The boundaries of separatism

In today's Chechnya, the elections are waiting as a border. Many expect that, having gained legitimate power organs, Chechnya will finally become “completely independent”. It is no accident that Maskhadov said with such pressure that he was a convinced supporter of the Chechen sovereign of theta. In this case, no violation of the Khasavyurt agreements will occur, since the text of the agreement clearly states: “The issue of status should be resolved no later than August 31, 2001.” Similar assumptions (but already without any delight) are expressed in Russia: they say, suddenly, after the election, the Chechen side will feel more confident and refuse to fulfill the agreements?

Such fears or hopes are absolutely groundless. In the near future, Chechnya cannot find any more independence than now. Just because, as they say, there is nowhere else to go. Moscow today in the Chechen territory does not control anything and does not manage anything, except perhaps in short -lived two brigades. And the boundaries of the Chechen sovereignty are determined not by documents, laws or agreements, but by the own resources of Chechnya. Those pereprets of Russian policy in Chechnya are built taking into account the real state of things. In the latest Moscow agreements there is not a single point from which the future of the Chechen government will be able to renounce: there is nothing unprofitable to the Chechen side.

Like, however, Russian. Mutual obligations to control the oil pipeline, railway and airport, recognition of the need to resolve customs relations the basis for normal existence-existence. This can be called the popular word "delegation of authority." The tasks that the federal center cannot cope with (order protection, for example) has to decide the Chechen authorities. And the fact that the Chechen authorities cannot do the power (social security, restoration of industry) remains with Moscow. The Chechen side believes that she is paid “indemnity”. The Russian side (not without reason) expects that the habit of living on subsidies will ultimately keep Chechnya in Russia.

So far, in Chechnya both among politicians and in society, the moods “away from Russia” dominate. If nothing violates the process of forming statehood, these sentiments will inevitably be pushed to the periphery of public life. You can’t build from the "away" state. And the supporters of the “most independent independence” have a clear concept or at least a clear image of the sovereignty. The financiers do not think about any national currency, investigators begin all the conversations with the fact that it is time to finally restore normal relations with Russian law enforcement agencies, school principals are almost fainted when you are talking about the refusal of the Russian language (after all, teaching all subjects is in Russian). And the question of the future Russian-Chechen border is at a standstill of even the “coolest” militants.

In principle, such a “sovereignty” is not much different from some Bashkir or Udmurt. Yes, and from Primorsky. In today's Russia, there are many territories that are more or less falling from the general Federal Law Field. Their "Russian" is determined primarily by subsidies. And, of course, the lack of borders. The Chechens still really want to call such a state of affairs “state independence”. The Kremlin chose to close his eyes to their words so far.

When you ask any Chechen - education and occupation do not matter - as he imagines independence, he begins to talk about guarantees from deportation, from the possibility of a new genocide. The remaining issues can be discussed. When I tried to insist: “Does statehood guaranteeing something? Did she save Poland, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 1938-1939? Didn't the independent Afghanistan lose almost a million inhabitants after the Soviet invasion? ” - The interlocutors did not argue, but did not agree, but did not ask for a doomedly: “So, nothing will save us at all?”> After everything that happened to Chechnya in the last two years, it is difficult for Chechens to admit that the democratic development of Russia is a much more faithful guarantee of security than their own statehood. Gradually, an understanding comes: in order to be able to influence domestic political processes in Russia, it is better to be closer to it, and not further. The possibility of such an influence seems to begin to be appreciated.