Return to Normality and Advanced Democratisation: Scenarios for a normal Russia in the future. Part 4

The design and principles of successfully functioning democracies and federations vary widely and are largely a compromise shaped by the specific circumstances of their emergence, subsequent evolution, and accumulated institutional path dependency. What matters is not so much devising the best recipe for Russian democracy as identifying the key goals of reform and the problems of institutional design around which the main debate is unfolding today and is likely to continue in the future.

The concluding part of the report ‘Return to Normality and Advanced Democratisation’, devoted to possible scenarios for political transformation in Russia and prepared as part of the project ‘Platform for Normalisation: Restoring the Future’, focuses on the key issues of the four main goals of advanced democratisation.

In its most concise form, the outline of a balanced political model can be described by the formula ‘three decentralisations plus competition’. This implies, first, the horizontal decentralisation of federal power and a transition from a super-presidential model to a more balanced distribution of powers within the federal ‘quartet’ of ‘president, government, State Duma, Federation Council’.

Second, it entails vertical decentralisation, a ‘new federalism’ grounded in a three-tier model of federal, regional and municipal government, with clearly defined competences and resource bases assigned to each level.

And, third, it involves the decentralisation of the security vertical, namely the distribution of law enforcement powers across the three tiers of government and the creation of a system of cross-cutting oversight designed to limit the risk of the ‘privatisation’ of state coercion.

The direction of the debate on these issues will be determined not only, and not primarily, by expert polemics, but above all by the pressure of a competitive political environment, which constitutes the foundation of democratic order and whose protection remains the main concern of any democratic society.

See the first three sections of the report here and here.

4. Advanced democratisation: three decentralisations plus competition

Four objectives of advanced democratisation

We, therefore, propose distinguishing between the two horizons of democratisation goals in Russia. The first is the objective of ‘returning to normality’, which implies the dismantling of dictatorship and a restoration of the basic standards of electoral democracy and a pluralist society. The second, longer-term objective is that of advanced democratisation, within which durable democratic institutions are to be consolidated, the capacity of citizens and organised interests to oversee government activity is to be expanded, and the distributed control of state coercion is to acquire stable institutional forms and become an entrenched tradition.

We proceed from the assumption that there are no universal or optimal formulas for democracy and federalism. The design and principles of successfully functioning democracies and federations vary widely and are to a considerable extent a compromise shaped by the specific circumstances of their origin, subsequent evolution and accumulated institutional path dependency. There are successfully functioning parliamentary and presidential-parliamentary democracies, as well as party-parliamentary and presidential autocracies. In some systems, obvious anachronisms (such as the election of the US president by the Electoral College) have been successfully adapted to new realities and have ensured democratic functionality for a long time. Conversely, even the most advanced constitutions frequently prove unable to shield a republic from authoritarian reversal and political corruption.

Over the past ten years, against the backdrop of the progressive degradation of the political system, discussions about reforming Russia's political structure have been quite intense. For example, a clearly articulated outline of political reforms was already set out in Alexei Navalny's 2018 ‘presidential programme’. Since then, and especially after the 2020 constitutional changes and the start of the war, the number of such initiatives has increased. Today, there exists an extensive library of projects, reviews and reports devoted to the political model of post-authoritarian Russia. This body of work includes semi-academic overviews of various institutional solutions for democratisation (see, for example, Grigory Golosov's book Political Regimes and Transformations, and the work by Irina Busygina and Mikhail Filippov, Devolution of Power). It also encompasses alternative drafts of a new constitution or amendments to the current one (the 2012 draft by Mikhail Krasnov's group, an alternative draft of amendments to the constitution in the collection Deconstruction of the Constitution), as well as a range of roadmaps for democratic reforms (the substantial Transit Project. Roadmap for the Democratisation of Russia‘ Free Russia Foundation, the above-mentioned work by Vladimir Milov and Fyodor Krasheninnikov, and the ’One Hundred Days After Putin’ project by the Memorial Centre).

