Uzbek lessons

You can argue with this. But first you need to agree on the terms

Arco Polo did not open new countries - he opened them from a new side. They already knew about distant Asia in Europe, but represented its inhabitants with the “Pesa heads”. Many centuries later, the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov “invited to pilaf” a group of journalists from Moscow - a kind of collective Marco Polo. In Tashkent, it was decided that after all of what was said in Russia about Uzbekistan, it was time to show not Pesi, but human heads.

Printed by the “Uzbek affairs” and replenishing the dictionary of the modern Russian language with the term “cottonolab”, Uzbekistan after the collapse of the Soviet empire fell out of view of a resident of the Central Russian Upland, which is now almost indifferent to everything that happened in this republic. And this despite the sporadic attempts of the liberal Moscow press to draw attention to the acceleration of the local national democratic opposition (Erk and Birlik movement), the beating of journalists and the authoritarian profile of Karimov.

Indeed, all opposition parties in the republic were tightly closed in 1992, students were weaned to go to rallies, and peasants to solve issues about land and water with a hoe and knives, as was done very shortly before in Osh and Ferghana. In the cities, starting with Tashkent, the central avenue was returned to the name of Sharaf Rashidov, who was overwhelmed by Moscow investigators, and the names of Gdlyan and Ivanov were transferred almost into the field of non -normative vocabulary.

As a result, Moscow began to distance himself more and more from Tashkent. It was easiest to explain such a discrepancy by determining the Uzbek model as hopelessly backward not only by European, but also by Russian standards. Alas, a complete indifference of the look, which the CIS codes were casting in, Kozyrevskaya diplomacy was the best combined with the arrogant disappointment of Russian progressives in Central Asia: they say, you can’t write anything.

Recall, by the way, that in parallel with Uzbek, another type of relationship between domestic reformers with local elites Tajik was formed. It would seem that recently Anatoly Sobchak in search of a common language with a “democratic opposition” tried on a quilted robe in Dushanbe. The search ended with the fact that reins were completely released in the region and as a result, Russia against its will

She crawled into someone else's, incomprehensible inter -plane war.

However, our Tashkent owners were not going to prove that they were striving not to lag behind Moscow on the same reform routes. “Everything is not like yours here,” the smiling Uzbeks repeated squinting, “but you see, it’s not so scary. By the way, they emphasized not without pride, we covered the Tajik border ourselves and tightly not like your generals in Chechnya. ”

The vocabulary at least the organizers of the trip was not the need to play on contrast, his sensation did not leave us anywhere, as keys to the keen accompanying did not let us go a step.

If in Russia the beginning of the new era was marked by the “ATMSTROME”, and the banks themselves with their chic, especially against the background of abandoned mansions and peeling high -rise buildings, facades became a symbol of consumption, then in Tashkent began with markets. New, original in architecture, with domes and minarets, reconstructs old, with kilometer rows under the canopies. In each town there is a bazaar at a bus station, which has something to buy. Significant areas of the once “cotton” of the Soviet Republic in recent years have been transferred to grain and vegetable crops, gardens. The goods can be sold, and without the mediation of mafia groups, robbing sellers in Moscow markets. It was the markets that became the Uzbek symbol of stability.

One of the sources of stability is the preservation of the collectivist "eastern" the beginning of the public way of public, even before the collapse of the Union, which has firmly established its dominance, despite the Sovietization and shy Russification.

Today, the capital of some “new Russian”, besides him, is used by the wife, children, as well as a partner in the offshore company somewhere in the Bagams.

In Uzbekistan, they tell us, otherwise. If the Uzbek got rich, then his condition is distributed more or less evenly between members of a large family or clan. And this is a hundred or two people. Since in each clan at least one has succeeded at least one, we are dealing with a certain social insurance mechanism that triggers in the event of death, illness, fire, as well as a wedding that is equivalent to a spontaneous disaster in a Muslim country in financial burden. Social protection for Mr. Karimov is largely solved by society itself, permeated by the traditions of redistribution and equalizing.

That is why, our owners insisted, in Central Asia their own laws of development: for us, both Gaidar and Zyuganov are equally unacceptable. On the one hand, in the Uzbekist, there is no need to set the state on the rich, because it will inevitably violate the clan balance and eventually reduce the standard of living. On the other hand, Western democracy is contraindicated to us, in which everyone is responsible for himself. It is worth introducing the declaration of income, as in the West, - and young people will lose their clans on entering the institute, marriage, and the acquisition of housing. Allow criticism, untie the hands of the troublemakers from the political opposition and sooner or later you will have to introduce tanks.

The rules of translation demonstrating confidence in stability at home and in the ability of their economy to survive, if not alone, then at least without Russia, our Uzbek guides chose an unusual way to process guests - a stream of counterclaims. Such tactics could be called "active defense." On three “round tables”, during a six -day trip, the pressure was tired. It was precisely tough, and the questions asked already suggested an answer that would advantageously set off the Uzbek experience. The Russian journalist fell into a situation when he himself had to respond disapprovingly about the Kremlin’s policy.

Why do not social shock absorbers of Russian reforms work? How do you allow such a rampant crime? - asked us. Finally, how did it happen that the prerequisites for the communist revenge are created in Russia? In us, in the “authoritarian” Uzbekistan you, the victory of the “red-brown”, as, indeed, Islamists, is impossible.

The culmination of the trip was the meeting of the group with the first person of the Republic of Islam Karimov in the Presidential House. Islam Abduganievich appeared before us smiling broadly, said "without a piece of paper." (I read only a page of statistical information, first publishing the secret articles of the Uzbek budget - defense costs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the maintenance of the state apparatus). Answering questions, he often shook his hands wide. Islam Abduganievich announced that he did not like to copy someone's experience, including Russian. Several times he repeated that the figure of Gaidar causes him almost the same rejection as Zyuganov’s figure (it became clear where this formulation was from his environment) that he wants to get away from a tough choice of either reform or social protection.

As for the place of Russia in the policy of Uzbekistan, the president determined it like this: “Without Russia we have no future, but we are not on the way with communist Russia.” Showing an undisguised interest in the outcome of the presidential elections in Russia, Karimov directly says that he would like to continue to see Boris Yeltsin in the Kremlin.

However, loyalty in relation to the current Russian president does not mean a rejection of a strict uphold in his position. Here is an example explaining many nuances and underwater trends in the “Russian-Uzbek dialogue”. In one of his visits to Tashkent, Andrei Kozyrev drew the attention of Karimov to a long queue of those who wanted to leave the republic from the Russian consulate. After 10 minutes, having received the necessary certificate, Karimov cited the Russian Minister of numbers proving the extremely low throughput of the consular department, actually creating a queue. At that moment, as Islam Abduganievich not without pleasure, usually the pale face of the Russian ambassador in Tashkent acquired a beetroot shade.

And yet, to the question about the main challenges of Uzbekistan, the president, without hesitation, replied: "The victory of the Communists in Russia and possible attempts to export the revolution to Uzbekistan."

Unambiguously making it clear that Russia has ceased to be an ally, Karimov at the same time sees a partner in it. And although partnerships are not at all that allied, they cost a lot. Losing them, and this is B. In the case of a communist revenge is almost inevitable, Tashkent does not want.