The end of the doctrine: why even a new mobilization will not allow Russia to achieve victory

Vladimir Putin and Putin's Russia appear to have missed the chance to win the war of attrition with Ukraine. And this can be considered a completely historical event, which until recently was difficult to imagine, which has yet to be comprehended and to the consequences of which Russia still has to get used to and adapt.

The ability to mobilize a huge resource of manpower with a high threshold of sensitivity to losses was the core of Russia's offensive strategy, which relied heavily on the experience and mythology of victory in World War II. Today, things are moving towards the point that the Ukrainian “wall of drones” will be capable of crushing almost any amount of enemy manpower.

In such a situation, even another “partial” mobilization will most likely not provide a turning point in military operations. Its resource will be crushed in a few months, but will not lead to a victory that could somehow justify this expense. This is what determines the extremely high risks of a new mobilization for the Putin regime. The result for Russia may be more similar to the outcome of the First World War than the Second.

The end of the "war of attrition" doctrine

When Vladimir Putin marched a 120,000-strong army and Z and V tank columns toward Kyiv on February 24, 2022, it was assumed that—with the exception of isolated pockets—mostly Ukraine and the Ukrainian military would not actively resist the invasion due to its futility. It seemed obvious that none of Russia’s neighbors – including Ukraine – had the ability to resist the resource power of the “Russian bear”, which also feeds on hydrocarbons from its endless taiga. And it’s just a matter of Moscow’s political will as to where Russian tanks will reach—to Kyiv, Lvov, or to the Polish border.

The flip side of this conviction was the defeat of the Russian army near Kiev, when its “psychic attack” choked. This, however, was regarded as a tactical miscalculation and did not shake the overall strategic vision. Both in Moscow and in the West, the prevailing idea was that the new scenario of military conflict was a war of attrition, and that even a limited mobilization of resources on Russia’s side made its advance and military victory, although not so quick and triumphant, inevitable.

This idea remained unshakable until 2025, when Donald Trump, having deprived Ukraine of most of the American aid, made it the main argument of his negotiating strategy: Ukraine is losing people and territory, but is not able to turn the tide of the war, and therefore Kyiv has no choice but to make concessions to Moscow, he inspired Vladimir Zelensky, essentially relying on the established consensus of “military realism.”

However, fears about the collapse of the Ukrainian front as a result of a lack of manpower and the inevitable breakthrough of Russian troops as a result of its accumulation, which were very relevant at the beginning of 2025, today seem to be a thing of the past. Already during 2025, a war of attrition began to look like at least a bilateral challenge. Russia was forced to use significantly greater economic and human resources for the offensive than defending Ukraine, but at the same time did not achieve a significant result. Economic optimism, fueled by public investment, quickly faded, and the budget problem grew. And the rapid development of the drone component of war changed the very idea of ​​the critical resources of military success.

In the first half of 2026, the situation has advanced one step further. Ukrainian drone attacks are now hitting the economic and military infrastructure of almost the majority of Russian territory, causing significant moral and economic damage. But what is even more important is that today things are moving towards the fact that the Ukrainian “wall of drones” will be capable of grinding down almost any amount of enemy manpower.

It is the latter circumstance that looks like a turning point in the course of both this war and, in a sense, Russian history as a whole. The ability to mobilize a huge resource of manpower with a low threshold for sensitivity to losses was the core of Russia's offensive strategy, which relied heavily on the experience and mythology of victory in World War II. Russian tank armies, accompanied by countless infantry who did not spare their lives, were the main instrument and confirmation of Soviet and Russian military power. Tanks were out of business a long time ago, but superiority in manpower was still the main stake of Russian offensives in the Donbass in 2024-2025. However, their results showed that in front of a “wall of drones”, superiority in manpower is no longer a critical resource for the success of an offensive operation.

Second World War or First?

The commercial contract recruitment model that fueled Russia's war of attrition doctrine for three years appears to be in crisis (→ Re: Russia: The contract is broken ). But this crisis is probably more systemic than it seems at first glance. The point is not that there are fewer people willing to sign the contract, but that even if there were more of them, this most likely would not have helped either. The Russian doctrine of war of attrition itself is in crisis. And even if Putin announces another “partial” mobilization and again recruits 200 thousand people, this will probably allow the front line to advance somewhat, but most likely will not lead to a turning point in the war or a serious change in the balance of power. The intensity of Russian losses could increase from today's 30 thousand people per month to 45-50 thousand. The resource involved will be crushed by a drone curtain within a matter of months, and Putin will simply send another 200 thousand Russians to their deaths, but will not achieve the victory that could somehow justify this.

The likelihood of such a result increases the Kremlin’s risks in making a decision on mobilization. In a situation where dissatisfaction with the war in Russia is noticeably growing and threatens to become almost universal, throwing into the furnace of the offensive not those who agreed to it voluntarily, for a monetary reward, as was the case in the last three years, but those who were forcibly mobilized, and ultimately not achieving success is a very big risk.

The reaction of society to the announcement of mobilization may also be completely different from last time. In the fall of 2022, the Russian authorities managed to create among at least some Russians the feeling that “the fatherland is in danger.” After three years of reports that "the special operation is progressing as planned", this is unlikely to be repeated. But the main difference is that last time the Russian average person did not yet understand that the entire tactics of the military command consist of meat assaults and overwhelming the enemy’s firepower with the corpses of their own recruits, and the middle command staff is a layer of racketeers and merciless robbers of their own soldiers. Today this idea is quite widespread.

In such circumstances, a new mobilization for another attempt at an offensive in the Donbass could become a replica of the Brusilov breakthrough of the Russian army in the summer of 1916. The breakthrough strategy similarly relied on superiority in manpower (one and a half to two times), which made it possible to launch a simultaneous offensive in several directions at once. However, after initial success, the operation floundered and did not lead to a turning point in the course of the war. According to many historians, the failure of the operation against the backdrop of colossal losses (at least half a million killed and wounded) undermined the legitimacy of the tsarist regime and launched the process of collapse of the Russian military machine, which ended in revolution and the Civil War. The victorious myth of World War II, which fuels the Kremlin’s propaganda discourse, may turn into a repetition of the history of its defeat in the First, the cause of which was not intervention, but internal breakdown and a crisis of legitimacy.

At the same time, the consequences of the fact that, in the face of a drone army, Russia was unable to realize its advantage in manpower as a resource for victory in a war of attrition, will not be limited to the conflict with Ukraine. Perhaps this will be the beginning of a new era in the history of Russia and its relations with its neighbors. The image of the “Russian bear” and the idea of ​​its undeniable military advantage in a conventional war are becoming a thing of the past. Containing Moscow's expansionism becomes a matter of a renewable resource of drone troops, rather than a non-renewable resource of manpower. And Russian militarism will no longer be able to feed on the myth of the inevitability of a Russian victory with “little blood”, used as a threat in foreign relations and as confirmation of the status of a “great power” in domestic politics.