From Living Force to Dead: Total expenditure on providing Russia's offensive with manpower amounts to more than 2 trillion roubles in the first half of 2025

An effective commercial 'contract for war' remains a key factor enabling Vladimir Putin to carry out offensive campaigns in Ukraine for a second consecutive year, despite extremely high losses and limited tangible gains in terms of captured territory.

The replenishment of manpower has been made possible by the rapid increase in signing bonuses. This growth was especially sharp in the second half of last year. The total value of such bonuses, including both federal and regional payments, peaked by February 2025 and has remained consistently high since. Among the twelve regions with the highest payments, the average bonus over the past six months reached approximately 2.7 million roubles (over $30,000 at current exchange rates).

At the same time, the pace of contract enlistment slightly declined in the first half of 2025 and showed a particularly marked drop in June. The total number of new contracts over the six months is around 200,000, which currently roughly corresponds to the scale of Russian troop losses in Ukraine.

However, signing bonuses – while the most visible – are by no means the only component of an effective contract that enables the maintenance of a steady flow of manpower amid high losses. The second component is the service pay received by military personnel. The total spending of Russian budgets at all levels on bonuses amounted to around 400 billion roubles in the first half of 2025. Service pay for the estimated 600,000-strong Russian force in Ukraine during the same period cost, by our calculations, approximately 860 billion roubles. Finally, the third element of the manpower expenditure, compensation to the families of the dead and wounded, will cost the budget around 750–760 billion roubles.

Altogether, in the first half of 2025, expenditure on the 'manpower' enabling the Russian offensive should amount to just over 2 trillion roubles. If current rates of casualties and replenishment are maintained in the second half of the year, annual spending will exceed 4 trillion roubles. This sum is equivalent to 2% of Russia’s GDP, 9.5% of this year’s federal budget expenditure, and 5.5% of last year’s consolidated budget. It is also 1 trillion roubles higher than our estimates of manpower-related spending for the period from July 2023 to June 2024. The main driver of this increased expenditure is the high level of losses and, accordingly, the need to enhance the attractiveness of contracts through bonuses, which now account for around 20% of total manpower spending, according to our estimates.

Contract enlistment dynamics

The Russian offensive of 2025 is approaching its climax — the pace of the army’s advance is roughly 2 to 2.5 times faster than last year — but this is still insufficient to demonstrate a decisive advantage or to achieve the Kremlin’s objectives for this year (→ Re:Russia: Last Summer). To a large extent, sustaining and building on the momentum of the offensive depends on Moscow’s ability to replenish front-line losses and ensure a continued influx of manpower to the front. This, in turn, hinges on the rate of enlistment through commercial contracts.

According to estimates by Janis Kluge, an expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), these enlistment rates slowed significantly in the first half of 2025, particularly in June. Kluge's methodology develops an approach first proposed by the publication Vazhnye Istorii (Important Stories), and is based on an analysis of regional bonus payment data for contract signings. He compiles budget statistics from 37 regions, which together account for 43% of Russia’s population, and then extrapolates these figures to the entire country. However, this extrapolation has its limitations: its accuracy depends on the specific regions included in the sample, as bonus amounts vary significantly between regions and it is not necessary to sign a contract in one’s region of residence. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that more contracts are signed in 'high-paying' regions than in 'low-paying' ones.

Nonetheless, Kluge’s resulting estimate – 190,000 contracts signed in the first half of 2025 – is fairly close to the figure cited by Deputy Security Council Chairman Dmitry Medvedev: 210,000 new contract soldiers as of 1 July 2025. In that case (according to Kluge’s calculations), the figures for the first half of 2025 are 25% higher than in the same period last year, but roughly 10% lower than the second half of 2024.

Commercial recruitment into the Russian army, 2024–2025

The extrapolation of monthly budget payment dynamics carried out by Kluge shows that the pace of contract enlistment grew significantly in late 2024, from approximately 750 recruits per day in August to around 1,700 per day by January 2025. Then, following a brief dip, it stabilised at 1,200–1,300 recruits per day in March–April (around 40,000 people per month), but in May–June declined once again, returning to levels seen in mid-2024 (fewer than 30,000 contracts per month).

Bonus dynamics

The slowdown in the rate of new contract signings in the first half of this year compared to the second half of 2024 coincides with the halting of growth in regional signing bonus amounts. We assess bonus trends using the average bonus in the twelve leading regions offering the highest one-off payments for signed contracts.

The sharp increase in bonuses began after Putin’s July 2024 announcement of a federal signing bonus increase (effective from 1 August) doubling the one-off payment for new contract soldiers from 195,000 to 400,000 roubles, and recommending that regional leaders add at least another 400,000 from their own budgets. As a result, 47 regions raised their 'signing bonuses' in August alone, according to calculations at the time by Important Stories, and the size of the largest regional payments increased by 50% over the following three months. On 13 August 2024, the three most generous regions were Moscow (1.9 million roubles), Saint Petersburg (1.7 million), and Karachay-Cherkessia (1.6 million). By 22 November, the leaders had become Belgorod and Nizhny Novgorod Oblasts (both 2.6 million) and the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug (2.2 million), according to data from the GOGOV aggregator.

