After the terrorist attack in the Crocus, politicians and propagandists demand to tighten migration policy. Could it prevent the attack?

We deal with the migration researcher Salavat Abylkalikov

Immediately after the terrorist attack in Crocus City Hall, a sharp surge of xenophobia occurred in Russia. Labor migrants from Tajikistan report the frequent cases of aggression - not only at the household level , but also from the security forces . At the same time, the State Duma deputies began to offer the migrants the entrance to Russia, and the former presidential candidate Vladislav Davankov came up with the initiative to deport them for the “slightest offense” and introduce digital control. Is Russian migration policy capable of ensuring the country security (and not to ruin the economy)? Medusa talked about this with the demographer Salavat Abylkalikov, an invited researcher of Northumbrian University in the UK and Cara scholarshipist.

- No accurate data on which legal basis the alleged executors of the attack in Crocus City Hall were in Russia. But on the part of the Russian authorities, several initiatives to tighten the immigration policy were already sounded . In your opinion, should the state react to such events like that?

- It seems to me that initially the discussion [regarding the causes and consequences of the attack] both in Russian society, and in power went the wrong way. I think that any terrorist attack is the failure of the special services, because they must first of all engage in their prevention. And if the attack occurred - minimizing victims. When special services, instead of monitoring the situation [with terrorism], develop their agent network, interact with colleagues from other countries, are engaged in the fight against dissenters, this is a logical result.

It's not about migration as such. In any large country, there are millions of migrants, but terrorists are always units. And when there is a conversation about the tightening of migration policy or some mass repressions [in relation to migrants], it is actually a collective punishment [migrants]. Although specific faces and [namely] were to work with them highly paid and authorized people. And they, apparently, were doing something wrong.

A separate issue is fire safety, the possibility of evacuation, how it was all agreed. Together with the terrorist attack, in fact, there was a repetition of the tragedy in the “Winter Cherry”. But this is not discussed, but a migration policy.

- Speaking wider, and not just in relation to the terrorist attack in Crocus City Hall, what do you think are the checks that migrants are now underway at the entrance to Russia and when receiving documents are sufficient to ensure security? And is it possible to raise the question in this way?

- It seems to me that the “sieve”, which stands on the border when checking migrants, and indeed everyone who enters the country, cannot be so small [to thoroughly check everyone]. Otherwise, we will stop our entire economic activity. During border control, it is simply impossible to check everything.

And if each time to close the borders with countries where terrorists come from, it will paradoxically turn out that the terrorist organizations, and not the multinational people of Russia through state authorities, will determine its foreign and domestic policy.

- But there are also checks in the paperwork - permission to stay, for work, and so on. How careful are they? Is it easy to get around them?

- My practice shows that the more “control”, the more irresponsibility, mess and corruption. Referring to the work [specialist in migration] Olga Chudinovskys , I can say that, for example, the vast majority of Russian citizenship recipients [as the second] gain it in an accelerated manner.

But still, I do not think that the issue of terrorism and the issue of migrants of Russian citizenship are so closely related. I believe that it is necessary to prevent the crimes themselves and plant specific guilty, and not punish or repress everyone indiscriminately.

- How acute, in your opinion, is the problem of integrating migrants into Russian society? Has something changed in recent years?

- In my opinion, the issues of integration or adaptation of migrants are mostly launched by itself. But at the same time, people from the post-Soviet countries still come to Russia, and their integration requires less effort and resources-for example, many know the Russian language, although, of course, the younger generations become more difficult with this. And the lifestyle in Tashkent or, say, Dushanbe is not so radically different from the Russian one.

- That is, the idea that in Russia there is a big problem of integration of migrants, is it more likely part of xenophobic rhetoric?

- Partly. But there are also problems, of course, just no one really does it. And it is unlikely that in the near future he will do.

- In recent years, experts noted that more and more citizens of Tajikistan are obtained by Russian citizenship. Is this really so compared to immigrants from other post -Soviet countries? What is it connected with?