Against this backdrop, any attempt to produce yet another version of an optimal institutional design for Russian democracy appears redundant. The priority is not to draft the best possible blueprint for democratic institutions, but to define the key objectives of reform and to identify the principal dilemmas and fault lines around which debate is unfolding today and is likely to continue in the future. In other words, the task is to map goals and problem areas rather than to prescribe optimal solutions.

In its most concise form, the outline of a balanced political model may be expressed through the simple formula ‘three decentralisations plus competition’. This encompasses:

(1) horizontal decentralisation: a more balanced distribution of powers within the federal ‘quartet’ of authority, namely president, government, State Duma and Federation Council;

(2) vertical decentralisation:clarification of the exclusive competences, principles of autonomy and interrelations of the three tiers of government, federal, regional and municipal (i.e. a ‘new federalism’);

(3) power decentralisation: the distribution of coercive powers across different levels of government, alongside the creation of cross-cutting oversight mechanisms and ‘two-key’ arrangements designed to limit the risk of the ‘privatisation’ of state violence;

(4) Political competition: measures to secure transparent and fair electoral and political competition, a diversified public policy and media environment, and the expansion of civil society infrastructure and instruments of direct democracy.

These four core objectives define the tasks of four reform clusters within the horizon of advanced democratisation. At the same time, these reforms would remain incomplete without a further transformation of the judicial system, intended to lay the foundations for an independent ‘third branch’ within the classical triad of powers. This question, however, lies beyond the scope of our consideration here.

It is worth noting that an independent judiciary cannot emerge as the product of a purely technocratic reform. Its existence presupposes a balance of mutually constraining political forces and a highly competitive political environment that prevents the ‘capture’ of the state and of the courts. For resource-rich groups, including elites, the demand for judicial arbitration arises when the option of coercive solutions is structurally constrained. Comparative research suggests that the consolidation of judicial authority tends to occur at later stages of democratisation. Undoubtedly, the current state of Russia’s judicial system will require urgent, emergency reforms aimed at clearing the legacy of the security vertical, including the renewal of the judicial corps, changes to appointment procedures and incentive structures, and the establishment of a high degree of transparency in judicial proceedings and decisions. Yet such reforms are more likely to achieve intermediate than deep structural goals in the formation of an autonomous judiciary.

Below, we address several key and contested questions concerning the institutional design of the three decentralisations, not with the intention of providing detailed legal drafting, but rather to examine their political substance.

Horizontal decentralisation: from parliamentary-presidential dualism to a ‘federal quartet’

The excessive concentration of authority in the hands of the president is the defining feature of the current political model, a trait common to many autocracies in which a presidential-parliamentary system has, under conditions of weak democracy, mutated into super-presidentialism. The formula for the distribution of powers between president and parliament set out in the 1993 Constitution, as subsequent practice has demonstrated, lacked sufficient safeguards against presidential dominance and adequate guarantees of parliamentary prerogatives. This imbalance became a ‘gateway’ for the expansion of presidentialism. As Mikhail Krasnov, one of the authors of the 1993 Constitution, once observed, the constitutional design of a presidential-parliamentary republic was balanced for a weak president, whereas a strong president was afforded the opportunity to overturn that balance.

Although proposals for a transition to a parliamentary system have become increasingly insistent within sections of the Russian opposition, this question will remain the subject of prolonged debate. The principal argument, noted above, is that a more natural trajectory would involve movement towards parliamentarism as political parties take shape and consolidate their authority, leading to a gradual reduction in presidential powers, as has occurred in a number of European and post-Soviet states. By contrast, the reverse sequence, namely the introduction of a parliamentary system in the expectation that it will itself stimulate the development of a party system, carries the risk of producing party-parliamentary authoritarianism. The formation of a new ‘party of power’ may outpace the development of other parties and begin forcibly to constrain them. ‘Parties of power’ are by no means an exclusively Russian phenomenon, and the regularities of their emergence and expansion in immature democracies merit particular attention. There is no particular reason to simply hope that this will not happen.

At the same time, the need to correct Russia’s constitutional model by expanding parliamentary authority and limiting presidential power is, in effect, a matter of consensus within the opposition community. Here and below, reference is made to the model of government established by the 1993 Constitution; the 2020 amendments should, on procedural grounds, be repealed unconditionally and in their entirety. The scale of any shift in the balance of powers in favour of parliament, however, is likely to become the subject of intense political struggle.