At the end of November, interest in signing contracts was further boosted by State Duma-approved measures to write off debts of new contract soldiers and their spouses of up to 10 million roubles. As of 30 January this year, the largest regional payouts were being offered by Samara Oblast (3.6 million roubles), Nizhny Novgorod Oblast (2.6 million), and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug (2.2 million), although Samara Oblast fairly quickly reduced its generous offer to 2.1 million.

However, after February 2025, growth in regional payments among the leading regions effectively came to a halt. In January, the average regional bonus among the top twelve regions stood at 2.19 million roubles; by June, it had only risen slightly to 2.24 million. At the end of June, the top three regions (Mari El, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, and Sverdlovsk Oblast) were offering contract soldiers a combined (federal, regional, and municipal) bonus averaging 2.62 million, compared to 2.8 million in January.

Dynamics of changes in regional payments, 2024–2025, million roubles

In addition to the previously mentioned Samara Oblast, which reduced its signing bonus from 3.6 million roubles to 2.1 million, bonuses in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast were cut from 2.3 million to 1.5 million, in Bashkortostan from 1.6 million to 1 million, and in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug from 3.1 million to 1.9 million, according to Vedomosti. The Yamal authorities told the publication that the payment had not been reduced but merely 'returned to the level that was previously in force in the region,' as the increase had been temporary (from 20 January to 15 April).

As indicated by the project Idel.Realii project, in Bashkortostan (which ranks first among the regions in terms of the number of confirmed deaths in the war in Ukraine), the signing bonus was cut from 1.6 million roubles to 1 million on 5 June. Additionally, the supplementary bonus for signing a contract in Ufa was halved, from 1.2 million to 600,000. According to economists interviewed by the outlet, this may be linked to the region’s growing budget deficit: in May, the State Assembly of Bashkortostan amended the 2025 budget law, increasing the deficit from 4 billion to 9.8 billion roubles, that is, from 1.3% to 3% of total expenditure. In Nizhny Novgorod and Samara Oblasts, the budget deficit in the first quarter reached 19% and 6%, respectively, economist Natalia Zubarevich told Vedomosti.

The simultaneous decline in the number of signed contracts and the stagnation of average bonus amounts is likely more related to increasing pressure on regional finances than to any genuine 'saturation' of the front lines with contract soldiers. This is evidenced, in particular, by the rise in reports of various forms of coercion and pressure being applied to conscripted soldiers to sign contracts. As Aleksei Tabalov, director of the 'School of the Conscript' organisation, told Verstka, the number of such incidents rose sharply across the country in June.

According to the same newspaper, the authorities in nine Russian regions – Arkhangelsk, Voronezh, Yaroslavl, Kaluga, and Ivanovo Oblasts, as well as Tatarstan, Yakutia, Mordovia, and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug – are offering monetary rewards ranging from 5,000 to 100,000 roubles to those who bring potential contract recruits to enlistment centres. Verstka also found several tenders on the government procurement website submitted by companies tasked with supplying volunteers for the war, including three applications from Khanty-Mansiysk’s City Electric Networks and one from the Aleksandrov Town Trade Market in Vladimir Oblast. In Zabaykalsky Krai, the Ministry of Culture instructed subordinate institutions (including museums, theatres, and libraries) to 'assist' military recruitment offices in finding volunteers to be sent to war, according to the Chita.ru portal. The Ministry of Defence itself, notes the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), is increasingly using online job search platforms to attract volunteers, while regional education ministries are offering military contracts to underperforming students.

Thus, the current strategy appears to involve halting the growth of bonus payments, or even slightly reducing them, while maintaining the pace of contract recruitment through soft coercion.

The full cost of an effective contract

The commercial 'contract for war' has become one of the Kremlin’s most effective tools and plays a key role in enabling the Russian army to wage a second consecutive year of major offensives despite heavy losses and modest territorial gains. The annual income of a new contract soldier could amount to around 4.5 million roubles (over $50,000 at the current exchange rate), assuming they survive the year. Although if they do not, their family stands to receive even more. This is 4.5 times greater than the average annual salary in Russia in 2024, and 5.5 times higher than the median regional salary excluding the four wealthiest regions, where wages are significantly above the national average.

However, the large-scale recruitment and payment apparatus that ramped up last year has become a genuinely burdensome item in state expenditure. According to Kluge’s calculations, the federal budget may have spent 80 billion roubles on signing bonuses in the first half of 2025, with regional budgets contributing approximately 230 billion (and up to 320 billion when including municipal and corporate bonuses). In most regions, regional signing bonuses in the first half of 2025 accounted for 2–3% of total budget spending; and in Mari El, one of Russia’s poorest regions, over 10%,according to Kluge's calculations.