- Let's look at the post -Soviet countries to Russia came to Russia. At one time, these were the Baltic countries, but now it is unlikely that anyone will want to come from there in the Russian Federation-the economic gap is increasing and increasing. Especially among Lithuania and Estonia. Belarus is close to the level of development comparable to Russia [for example, in terms of salaries]. Previously, migrants from Moldova, thanks to the visa regime with the EU and the ease of obtaining Romanian passports, were mostly reoriented to the European Union. Azerbaijan himself began to get rich in oil and gas. There is also Georgia and Armenia - but these are all [relatively] small countries.

So the states of Central Asia remain. But Kazakhstan also got rich, salaries there are almost higher than in Russia. Turkmenistan all post -Soviet time was isolated. Uzbekistan, the largest country in the region [by the population], still gives many migrants, but at the same time, after the arrival of the new president [Shavkat Mirziyoyev] there were very serious reforms, [began] rapid economic development. So for many Uzbekers, the question arises of whether it makes sense to go to Russia.

And only Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain - rather poor countries that can give Russia migrants. But immigrants from Kyrgyzstan are less likely to [than citizens of Tajikistan] seek Russian citizenship. Because thanks to the regulation of migration within the framework of the Eurasian Union, they can work in the Russian Federation without special permission.

At the same time, among the hosts, competition for migrants is increasing - it is also the European Union, and Türkiye, South Korea and others. So they will gradually pull migrants from Central Asia to themselves, and the attractiveness of Russia will decline.

- In 2023, the influx of migrants to Russia fell to minimal values. Is this just due to the fact that Russia's economic attractiveness is reduced, plus migrants now risk being mobilized?

- The ruble course sagged very much - especially compared to 2022. As a result, sending money to his homeland has become less profitable. Perhaps other factors play a role: reports that migrants can be sent to war could scare someone. Yes, and the current information agenda [after the terrorist attack in Crocus City Hall] will also surely affect.

- Since the economic attractiveness of Russia for migrants is reduced, will their influx decrease further?

- Migration is stronger than all demographic processes depends on the economic situation. On the one hand, the economic problems of Russia and the weakening of the ruble will contribute to a decrease in the migration tributary. At the same time, against the background of a shortage of personnel in the Russian labor market (and in the Russian Federation a record low unemployment), a huge demand for labor is more and more noticeable, so the dilemma actually actually faces the migrants: there is little money, but you can easily work; There will probably be discrimination, but there is no need to learn a new language - say, Korean, Arab or English. What scales will outweigh the scales?

It still seems to me that over time, the migration growth will be greatly reduced, because the new generations that did not have the experience of migration to Russia are likely to initially decide to go to Turkey, the UAE, Qatar, South Korea or somewhere else.

-Taking into account the needs of the labor market in labor, the Russian authorities could do something in order to attract more migrants? And is it realistic?

- It's hard to say what can be done here. The good advice is to develop the Russian economy. Of course, you can introduce some special programs, simplify the entrance, but the question is not only how easy it is to come to Russia, but whether there are those who want to come. And if they arrive, will they remain? And at the same time, the very logic of economic development pushes employers to attract migrants: they simply have no choice. And if you return to the terrorist attack, experience shows that the bursts of xenophobia that cause such extreme events quickly come to naught: you can recall, for example, the situation with migrants from Georgia during and immediately after the 2008 war.

Now, due to the overall instability and difficult economic situation, people have a need to declare someone guilty. As a rule, it is easiest to declare those who differ from us to be guilty - either with sexual preferences, or views, religion, skin color, eye cut, tongue and so on. And the latter is just quite easy to identify. The war will contribute to the growth of crime in society: the price of human life has decreased. Dysfunctional people with combat experience will return to the country, the level of intolerance will grow. And all this will also fuel hatred and xenophobia.

Talked by Margarita Lyutova