Survey data suggest that preferences for a ‘strong leader’ in Russia are higher than in countries with a long democratic tradition, yet broadly comparable to those observed in many developing states, as can be seen from the World Values Survey data. These preferences reflect low levels of trust in horizontal associations and limited experience of interaction within them. They are not an expression of any ‘genetic code’, but rather an attribute of a particular stage of social development.

Government accountability is a key issue in the balance of power between the two branches. Russian super-presidentialism developed in large part as a projection of presidential authority over the government, enabling it to become a direct extension and integral component of an expanded presidential office. Such an arrangement is characteristic of fully presidential systems, yet in those systems the president does not possess the power to dissolve parliament. The combination of presidentialist elements, the transformation of the government into a subdivision of the presidential office, with semi-presidential features, notably the right to dissolve parliament, led to the mutation of the latter into super-presidentialism.

One of the key elements of the reform should, therefore, be the creation of a system in which the cabinet is at least as accountable to parliament as it is to the president, while retaining a degree of autonomy reflecting this dual accountability. Parliament, in turn, must be equipped with effective instruments for forming and overseeing the government. In this way, the model of presidential-parliamentary dualism would be transformed into a tripartite system of parliament, government and president.

More broadly, correction of the presidential bias of the constitutional structure may be achieved through:

— reducing the president's constitutional powers, primarily the right to chair cabinet meetings and certain other prerogatives (a detailed list of problematic presidential powers is set out in ‘Appendix 3 Legislation for the Future of Russia: Drafts and Explanatory Notes’ of the ‘Transit Project: Roadmap for the Democratisation of Russia’);

— expanding the State Duma’s powers in appointing the prime minister and key cabinet ministers (security, finance, foreign affairs), as well as in dismissing them and exercising comprehensive oversight of the government’s activities;

— narrowing the president's powers to call new parliamentary elections (under the model proposed by ‘Transit Project’, the prime minister may either be a representative of the parliamentary majority or a compromise figure nominated by the president and approved by a majority in the State Duma. Dissolution of the Duma would occur only if it proves impossible to appoint a prime minister under either procedure, see the aforementioned ‘Appendix 3. Legislation of the Future Russia’);

— limiting the executive powers of the presidency through the functional decentralisation of the ‘security bloc’ and the law enforcement system, alongside the restoration of the political weight and functional role of the Federation Council.

The Federation Council should become a further key participant in what would then be a ‘federal quartet’, strengthening the horizontal decentralisation of federal authority and increasing the potential number of veto players. Under the Russian Constitution, the Federation Council is vested with significant powers in shaping and overseeing the law enforcement system and, at the same time, may carry considerable weight as the institutional expression of the federal dimension of Russian democracy. Its role should be enhanced so that the upper chamber is capable of acting as a counterweight to both the presidency and the State Duma.

The Federation Council: completing the architecture of representative authority

Today, more than half of the Federation Council is composed of authorised representatives of the executive branch. Yet it is vested with exclusive competence to approve the Prosecutor General, as well as the judges and chairpersons of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. In practice, this means that all these key positions within the law enforcement and judicial system fall under the direct influence of the presidential office. The largely nominal character of the Federation Council also impedes the development of federalism. The regions lack an effective forum in which their concerns might be elevated to the national agenda, and territorial interests are unable to be articulated not merely by individual delegates but through party-structured senate groups.

What might be termed a ‘democratic consensus’ today holds that members of the Federation Council should be elected through direct, competitive elections by the residents of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. This principle should, in all likelihood, be enshrined explicitly in the Constitution. The current wording is deliberately ambiguous, and the scope for divergent interpretations risks perpetuating uncertainty surrounding the status of the chamber. The election of Federation Council members would restore to it a substantive role in the legislative process, in the formation of the judiciary and the прокуратура, and would strengthen the Federal Assembly as a whole, the representative branch of government, by creating additional constraints and oversight procedures for the executive.

