail of military Putinism has definitely cracked, emitting not yet a “pop,” but an unpleasant grinding sound. We will have to monitor the fate of the resulting crack in the near future.

This is not the first time Putin has encountered the problem of spreading internal murmur. However, previous episodes of this kind - in 2011-2013 and 2018-2020 - look quite light against the backdrop of today's circumstances. An unsuccessful war and one and a half million killed and wounded behind it are, if not terminal, but a very serious challenge for any regime. To a first approximation, three channels can be identified through which internal tension can develop and intensify.

The emerging economic problems certainly do not look critical. Rather, they are pulling out from under the citizens and elites the bedding that helped them put up with the protracted war and sanctions in previous years. Today it is sometimes said that the elites in Russia have lost their “image of the future.” This is partly true. At the same time, there was no image of the future, perhaps even three years ago. What the elites have lost is the belief that the regime is the guarantor that this uncertain future will eventually take on an acceptable shape. Two or three years ago, the regime's successes in fighting sanctions, stimulating the economy and creating a new military machine indicated that this could be counted on. Now serious doubts have arisen about this, and many in the elite have ceased to see themselves as part of this future, suspecting that they are precisely those who are supposed to be eaten on the way to it.

The threat to the regime is not the economic situation in itself, but the fact that the exit from the war - its end acceptable to the regime - is associated with a further concentration of resources in the hands of the state, which can now only be taken directly from the pockets of citizens and private businesses. It seems that the regime, business, and citizens are realizing this and are preparing for it in their own way.

The second challenge for the regime is that its communication with the population is in a weak state. In the “classic” period - in the 2000s and 2010s - its strength was “soft” manipulative propaganda, the main vehicle of which was television. It was through this channel that a loyalty base was formed, to which other tools of authoritarian control were added. Today, instead of television, the main tool should be the network environment, and the main means of control should be “hard” propaganda. While “soft” propaganda, which grew out of the practices of “PR” and marketing, is intended only to convince citizens that all the country’s successes are related to the wisdom of government, and failures and problems are due to external factors, “hard” propaganda involves ideological indoctrination that justifies repression against dissenters and the need for belt-tightening and resistance to deprivation. The last three years have demonstrated that the regime is having problems creating such a product. He knows how to punish and bribe with inspiration, but cannot cope with persuasion and ideological mobilization. After abandoning this practice in the previous period of his evolution, it will not be so easy for him to return to it again.

Finally, the third challenge, which is “subjective” and at the same time, oddly enough, seems perhaps the most relevant and acute, can be defined as the challenge of escalating incompetence and the associated conflict in the elites. The problem here is that Vladimir Putin himself and the security officials around him, on whom he increasingly tends to rely, are not competent enough in the issues on which they have to make decisions. And, apparently, both in the military and civilian spheres. In any case, they are probably less competent than the civilian part of Putin’s coalition.

However, this circumstance only increases their suspicion and distrust of this other part. Possessing greater political power, they are not ready to admit their incompetence, because such an admission implies the transfer of power and initiative into the hands of a rival faction. As a result, they are more likely to insist on the correctness and lack of alternatives to their chosen strategies, increasing both the costs of their own incompetence and the tension between the two elite groups. Such a scenario can accelerate the movement towards a crisis, even though its structural preconditions still seem insufficient.

The difficulty with forecasting social processes is due to the fact that they are reciprocal. Certain changes and challenges provoke a response from the participants in the events, to which, in turn, the other side can react in one way or another. The range of possible reactions is given by circumstances and structural factors, but at the same time variations within this range can direct events along one or another path, which as a result diverge significantly. The development of events is deterministic and non-deterministic at the same time. But for now, it makes sense to fix tomorrow’s Non-Victory Day as the point at which military Putinism enters the regime of instability.