The average one-off payment for signing a contract, including both federal and regional contributions currently stands at 1.6 million roubles nationwide, 2.7 million across the top 12 regions, and 2.2 million for the top half of the list by region. Since contracts can be signed in virtually any region, the effective bonus – that is, the average size of the bonus for contracts actually signed – is likely skewed upward and, in our view, should be at least 2 million roubles. Based on this, and assuming around 200,000 contracts were signed in the first half of the year, total federal spending on signing bonuses aligns with Kluge’s estimates of 80 billion roubles, while regional expenditures would exceed them, reaching approximately 400 billion for the half-year. If these recruitment rates and bonus levels remain stable, total (federal and regional) spending on contract enlistment could reach 960 billion roubles by year-end.

Leading regions by size of signing bonuses, June 2025, million roubles

The second major category of spending on manpower is the monthly salary payments. The minimum monthly pay is set at 210,000 roubles, to which are added bonuses for rank and position, as well as additional payments for offensive operations, advancing as part of an assault group, destroying or capturing enemy equipment, and so on. Taking these into account, the average monthly pay can be roughly estimated at 240,000 roubles.

In February 2025, analysts at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Yurri Clavilier and Michael Gjerstad, estimated the size of the Russian force in Ukraine at 617,000 personnel, including those lightly wounded or undergoing training. Since then, the grouping should have been reinforced by around 200,000 people (the average between Kluge’s estimates and the figure cited by Dmitry Medvedev). At the same time, however, it has likely suffered considerable losses.

In early July, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Oleksandr Syrskyi estimated Russian army losses for the first half of the year at 230,000 killed and wounded. The British Ministry of Defence reported that from the beginning of the year to mid-April, Russia had lost approximately 138,000 personnel on the battlefield. Moreover, the pace of losses was increasing: in February, losses were running at 1,250 per day (35,000 per month), and in March–early April, 1,300 per day (39,000 per month). At this rate, by the end of the half-year, the figure should be close to Syrskyi’s estimate of 225,000. Taking into account that some of the casualties are lightly wounded soldiers who, after receiving medical treatment, are returned to the front, we may assume that the overall size of the force remained relatively stable, at around 600,000 troops. In that case, spending on salaries for the grouping can be estimated at 860 billion roubles for the half-year, or 1.7 trillion roubles on an annual basis.

Finally, the commercial military contract includes compensation for death and injury. As in our previous estimate (→ Re:Russia: Three Million For The Living and The Dead), we rely on the assessment by experts from War on the Rocks, who calculated the compensation for a soldier killed in action to be 14 million roubles. The Mediazona and BBC project has confirmed the identities of nearly 4,000 killed soldiers in the first six months of this year. However, data on fatalities accumulates gradually and with a significant delay, meaning the full picture will only become clear in a few months. For the first half of 2024, the same project identified 17,991 dead, and based on past sample checks, about half of the actual number of fatalities typically appear in the Mediazona–BBC database. With a fair degree of caution, we may assume that the number of dead this year is roughly in line with last year’s losses. In this case, the state’s obligations to families of the deceased could amount to approximately 490 billion roubles.

Estimating payouts for injuries is especially difficult following the presidential decree issued in November, which differentiated the payments based on the severity of the injury. For injuries resulting in disability, 4 million roubles are paid; 3 million for severe injuries;1 million for moderate injuries; and 100,000 for the most minor. Moreover, if we base our assumptions on general loss estimates and extrapolate fatality figures from the 2024 data, the wounded-to-killed ratio appears excessively high (6 to 1), possibly indicating a large proportion of mild and very minor injuries. If we hypothetically divide total casualties into thirds – one-third each falling into the first two categories, moderate, and minor injuries – then obligations for injury compensation for the first half of 2025 would amount to around 275 billion roubles.

Estimated expenditure on ‘manpower’ in the first half of 2025

In total, the payments and obligations of budgets at all levels for sustaining the war in Ukraine with manpower in the first half of 2025 are estimated at just over 2 trillion roubles. Of this amount, 20% (around 400 billion) accounts for contract signing bonuses, just over 40% (865 billion) for monthly pay, and just under 40% (765 billion) for compensation related to deaths and injuries. Accordingly, on an annualised basis, and assuming similar levels of casualties and recruitment, these expenditures would exceed 4 trillion roubles. This figure is equivalent to 9.5% of all projected federal budget spending for 2025, 5.5% of the 2024 consolidated budget of the Russian Federation, and 2% of Russia’s GDP.

This figure does not include any spending on weapons, equipment or infrastructure, and solely reflects the cost of the effective commercial contract for war. The current estimate also exceeds by more than one-third our previous calculation of manpower costs published in July 2024 for the period from July 2023 to June 2024, which amounted to 2.75–3 trillion roubles. The main drivers of increased expenditure have been the growth in contract signing bonuses and the high intensity of casualties, and, as a result, the accelerated recruitment of new contract soldiers.