Theoretically, in a stable competitive system of regional governance, one might envisage a model in which the upper chamber is composed of representatives of the authorities of the constituent entities, as in the German Bundesrat. However, the number and relative weight of Russia’s regions must be taken into account. A significant proportion of the more than 80 regions are economically non-viable, a factor that would reinforce their dependence on the federal executive. Fiscal paternalism would once again become a lever of influence within the upper chamber. Under the current configuration of the federation, such a mechanism appears dysfunctional.

The specific design of elections to the Federation Council should be the subject of detailed expert work and serious political debate. Two issues merit particular attention. First, to secure more balanced representation, elections might be conducted in two-member constituencies using the single non-transferable vote system, with the two mandates allocated to the candidates receiving the highest number of votes in each constituency. Under such an arrangement, senators from a given region would be more likely to represent two competing parties, and thus, taken together, reflect the real majority of that region’s electorate.

The second problem associated with the formation of the upper chamber will become increasingly acute as its political role grows. Russia has never really functioned as a federation. Its administrative and territorial structure was formed within a unitary state and subsequently elevated, in largely formal terms, to federal status. One consequence is extreme asymmetry among the constituent entities. Population size ranges from 40,000 to 50,000 in the Chukotka and Nenets autonomous districts and 134,000 in the Magadan region, to 13.1 million (according to official data) in Moscow, i.e. a difference of 100-fold or more. These are not marginal cases but reflect a systemic imbalance. Under the current system of representation, the 17 most populous regions, home to more than 50% of the country’s population, approximately 73.5 million people, account for only 20% of the seats in the chamber. By contrast, half of the least populous regions, which occupy half of the seats in the Federation Council, are home to only 20% of the population. Citizens in the latter group are thus represented with a coefficient of 2.5, while those in the former are represented with a coefficient of 0.4. The disparity is substantial.

This imbalance is a political problem. The most overrepresented territories are sparsely populated regions, while the most underrepresented are major urban centres with the highest population density and the greatest concentration of the country’s human and economic capital. The chamber would inevitably contain a majority representing economically weaker and more conservative territories, likely to advance demands for expanded redistribution and to align with a federal government interested in maximising its redistributive powers. As genuine democracy is restored and the Federation Council acquires real political weight, this asymmetry may become a source of increasingly acute conflict.

One solution to the problem could be to follow the model of the German Bundesrat, where the representation of the states reflects population size. Representation in the Federation Council could be determined by a special formula partially accommodating vast demographic disparities. For example, one mandate per 1 million residents plus one additional mandate per region, with a minimum of two mandates per constituent entity. Under such a formula, Moscow would receive 14 seats in the upper chamber, 13 million residents plus one mandate, while Magadan Oblast, with 134,000 residents, would receive two. In this scenario, the same 17 most populous regions, comprising 50% of the population, would hold approximately 38% of the seats, while half of the least populous regions, home to 20% of the population, would hold around 35%. Alternatively, a different formula could be adopted, provided that the 17 largest regions, representing 50% of the population, hold more than one third of the seats in the chamber.

Vertical decentralisation: a three-tier ‘new federalism’

The design of federations worldwide varies even more widely than that of democracies and is shaped by historical, geographical, demographic and political conditions. The search for a balance of interests, rights and responsibilities among constituent entities is typically a long and evolutionary process.

The administrative-territorial units of the Russian Federation, as noted above, were formed within a unitary state and subsequently elevated in largely mechanical fashion to the status of ‘subjects’ of a federation. As a result, Russia has the largest number of constituent entities of any federation in the world (by comparison, the United States is in second place, with 51 states and a population approximately 2.3 times larger than that of Russia). At the same time, during successive episodes of political confrontation at the federal level, both sides were typically interested in securing the loyalty of regional authorities. This dynamic impeded the development of a more pragmatic debate on the structural problems of Russian federalism.

In the 1990s, the cornerstone of Russian federalism was the direct election of regional heads, who were then co-opted into the upper chamber of parliament. This arrangement strengthened the lobbying capacity of the regions but weakened citizen oversight of both regional and federal authorities, transforming the upper chamber into a ‘chamber of barons’. Such a model did not so much expand regional rights as institutionalise a lobbying framework in centre-region relations and a paternalistic political order within the regions themselves. The conceptual framework of a new federalism has been less developed in projects for an alternative democratic Russia than proposals concerning reform of federal institutions. Nevertheless, expert discussions have yielded a substantively new understanding, distinct from that of the 1990s. Decentralisation of the ‘power vertical’ should be understood not merely as federalisation in the narrow sense, that is, a division of authority between two levels, federal and regional, but rather as a three-tier distribution of power among federal, regional and municipal levels. Such a construction would help prevent the ‘feudalisation’ of the country along the lines observed in the 1990s and should form the basis of a renewed model of vertical democracy. It is worth noting that, despite the systematic hollowing out of federalism during the 2000s and 2010s, regional identities gradually consolidated as a political phenomenon. There is now a tangible demand for the development of both federalism and local self-government.

The essential elements of a three-tier model should be (1) a clear delineation of the exclusive competences of each level, (2) guarantees of autonomy in exercising those competences, (3) securing sources of budget revenue for the exercise of these powers, including defined shares of tax receipts, and finally (4) expanded rights for regions and municipalities to conduct fiscal manoeuvre within a framework of budgetary federalism. The triad of executive authority, fiscal authority and revenue sources should be regarded as the foundation of the new federalism. The allocation of the tax base, insofar as it ensures the effective autonomy of the three levels of government, might in some form be reflected in the Constitution. Detailed elaboration of such a model would require careful expert deliberation.

An important component of developing new federalism at the regional and municipal levels would be the introduction of instruments of direct democracy, notably binding citizen consultations on matters falling within their exclusive competences. In the long term, such a system should become mandatory for decision-making on certain issues.

Despite vast disparities among regions in population size and economic capacity, experience suggests that strategies aimed at amalgamating constituent entities encounter substantial resistance at the local level. In the context of reform, raising this issue risks opening a second front in an already complex political struggle. A more pragmatic solution would allow the law to provide for the creation by constituent entities of joint governments and consolidated budgets, procedurally through the establishment of functionally integrated territories on the basis of fixed-term agreements without formal merger, alongside incentives to encourage such integration. Larger and economically self-sufficient entities might claim a broader scope of competences, while a high volume of transfers from the federal budget could justify enhanced oversight by the centre, potentially extending to the approval of a regional prime minister and finance minister in agreement with the federal government.

Excluding the three super-rich autonomous districts (Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets and Khanty-Mansi), the disparity in per capita gross regional product between the top and bottom deciles of Russia’s constituent entities amounts to a factor of 7.7. Such regional economic inequality necessitates the development of equalisation mechanisms designed to raise budgetary provision at least to the median level. The mechanism and sources of transfers should be specified in law, and their volume determined on a per capita basis, taking into account the needs of both regional and municipal levels. In other words, transfers should be structured from the outset so that they are allocated between the regional government and municipalities.

Particular attention must be given to the status of urban agglomerations within the structure of municipal and regional governance. Russian regions are typically organised around the capital of the constituent entity, where the principal economic potential and a substantial share of the population are concentrated. On average, around 40% of a region’s population resides in its capital city, and the trend towards further concentration in metropolitan agglomerations continues. This dynamic confers a special status on regional capitals and generates persistent tensions between the authorities of the federal subject and its capital.

In total, 92 Russian cities have populations exceeding 200,000; together they are home to approximately 48 million citizens, or 33% of the country’s population, excluding Moscow and St Petersburg, which are separate constituent entities. In substantive terms, these urban agglomerations, which concentrate the country’s principal modernising potential and often surpass many regions in both demographic and economic weight, effectively constitute an additional level of governance. These realities should be taken into account when determining the competences and internal organisation of urban agglomerations, most of which would likely require a three-tier structure of governance, comprising city-wide, district and territorial levels. It is within urban agglomerations that the principal potential of a three-tier federal model appears to be concentrated.

Decentralisation of power resources: distributed control and accountability of the law enforcement system

One of the central problems of contemporary Russia, and a manifestation of the degradation of its political system, is the capture of the law enforcement apparatus and its use in the interests of a narrow coalition of regime beneficiaries and their client networks. This has been facilitated, inter alia, by the extension of the ‘power vertical’’ to the law enforcement system, the absence of external public oversight of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the deliberate indeterminacy of legislative norms and the subordination of the judiciary to executive dominance. Distributed control over the system of state coercion is a fundamental element of decentralising authority and restoring normal constitutional order. Several institutional mechanisms and design choices should contribute to this.

First, the law enforcement system should be decentralised and functionally divided among three levels of government responsible for organisation and oversight respectively: (1) municipal police (at the level of the municipal district), (2) regional investigation and law enforcement services (at the regional level), and (3) federal investigative bodies, a national guard, and a bureau for investigating crimes against the state. The precise allocation of competences and responsibilities at each level should be the subject of detailed expert elaboration, drawing on comparative international experience.

While the appointment and dismissal of heads of regional and municipal law enforcement units should remain the prerogative of the representative bodies at the corresponding level, it is equally essential to establish a robust system of external oversight over their activities, both at the federal and regional levels. The protection of citizens’ constitutional rights and freedoms should become a central task of the federal prosecution service, thereby ensuring the unity of the legal framework.

A second necessary element of a distributed coercive apparatus is the establishment of a strong system of public oversight over law enforcement agencies. Commissions for public monitoring of the police and the penitentiary system should be created at all three levels of government under the corresponding representative bodies. These commissions should not serve as the same body responsible for nominating candidates for leadership positions in law enforcement agencies. On the contrary, they should have a distinct status and include representatives of various political parties as well as civil-society organisations recognised as official commission members. Reports and recommendations of these commissions should be mandatory for consideration at plenary sessions of the relevant governing body and subject to public publication. Commissions should also have the authority to commission independent investigations and the resources necessary to carry them out. It may also be reasonable to establish the position of an ombudsman for torture and unlawful violence by law enforcement officers, including with respect to detainees and prisoners (whether suspected or convicted).

Finally, following the example of many countries, there should be the creation of a specialised anti-corruption and inspection authority, with a mandate to investigate misconduct within law enforcement bodies and the broader justice system, including the prosecution service and courts. Substantial international experience exists in this area, and it should serve as the starting point for developing concrete institutional solutions.

The struggle for competition

Of course, this is far from an exhaustive list of issues that will confront Russian society in the process of advanced democratisation after emerging from a state of abnormality. However, debate over these issues will be shaped not only, or even primarily, by expert discourse, but above all by the pressures of a competitive political environment, which is the foundation of democratic order and whose protection remains the principal concern of any democratic society.

The institutional forms for ensuring such protection merit separate discussion and will evolve continuously as new threats arise (it should be noted that conceptual questions concerning the choice of electoral systems, changes to election law, and post-authoritarian transitions in political competition have been examined in detail in the works of Arkady Lyubarev and a number of other authors).

One of the main and most systemic threats to political competition, as noted earlier, will be the excessive concentration of capital and ownership in the Russian economy. Advanced democratisation and fair rules of market competition are deeply interconnected. This will inevitably provoke prolonged struggles both in the spheres of economic and regulatory policy and in electoral and party legislation. Early steps are likely to include the adoption of legislation on lobbying and the forms of business participation in political life. It should be noted, however, that stricter regulation does not always achieve its intended effect. As is well known, the rigidity of laws may be offset by lax enforcement. A more effective approach may be a relatively liberal regulatory framework combined with a strict system of penalties for violations.

Widespread digitalisation and networked communications are radically transforming the information and media environment. This will require a largely new set of rules and laws governing access to the global network and its limited regulation. Finally, the issue of ensuring the integrity of election results, once a certain level of political competition is reached, may be reliably addressed through blockchain and digital technologies.

Yet, as historical experience and contemporary events show, no norms or institutions can provide an absolute guarantee against the erosion of democratic principles. These principles must remain the concern and responsibility of a broad, cross-party public coalition. In this sense, competition ends where the struggle over its rules ends.